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INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF TWO WOMEN 
In 1985, Gertrude Thomas sought Social Security survivors’ 
benefits as Joseph Thomas’s widow. Gertrude had been married to 
Joseph—or thought herself to have been—for forty-seven years. She 
bore and raised ten children over the course of their marriage. 
Gertrude knew Joseph had been married briefly before they wed, but 
she thought that his first marriage had ended in divorce. When the 
Department of Health and Human Services asked Gertrude for proof 
of her marriage to Joseph, she could not produce a marriage certificate 
or any other record of her marriage. She did have a statement signed 
by Joseph acknowledging their marriage. She also claimed that she 
and Joseph were “common law” spouses—that they agreed to be 
married and held themselves out as a married couple. But when Josie, 
the first wife, also applied for survivors’ benefits as Joseph’s widow, 
the agency found that Josie, not Gertrude, had been Joseph’s wife for 
those many years, and it denied Gertrude’s application.1 In a 1990 
Second Circuit opinion affirming the agency’s determination, a 
 
 1. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 922 F.2d 132, 134, 135, 138 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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concurring judge lamented that “[i]t seems unconscionable to me that 
this seventy-four year old widow who lived with Joseph Thomas for 
forty-seven years and bore ten of his children is now to be branded an 
adulteress.”2 
In 1837, Thankful Reynolds of Waldo County, Maine, applied 
for a pension under a federal statute that provided for widows of 
Revolutionary War veterans.3 Thankful was—or thought herself to 
be—the widow of Daniel Reynolds. Daniel had served in the 
Revolutionary War. He did not die in service. Rather, he died many 
decades later, in 1832, at seventy-two years of age. Thankful was 
seventy-eight when she applied for a pension under a federal statute 
enacted in 1836—one of over ninety public law statutes Congress 
enacted during the early nineteenth century creating and regulating 
cash and land subsidies for large classes of military widows.4 Like the 
tens of thousands of other widows seeking such subsidies, Thankful 
was required to prove that Daniel had served in the military and that 
she was, in fact, his widow. Proof of Daniel’s service posed no problem 
for Thankful, but proving that she had been married to Daniel was 
another issue altogether. Thankful testified in a sworn, certified 
declaration that she was Daniel’s widow. Seven neighbors testified in 
sworn, certified declarations that Thankful and Daniel had lived 
together as husband and wife and had been generally reputed to be 
such. But the clerks working in the Pension Office in Washington, 
D.C., were underwhelmed by Thankful’s offers of proof. They wanted 
official record evidence of her marriage to Daniel. This demand asked 
the near impossible of Thankful, as she had married during a period 
when few municipalities had mandatory registration requirements. 
The Pension Office denied Thankful’s application.5 
 
 2. Id. at 139 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring). 
 3. File of Thankful Reynolds, Nat’l Archives & Records Administration, Washington, D.C., 
(“NARA”) Records of the Dep’t of Veterans’ Affairs, Record Group (“RG”) 15, W1118, microformed 
on RECORDS OF THE VETERANS’ ADMINISTRATION, REVOLUTIONARY WAR PENSION AND BOUNTY 
LAND APPLICATION FILES, 1800–1900 (1974), Series M804, Roll 2026. Many of the widows’ 
subsidy applications cited in this Article are available in microfilm Series M804. All citations to 
microfilmed applications include the unique index number assigned by the Pension Office (e.g., 
W1234 or R5678) and the microfilm roll number (e.g., Roll 1145). For additional information 
regarding the widows’ subsidy application files, see infra note 26. 
 4. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 362, § 3, 5 Stat. 127, 127–28 (creating pensions for widows of 
veterans of the Revolutionary War); see also sources cited infra notes 47–62 and accompanying 
text. 
 5. For facts regarding Thankful Reynolds’s pension application, date of marriage, 
husband’s service, and husband’s death, see File of Thankful Reynolds, W11118, Roll 2026, Decl. 
of Thankful Reynolds (Oct. 14, 1837). For evidence of Thankful Reynolds’s struggle with the 
Pension Office, see id., Letter from Geo[rge] W. M[orton] to J.L. Edwards, Comm’r of Pensions 
(Feb. 13, 1838); id., Letter from J.L. Edwards to Hon. Ruel Williams (Apr. 23, 1840). For 
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* * * * 
 
A significant literature has emerged demonstrating how 
marriage is employed—for better or worse, successfully or 
unsuccessfully—as an antidote for women’s poverty and as a 
substitute for social provision.6 These accounts describe how the 
liberal state promotes the private family as the primary and 
normatively appropriate site for the support of women as family 
dependents and leans on marriage as a cure for women’s poverty.7 
Reliance on the private family as a site of support for women is also 
claimed to shape the contours of the legally recognized family itself. 
Legal officials support marriage promotion policies and give official 
recognition to marriage-like relationships in order to bring women 
within the protective fold of a relationship that, once recognized in 
law, gives them a claim on a husband or would-be husband’s financial 
resources.8 In so doing, such policies theoretically limit the need for 
government assistance by “privatizing” women’s dependency within 
the marital relationship.9 While most accounts of this phenomenon 
focus on modern welfare policy, important historical investigations of 
 
neighbors’ testimony, see id., Decl. of Bunker Carter (Oct. 2, 1837); id., Decl. of Hannah Peck 
(Aug. 5, 1837); id., Decl. of Olive Smith (Dec. 13, 1838); id., Decl. of Stephen Bartlett (Mar. 28, 
1840); id., Decl. of Hezekiah Chase (Mar. 28, 1840); id., Decl. of Daniel Whitmore (Mar. 28, 
1840); id., Decl. of Elisha Douglas (May 7, 1840). For more details concerning Thankful 
Reynolds’s pursuit of a pension, see infra notes 209–11 and accompanying text. 
 6. The term “social provision” simply refers to goods, services, or cash benefits provided by 
the government to individual citizens for their welfare. For a sample of literature arguing that 
the liberal state relies on the institution of marriage to insulate the polity from the costs 
associated with familial dependency, see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED 
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES 106–18 (1995); 
Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and 
Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1267–70 (2001); 
Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of Dependency, 
13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 415, 442–48 (2005); Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking 
Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2204–06 (1995); Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-
Bellum Control, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1647, 1673–82 (2005); cf. Katherine Boo, The Marriage Cure, 
NEW YORKER, Aug. 18, 2003, at 105. 
 7. See, e.g., Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 6, at 1664 (discussing federal programs that 
“blindly promote marriage as a means of eliminating state financial responsibility for poor 
women and children”); Boo, supra note 6, at 105 (describing an Oklahoma program promoting 
marriage to single welfare mothers as a way to alleviate poverty). 
 8.  See infra notes 301–03 and accompanying text. 
 9. In this context, “privatization” refers to the restriction of government provision for 
families and the concomitant maintenance of family dependents—those who do not participate in 
the market economy and hence are unable to support themselves—by private individuals, 
usually (but not always) a husband or father. See Cossman, supra note 6, at 416–18 (discussing 
the privatization of dependency in American family law and welfare policy). 
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the development of marriage law have traced this relationship 
between welfare policy and the legal form of the family to the early 
nineteenth century. At that time, judges employed a liberal approach 
to marriage recognition—through both generous evidentiary 
standards and recognition of informal, or “common law,” marriage—in 
part to secure marriage’s promises of financial support for women.10 
Whether focusing on the experiences of women past or present, 
investigations of how marriage is legally constructed in relation to 
welfare policy tend not to contemplate the experiences of women like 
Gertrude Thomas and Thankful Reynolds—women who seek social 
provision on the basis of their marital status. Rather, such 
investigations tend to focus on the ways that marriage and marriage-
like relationships are enlisted to effectively exclude women from need-
based social provision by attaching them to a male provider.11 But 
myriad forms of social provision use marriage as a basis for eligibility 
rather than as a basis for de facto exclusion, a point that is 
underscored today by the efforts of gay rights activists to secure 
various marriage-based entitlements for same-sex couples.12 Indeed, a 
holistic view of centralized social provision in the United States 
reveals that, in many circumstances, a woman’s formal marital 
relationship with a man gives her a special claim on the polity for 
support.13 Today, the number of women in the United States who 
 
 10. Ariela Dubler has provided rich analyses of this phenomenon. See Ariela R. Dubler, In 
the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 
112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1656–59 (2003) [hereinafter Dubler, Shadow]; Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely 
Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 967–74 (2000) [hereinafter 
Dubler, Wifely Behavior]; Ariela R. Dubler, Note, Governing Through Contract: Common Law 
Marriage in the Nineteenth Century, 107 YALE L.J. 1885 (1998) [hereinafter Dubler, Governing]; 
see also MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 69–75 (1985) (describing the judicial creation of common law marriage in the 
early nineteenth century); Nancy F. Cott, Giving Character to Our Whole Civil Polity: Marriage 
and the Public Order in the Late Nineteenth Century, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN’S HISTORY: 
NEW FEMINIST ESSAYS 107, 116 (Linda K. Kerber, Alice Kessler-Harris & Kathryn Kish Sklar 
eds., 1995) [hereinafter U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN’S HISTORY] (describing nineteenth-century 
judicial opinions “which seemed to grant great latitude to individuals to contract marriage”). 
 11. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 6, at 1270 (observing that “the trend has been to 
privatize economic obligations, that is, to substitute property division and family support 
obligations for public social security[,] . . . ultimately pav[ing] the way for uniform inclusion of all 
cohabiting couples, whether formally married or not”); Cossman, supra note 6, at 465 (discussing 
welfare reform efforts through which “the federal government has . . . . sought to reduce the rates 
of single motherhood by reducing out-of-wedlock births and promoting marriage”); see also 
sources infra notes 301–03 and accompanying text. 
 12.  See infra text accompanying notes 307–09. 
 13. The most obvious modern example is the Social Security Act, which provides insurance 
benefits to the spouses, widows, and widowers of “insured individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2006). 
Due to the requirements of modern equal protection doctrine, marriage now gives men a claim to 
social provision such as Social Security on the basis of their status as husbands or widowers. See 
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receive some sort of social provision based on their marital status (i.e., 
as wives or widows)14 is several times that of the number of women 
who receive purely need-based assistance.15 The relationship between 
welfare policy and the legal construction of marriage in such a 
context—where public marriage-based entitlements have been at 
stake—also has a history.16 Using archival sources, this Article 
investigates the origins of public marriage-based entitlements and, 
more specifically, considers how the use of marriage as a basis for 
eligibility for social provision has shaped the legal metes and bounds 
of marriage itself. 
 
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 204 (1977) (invalidating the Social Security Act’s requirement 
that widowers but not widows prove dependency in order to receive spousal survivor benefits). 
Nevertheless, it is appropriate to discuss modern marriage-based entitlements in terms of 
women’s claims on the polity because such entitlements continue to function in a gender-salient 
manner. Today, only two percent of individuals receiving Social Security as spouses are men. See 
Social Security Benefits for Economically Vulnerable Beneficiaries: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Social Security of the H. Ways and Means Comm., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Joan 
Entmacher, Vice President and Director of Family Economic Security, National Women’s Law 
Center). For a discussion of Social Security as a form of social provision, see infra note 298 and 
accompanying text. 
 14. Throughout this Article, I use the term “marital status” to include what might seem to 
be more accurately described as “former marital status” or “widowhood.” I do so for two reasons. 
First, generally speaking, the phrase “marital status” refers not only to whether one is currently 
married or unmarried, but instead distinguishes between the ever-married and the never-
married. Hence, “marital status” also typically encompasses the categories “divorced” and 
“widowed.” Second, I do not use the term “widowhood” in place of “marital status” because that 
phrase took on special meaning in the context of early nineteenth-century widows’ military 
subsidies: Women were required to prove both the legitimacy of their marriages to their deceased 
husbands and their continuing widowhood. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 15. Compare U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF POLICY, OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS, AND 
DISABILITY INSURANCE, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT tbl.5.A7 (2007), http://www. 
ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2007/5a.html#table5.a7 (finding that approximately 
seven million women received Social Security benefits as widows or wives in 2006), with U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, CHARACTERISTICS AND 
FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF TANF RECIPIENTS tbl.20 (2005), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/ character/FY2005/tab20.htm (finding that approximately 
one million women received TANF benefits in 2004–2005). 
 16. Legal historians have provided searching analyses of the private law doctrines that 
developed to provide for a married woman both during marriage and at her husband’s death, see, 
e.g., sources cited supra note 10, and historians of social policy have attended to the development 
of programmatic provision for women in the early twentieth century. See generally MIMI 
ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL 
TIMES TO THE PRESENT 181–213 (1996); LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE 
MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890–1935, at 37–64 (1994); SUZANNE METTLER, 
DIVIDING CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL PUBLIC POLICY (1998); THEDA 
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN 
THE UNITED STATES 427–524 (1992); Barbara J. Nelson, The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare 
State: Workmen’s Compensation and Mother’s Aid, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 123, 138 
(Linda Gordon ed., 1990). However, it appears that little sustained attention has been given to 
the earliest origins of centralized public marriage-based entitlements per se and the relationship 
of those entitlements to the legal definition of marriage. 
1B. Collins_PAGE 6/15/2009 12:33:42 PM 
2009] ADMINISTERING MARRIAGE 1091 
Marriage-based entitlements are generally thought of as a 
fairly modern phenomenon—a product of the development of 
America’s peculiar and relatively limited welfare state in the early 
twentieth century. Traditional accounts of the origins of social 
provision in the United States identify the 1939 Social Security Act,17 
or perhaps the Mothers’ Aid statutes of the Progressive Era, 18 as the 
earliest forms of social provision specifically intended for women.19 
Following Theda Skocpol’s seminal work on the Civil War pension 
system, some might contend that cash assistance for Civil War widows 
was the first systematic social provision for women.20 My first task, 
undertaken in Part I, is to reconsider these chronological accounts, 
with specific attention to the central role of marriage law in the 
development of social provision for women in the United States. I do 
so by providing the first thorough analysis of a significant early 
nineteenth-century system of cash and land subsidies for the widows 
of men who participated in all manner of military endeavors on behalf 
of the United States, from the Revolutionary War through the 
Mexican-American War.21 Surprisingly, these federal widows’ military 
subsidies—the first broad-scale marriage-based entitlements in 
American law and policy—have gone virtually unacknowledged in the 
history of welfare policy and the legal construction of the family, 
notwithstanding their importance as a source of financial support for 
tens of thousands of women in the early nineteenth century.22 
 
 17. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360. For a wonderfully rich 
examination of the deliberations leading to the enactment of the 1939 Act, see Alice Kessler-
Harris, Designing Women and Old Fools: The Construction of the Social Security Amendments of 
1939, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN’S HISTORY, supra note 10, at 87. 
 18. Mothers’ Aid—cash assistance for poor mothers—emerged in a flurry of state legislation 
during the first two decades of the twentieth century. In most states Mothers’ Aid statutes 
tended to benefit widows and deserted wives with children, rather than never-married mothers. 
See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 16, at 201 (noting that “eligibility rules distinguished among women 
according to their marital status and denied aid to other husbandless women viewed as 
departing from prescribed wife and mother roles”). 
 19.  See sources cited supra note 16. 
 20. See SKOCPOL, supra note 16, at 132. 
 21. See infra Part I.A. 
 22. Without particular attention to their historical significance as marriage-based 
entitlements, I analyze the pre-Civil War widows’ military pensions as an example of early 
federal family law policy in Federalism’s Fallacy: Early Federal Family Law and the Invention of 
States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1784–1808 (2005). Linda Kerber examines women’s 
Revolutionary era petitions for private relief in WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND 
IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 93–94 (1980), but does not examine the public law 
statutes that were enacted throughout the pre-Civil War period, which are the focus of this 
Article. Both Laura Jensen and John Resch provide important analyses of early nineteenth-
century veterans’ military subsidies, but neither gives significant attention to widows’ subsidies. 
See LAURA JENSEN, PATRIOTS, SETTLERS, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY (2003); 
JOHN RESCH, SUFFERING SOLDIERS: REVOLUTIONARY WAR VETERANS, MORAL SENTIMENT, AND 
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The story of early nineteenth-century widows’ military 
subsidies not only gives new challenge to lingering claims of laissez-
faire liberalism’s particular hold on the nineteenth century,23 it also 
provides a fresh perspective on the socio-legal evolution of marriage. 
As the first broad-scale system of public marriage-based entitlements, 
widows’ military subsidies marked an important development in 
marriage’s legal significance, both for women and for the state. 
Although marriage had traditionally functioned to secure certain 
forms of material support for women through various private law 
liabilities—such as the husband’s obligation to support his wife and 
children and the widow’s right to dower24—widows’ military subsidies 
used marriage as a basis for broad-scale public law liability for 
women’s support.25 In so doing, women’s military subsidies gave the 
 
POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1999); John Resch, Federal Welfare for 
Revolutionary War Veterans, 56 SOC. SERV. REV. 173 (1982). Lori Beth Finklestein’s unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Matrons of the Nation: Old Women, Younger Men, and the Pursuit of 
Revolutionary War Pensions for Widows in Nineteenth-Century America (N.Y.U. History 
Department, 2003), analyzes Revolutionary War widows’ pension applications for evidence of 
intergenerational relationships between elderly widows and their younger male pension agents 
but does not focus on the pensions’ significance as social provision or as marriage-based 
entitlements. In contrast, there is a significant literature concerning Civil War widows’ pensions. 
See, e.g., ELIZABETH REGOSIN, FREEDOM’S PROMISE: EX-SLAVE FAMILIES AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE 
AGE OF EMANCIPATION (2002); SKOCPOL, supra note 16, at 129, 132, 139; Katherine M. Franke, 
Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L 
& HUMAN. 251 (1999); Amy E. Holmes, “Such Is the Price We Pay”: American Widows and the 
Civil War Pension System, in TOWARD A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 171 (Maris 
A. Vinovskis ed., 1990); Megan J. McClintock, Civil War Pensions and the Reconstruction of 
Union Families, 83 J. AM. HIST. 456 (1996); Beverly Schwartzberg, “Lots of Them Did That”: 
Desertion, Bigamy, and Marital Fluidity in Late-Nineteenth-Century America, 37 J. SOC. HIST. 
573 (2004). 
 23. Such claims are, indeed, only lingering in light of the contributions of historians who 
have reconstructed various aspects of antebellum regulation. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE 
PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996) (analyzing 
the regulation of health, safety, morality, and welfare in the nineteenth century); Richard R. 
John, Governmental Institutions as Agents of Change: Rethinking American Political 
Development in the Early Republic, 1787–1835, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 347, 368–73 (1997) 
(describing the new “institutionalist” accounts of the early republic’s government, its polity, and 
political developments); sources cited infra note 125.  
 24. See infra Part I.B. 
 25. Throughout this Article, I use the term “private law” to refer to those laws that created 
or allocated liabilities and legal duties among and between individuals, and “public law” to refer 
to those laws that created legal liabilities or duties between the individual and the state. See Ralf 
Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, 
Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 849 (2006) (noting that in certain contexts, “private law” is 
used to describe relations between private parties, while “public law” describes “relations that 
include the state in its role of sovereign”). I do so not because those are the only or even best 
understandings of those terms generally, but because they are the understandings that best 
convey the shift in the legal implication of marriage that I seek to describe in this Article. By 
asserting that widows’ military subsidies created a new form of public law liability, I do not 
suggest that marriage was not already a public legal status in many respects, only that those 
respects did not generally include the creation of a legal claim against the state for material 
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polity a different financial stake in the regulation of marriage: 
whereas before, marriage had largely worked to insulate the polity 
from women’s claims of financial need, with the creation of marriage-
based entitlements, marriage could also serve as a doorway to public 
support. 
My second task is to consider how this development—the 
creation of a significant redistributive system that tied eligibility for 
social provision to marital status—helped to shape the legal 
construction of marriage itself, a project I undertake in Part II. 
Through the careful examination of over 300 randomly selected 
handwritten widows’ military subsidy applications, I explore an 
unexamined world of early nineteenth-century family law 
adjudication.26 Accounts of regulation of the marital family in the 
early nineteenth century have focused on the judicial construction of 
marriage.27 Empowered by their offices and the common law method, 
judges developed a broad legal definition of marriage during the 
period, thereby reaffirming the private family, rather than the state, 
as the proper source of financial support for women—privatizing 
women’s dependency, in modern parlance.28 
But the tens of thousands of women who sought military 
subsidies were required to prove their marital status and their 
ongoing widowhood not in the courts, but through a surprisingly 
formalized federal administrative process—a point that is itself 
notable in an era reputed for its anemic administrative apparatus.29 
Unlike judges, the low-level pension clerks charged with the review of 
military subsidy applications showed extreme skepticism of women’s 
claims of marital status, even when those claims were based on 
assertions of fact that would have satisfied a judicial definition of 
marriage.30 Saddled with the responsibility of allocating government 
 
support based on marital status. For a rich, historically based description of the public 
dimensions of marriage, see NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE 
NATION (2000). 
 26. My study of widows’ subsidy applications has entailed review of over 300 randomly 
selected handwritten military subsidy applications from the pre-Civil War period, out of over 
50,000 applications filed by widows during that period. See infra note 63. Individual applications 
range in length from about twenty to seventy pages. All extant widows’ military subsidy 
applications from that period are housed in the National Archives in Washington, D.C., as part 
of the Records of the Department of Veterans’ Administration, Record Group (“RG”) 15. All 
transcriptions are my own, as are any transcription errors. 
 27. See infra Part II.A. 
 28. See Dubler, Wifely Behavior, supra note 10, at 969 (“The doctrine of common law 
marriage provided judges with a way to privatize the financial dependency of economically 
unstable plaintiffs.”). 
 29. See infra Part II.B.1; see also infra note 125. 
 30. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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assets and protecting those assets from unfounded and fraudulent 
claims, pension clerks ruthlessly questioned women’s assertions of 
marital status, developing a bureaucratized definition of marriage. In 
so doing, these administrators introduced a restrictive, state-centered 
construction of marriage during a period otherwise known for its 
generous, community-based definition of legal marriage. But despite 
the divergence in their legal conceptions of marriage, judges’ and 
administrators’ disparate definitions were fiscally and ideologically 
consistent: in their respective contexts, both limited the state’s 
responsibility for women’s financial needs. 
My goal in examining the operation of marriage law in early 
nineteenth-century administrative adjudication is not to challenge the 
general account of the evolution of the legal regulation of marriage in 
nineteenth-century courts. Rather, it is to expand our understanding 
of “the law” of marriage by shifting the institutional frame through 
which we assess the legal history of family law to include 
administrative law and process. The sources I examine show how 
family law, like other areas of law, had a life outside the courts—one 
that was subject to various ideological, institutional, and fiscal 
pressures.31 As I discuss in Part III, once we broaden our field of 
analysis to include administrative law and processes, we begin to see 
how divergent liability regimes, implemented by different legal 
officials, led to pluralism in early nineteenth-century marriage law: 
multiple definitions of marriage employed by legal actors operating in 
different institutional contexts. This was not pluralism with a 
liberatory potential. Rather, it was a pluralism that enabled the state 
to control marriage as a legal status and, with sensitivity to different 
redistributive incentive structures, protect the polity from women’s 
dependency. 
Legal history is important for what it tells us about the past, 
and because it provides critical perspective on the present. Hence, I 
 
 31. In recent years, the phrase “law outside the courts” has been employed frequently in 
reference to constitutional law, specifically to describe the view that the socio-legal meaning of 
the Constitution is not formed entirely or even primarily through judicial interpretation. See, 
e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). But 
the notion that law more generally is shaped and constituted by the actions and interpretive 
efforts of both official and unofficial actors operating in various legal and nonlegal contexts has a 
robust tradition—a tradition that is closely identified with the law and society movement. See, 
e.g., Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal Scholarship 
and Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21, 50 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 
1993) (explaining that “[c]onstitutive theories of law reject the instrumentalist picture of law as 
external to social practices and as displaceable by systems of norms and relations that exist 
beyond the reach of law”); see also infra Part III.B. 
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conclude in Part IV by considering how the study of early nineteenth-
century widows’ military subsidies illuminates modern debates 
concerning the nature of marriage as a legal institution, the 
interaction between marriage law and social provision, and the 
relationship between women and the state. It is undoubtedly true that 
today, marriage and legally recognized familial relationships function 
as tools for containing women’s dependency within the private 
family.32 But even (or especially) in the United States—with its 
relatively limited and conditional system of social safety nets—
marriage also serves to make certain forms of family dependency a 
basis for social provision.33 And today, as in the past, when marriage 
functions as a conduit for social provision, the state tends to 
emphasize marriage’s role as an instrument of social and legal closure. 
This point is demonstrated by the rather elaborate qualifications of 
the term “spouse” in the Social Security Act and is dramatically 
illustrated by the Defense of Marriage Act’s effective exclusion of 
same-sex couples from federal benefits.34 Accordingly, just as we 
should be attentive to how the state employs an expansive vision of 
the legally recognized family to limit public liability for women’s 
financial needs, we should also be sensitive to how the state reinforces 
marriage’s exclusionary dimensions when allocating social provision. 
In the hands of different legal officials, operating in different 
institutional contexts, the legal family transforms in response to 
pressures of various kinds—ideological, moral, institutional, and 
fiscal. The story of widows’ military subsidies, and their adjudication, 
thus undermines persistent claims today of marriage’s enduring and 
transhistorically stable form—claims that are used to justify 
continued exclusion of various groups from marriage’s many 
entitlements. 
I. WIDOWS’ MILITARY SUBSIDIES AND THE ORIGINS OF MARRIAGE-
BASED ENTITLEMENTS 
Thankful Reynolds’s pursuit of a widows’ pension was a 
common enough experience in the early nineteenth century, but one 
that is not easily situated within the conventional understanding that 
 
 32. See sources cited supra note 6 and infra notes 301–03. 
 33. See Madonna Harrington Meyer, Making Claims as Workers or Wives: The Distribution 
of Social Security Benefits, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 449, 451 (1996) (noting that the Social Security 
system “has a dual eligibility structure that permits older people to receive social security 
benefits as retired workers or as spouses or widows of retired workers”). 
 34. See infra Part IV. 
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government assistance during the period was by and large limited to 
local poor relief and almshouses.35 Reynolds’s story, and the stories of 
the tens of thousands of other women who applied for widows’ military 
subsidies in the early nineteenth century, have received little 
attention despite interest in the history of welfare policy, and in public 
and private law responses to the “feminization of poverty.”36 In this 
Part, I provide the first thorough accounting of these unfamiliar 
artifacts—the public laws enacted by Congress to provide for military 
widows—and argue that the military subsidy system that developed 
for widows in the early nineteenth century should be understood as an 
innovative form of social provision that has now become a 
commonplace fixture in American social policy: the marriage-based 
entitlement. The very existence of these entitlements challenges the 
chronological account that places the origins of centralized social 
provision for women in the early twentieth century. And, the focus of 
my inquiry here, accounting for these early nineteenth-century 
marriage-based entitlements reveals the central function of marriage 
law in the development of social provision and, at the same time, 
evidences an important expansion of the socio-legal significance of 
marriage. 
First, I describe the statutory evolution of pre-Civil War 
military subsidies for widows, demonstrating how they grew from a 
very limited subsidy for officers’ war widows into a government 
entitlement available to a substantial cross-section of women. Next, I 
examine how the evolution of widows’ military subsidies altered the 
legal significance of marriage itself. Specifically, I argue that these 
subsidies signified an important development in the redistributive 
effect of marriage: while marriage had mostly affected private 
liabilities (i.e., the transfer of private property and the creation of 
private law liabilities), now it could also result in a statutory public 
law claim on the federal coffers. Finally, drawing on the legislative 
history of widows’ military subsidies, I show how widows’ subsidy 
legislation functioned as a site of contest concerning the propriety of 
using marital status as a basis for redistributing public assets. 
 
 35. See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 16, at 75–100, 137–71 (describing the development and 
reform of the poor laws in colonial and early nineteenth-century America); WALTER I. TRATTNER, 
FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 47–71 (6th ed. 
1999) (examining the spread of poor laws in the post-revolutionary period). 
 36.  See sources cited supra notes 10, 16. 
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A. Recuperating Early Nineteenth-Century Widows’ Military Subsidies 
Over the course of the early nineteenth century, a public law 
military subsidy system blossomed, such that during the mid-1830s, 
the federal government regularly dedicated between ten and twenty 
percent of its total budget to military pensions.37 During the pre-Civil 
War period, the federal government also allocated nearly fifty million 
acres of public lands for military land bounties.38 The subsidies 
Congress granted to veterans and widows during this period were of a 
new scope and dimension, leading one early twentieth-century 
historian of the system to remark that “[i]n its grants for the reward 
and relief of soldiers the United States pension system has become 
more generous—even lavish—than that of any other nation in the 
history of the world.”39 
Recent scholarship has shed light on how this “lavish” system 
provided for an ever-expanding class of veterans in the early 
nineteenth century.40 But much of this system concerned the 
administration not of veterans’ claims to pensions and bounty lands, 
but of widows’ military subsidies. It is estimated that pensions paid to 
widows accounted for about a quarter of the approximately $90 million 
paid out under Revolutionary War pension statutes alone41—a tally 
that excludes pensions granted to the widows of men who served in 
other military encounters, such as the War of 1812, frontier battles, 
assorted naval encounters, and the Mexican-American War. An 1854 
guide to the military subsidy system, Robert Mayo and Ferdinand 
Moulton’s Army and Navy Pension Laws and Bounty Land Law of the 
United States, observed that widows and orphans constituted the most 
numerous class of pensioners under the military pension system then 
 
 37.  See JENSEN, supra note 22, at 118 fig.3.9 (showing the percentage of veterans’ pensions 
out of total federal expenditures from 1792 to 1838). 
 38. JAMES W. OBERLY, SIXTY MILLION ACRES: AMERICAN VETERANS AND THE PUBLIC LANDS 
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 114 (1990) (showing that between 1847 and 1861, the Pension Office 
issued bounty land warrants to veterans and widows for approximately 49,756,000 acres). 
 39. WILLIAM H. GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1918) 
[hereinafter GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY PENSIONS]; see also WILLIAM HENRY GLASSON, 
HISTORY OF MILITARY PENSION LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 127 (1900) [hereinafter 
GLASSON, HISTORY]. 
 40. See JENSEN, supra note 22, at 88–109 (describing the expansion of Revolutionary War 
veterans’ pensions in the early nineteenth century); RESCH, supra note 22, ch. 4 (discussing the 
political controversy and cultural changes leading to the enactment of the 1818 pension act for 
Revolutionary War veterans); see also GLASSON, HISTORY, supra note 39, at 33–36 (noting that 
the 1818 Pension Act dramatically expanded Revolutionary War veterans’ pensions). 
 41. See GLASSON, HISTORY, supra note 39, at 52. 
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in effect.42 It should come as no surprise, then, that Francis Triplett, a 
retired Chief Clerk of the Pension Office, dedicated a substantial 
portion of his volume An Analytical Digest of the Pension and Bounty 
Land Laws to the interpretation and administration of widows’ 
subsidies.43 
One might assume that in the early nineteenth century public 
support for military widows was an expected state function, given a 
long tradition of compensation for “war widows.”44 But the system of 
federal widows’ military subsidies that developed in America over the 
course of the early nineteenth century differed significantly from 
eighteenth-century English and colonial practices in both scope and 
kind. First, Congress gradually but substantially expanded the 
demographic reach of the subsidy system as it applied to traditional 
war widows—those women whose husbands died in the line of duty. In 
eighteenth-century England, systematic provision for the widows of 
officers was routine, but provision for the widows of soldiers was far 
less common.45 In keeping with this tradition of status-based social 
 
 42. See ROBERT MAYO & FERDINAND MOULTON, ARMY AND NAVY PENSION LAWS, AND 
BOUNTY LAND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, at xxiv (2d ed., Balt., Lucas Brothers 1854). 
 43. See F.C.C. TRIPLETT, AN ANALYTICAL DIGEST OF THE PENSION AND BOUNTY LAND LAWS, 
29–44, 45–47, 107–21, 141–51, 223–27 (Wash., D.C., 1854). 
 44. See, e.g., GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY PENSIONS, supra note 39, at 16–17 (describing 
colonial-era military pensions for “maimed” veterans and the families of soldiers “slain” in 
battle). 
 45. For example, in England, by the eighteenth century pensions for officers’ war widows 
were routinely available, but such pensions were not made available to the war widows of 
soldiers until the end of the nineteenth century. See MYNA TRUSTRAM, WOMEN OF THE 
REGIMENT: MARRIAGE AND THE VICTORIAN ARMY 92 (1984) (“Pensions for widows of officers 
originated in the early eighteenth century. NCOs and privates had to wait for almost two 
centuries before the needs of their families were recognized.”); see also DUDLEY POPE, LIFE IN 
NELSON’S NAVY 89 (1996) (noting that “[p]ensions were paid to . . . officers [in the eighteenth-
century British navy] and, in certain cases, to their widows”). Historians have uncovered two 
exceptions to this trend, exceptions that may prove the general rule. Geoffrey Hudson provides a 
rich account of the pensions awarded to the widows of common soldiers who died fighting the 
Royalists in the English Civil War in the mid-seventeenth century. For a relatively brief period, 
soldiers’ war widows were eligible to receive pensions from a fund established by the short-lived 
republican Commonwealth government, so long as the widow could demonstrate poverty due to 
her husband’s death. See Geoffrey L. Hudson, Negotiating for Blood Money: War Widows and the 
Courts in Seventeenth-Century England, in WOMEN, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN EARLY MODERN 
ENGLAND 146, 151–52 (Jennifer Kermode & Garthine Walker eds., 1994). Hudson explains, 
however, that after the demise of that system with the Restoration of the monarchy, widows of 
English soldiers would not receive pensions “for over 200 years.” Id. at 146. Isser Woloch has 
excavated another republican experiment with soldiers’ widows’ pensions, in France at the end of 
the eighteenth century. France’s experiment with pension alimentaire for soldiers’ widows was 
also short-lived, ending in the 1810s. See Isser Woloch, War-Widows Pensions: Social Policy in 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, 6 SOCIETAS 235, 238–40 (1976) (discussing military 
pensions provided in 1790 to widows whose husbands died in the line of duty, and the 
development of war widows’ pensions through the Napoleonic Wars). Notably, Woloch describes 
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provision for war widows, colonial governments tended to provide 
significant pensions to widows of officers as a matter of course, but 
they tended to provide for widows of soldiers, if at all, through poor-
law type statutes that were based on need and limited to subsistence-
level support.46  
This status-based trend continued in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, when both the Continental Congress and 
later Congress enacted statutes providing pensions for widows of 
officers only. For example, with respect to Revolutionary War widows, 
the Continental Congress awarded seven-year half-pay pensions to the 
widows of officers, but nothing to the widows of soldiers.47 In the 
 
the war widows’ pensions made available to traditional war widows as “a welfare measure rather 
than a form of earned recompense.” Id. at 238. 
 46. For examples of revolutionary-era colonial and state poor law provision for families of 
soldiers, see An Act for the Ordering & Regulateing of the Militia of this Prouince & for the 
Better Security and Defence Thereof (1678), 7 PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, OCT. 1678–NOV. 1683, at 58 (William Hand Browne ed., Balt., 1889); 
An Act for Relieving Such as Shall be Maimed in the Colonies Service, and the Widow, Parents 
or Relations of Such as Shall be Kill’d in the Colonies Service, and Shall not Be Able to Subsist or 
Maintain Themselves (1718), reprinted in THE EARLIEST ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF 
RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 1647–1719, at 228–29 (John D. Cushing ed., 
1977); An Act for Speedily Recruiting the Virginia Regiments on Continental Establishment 
(1778), ch. 45, 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 
588, 589 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, J.& G. Cochran 1821) [hereinafter 9 LAWS OF 
VA.]; An Act for Raising a Body of Volunteers for the Defence of the Commonwealth (1779), ch. 4, 
10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 18, 21 (William 
Waller Hening ed., Richmond, George Cochran 1822) [hereinafter 10 LAWS OF VA.]; An Act for 
Speedily Recruiting the Quota of this State for the Continental Army (1779), ch. 12, 10 LAWS OF 
VA. 257, 262; An Act to Amend the Act Concerning Pensioners (1785), ch. 44, 12 THE STATUTES 
AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 102, 105 (William Waller Hening 
ed., Richmond, George Cochran 1823) [hereinafter 12 LAWS OF VA.]. For examples of 
revolutionary-era statutes providing pensions for the widows of officers, see An Act for Making 
Good the Future Pay of the Army, and for Other Purposes (1780), ch. 27, 10 LAWS OF VA., supra, 
at 373, 374; An Act Concerning the Claims to Full Pay of Certain Officers, and to Half Pay of the 
Widows and Orphans of Officers that Died in the Service (1786), ch. 22, 12 LAWS OF VA., supra, 
at 279; An Act for the More Effectual Supply and Honourable Reward of Pennsylvania Troops, in 
the Service of the United States of America, ch. 880, LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 831, 833 (Alexander James Dallas ed., Phila., 1797). In 1778, Virginia enacted a 
statute promising half-pay pensions to war widows of officers and soldiers. See Act of Oct. 3, 
1778, ch. 30, 9 LAWS OF VA., supra, at 565, 566. (“[T]he widow of every such officer and soldier 
[who is killed in war] shall, during her natural life, be entitled to and receive half the pay that 
her husband was entitled to when in the service.”). However, given that subsequent pension laws 
enacted by Virginia provided for the widows of soldiers only upon demonstration of poverty, it is 
unclear how many soldiers’ widows benefited from this unusual entitlement statute. Moreover, 
as I have explained elsewhere, the states were notoriously remiss in actually paying war widows’ 
(and invalid soldiers’) pensions, and the failure of the states and the federal government to 
provide for the Revolutionary War widows of soldiers is evident in contemporary appeals to 
Congress. Collins, supra note 22, at 1788–89; see also KERBER, supra note 22, at 92–93 
(describing how war widows, having received no help from the federal government, turned to 
state legislatures, which were “troubled by war debts” and “hesitated to embark on a general 
commitment”). 
 47. See 17 J. CONT. CONG. (1774–1789) 415, 772–73 (1780).  
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1790s, when Congress first began enacting military subsidy statutes 
for the widows of sundry early nineteenth-century military 
encounters, it did little to depart from this status-based approach. In 
several significant acts concerning the establishment of a military, 
Congress continued the practice of awarding pensions to officers’ war 
widows only.48  
Two years into the War of 1812, Congress began leveling 
traditional war widows’ pensions, but it was a slow and piecemeal 
process.49 As Mayo and Moulton observed in their comprehensive, 900-
page tome on pension and land bounty laws, widows’ pensions were 
“gradually extended . . . until at length the principle of equal right 
 
 48. For examples of acts granting pensions to officers’ war widows only, see Act of Mar. 3, 
1815, ch. 79, § 7, 3 Stat. 224, 225 (extending widows’ pensions authorized by the Act of Mar. 16, 
1802 to widows of officers enlisted pursuant to this statute); Act of Aug. 2, 1813, ch. 40, § 1, 3 
Stat. 73, 73–74 (providing five-year half-pay pensions to the widows of “commissioned officer[s] of 
the militia, or of any volunteer corps” killed while in “actual service of the United States”); Act of 
Jan. 29, 1813, ch. 16, § 11, 2 Stat. 794, 795–96 (providing five-year half-pay pensions to widows 
of commissioned officers enlisted pursuant to this statute who “die, by reason of any wound 
received in actual service of the United States”); Act of Jan. 20, 1813, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 790, 790–91 
(providing five-year half-pay pensions to widows of “officer[s] of the navy or marines [who] shall 
be killed or die, by reason of a wound received in the line of his duty”); Act of Jan. 11, 1812, ch. 
14, § 15, 2 Stat. 671, 673 (providing five-year half-pay pensions to widows of “any commissioned 
officer in the military establishment of the United States” who died “by reason of any wound 
received in actual service of the United States”); Act of Jan. 2, 1812, ch. 11, § 4, 2 Stat. 670, 670 
(extending widows’ pensions authorized by the Act of Mar. 16, 1802 to widows of officers enlisted 
pursuant to this statute); Act of Apr. 12, 1808, ch. 43, § 5, 2 Stat. 481, 483 (extending widows’ 
pensions authorized by the Act of Mar. 16, 1802 to widows of officers enlisted pursuant to this 
statute); Act of Mar. 16, 1802, ch. 9, § 15, 2 Stat. 132, 135 (providing five-year half-pay pensions 
to the widows of commissioned officers of the United States who “die by reason of any wound 
received in actual service of the United States”); Act of Mar. 14, 1798, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 540, 540 
(extending widows’ pensions authorized by the Act of June 7, 1794 to the widows of 
“commissioned officers of the troops of the United States, and of the militia” who “died by reason 
of wounds received” in the line of duty after 1789); Act of June 7, 1794, ch. 52, § 1, 1 Stat. 390, 
390 (providing five-year half-pay pensions to widows of commissioned officers who “die by reason 
of wounds received in actual service of the United States”). There were occasional departures 
from this trend. In 1802, two years after the naval vessels Insurgent and Pickering were lost in a 
storm during the undeclared war with France, Congress authorized a small one-time payment to 
the widows and orphans of “officers, seamen and marines” who died on board, thus reaching the 
widows of men of all ranks, not just those of officers. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 33, 2 Stat. 170, 170. 
Also, in 1812, widows of “officers . . . , non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, of the volunteers 
or militia” killed “in the late campaign on the Wabash against the hostile Indians” were awarded 
five-year half-pay pensions. Act of Apr. 10, 1812, ch. 54, § 2, 2 Stat. 704, 704. An 1836 report of 
the House Committee of Claims confirms that the Act of April 10, 1812 was “the first act that 
granted half pay to the widows and orphans of non-commissioned officers and soldiers, being 
volunteer or militia,” adding that the act was “retrospective in its operations.” COMM. ON CLAIMS, 
MAJOR DADE, ET AL.–PENSIONS TO WIDOWS AND CHILDREN, H.R. REP. NO. 34-415, at 3 (1st 
Sess.1836).  
 49. The legislative debates concerning subsidies for widows of soldiers evidence a 
pronounced concern for family equality. See Collins, supra note 22, at 1795–1803; see also Kristin 
A. Collins, “Petitions Without Number,” 29–37 (May 14, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Vanderbilt Law Review). 
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embraced the widows and orphans of officers and soldiers.”50 In March 
1814, Congress granted pensions to widows of any seamen or 
marines—the Navy equivalent of enlisted soldiers—who “shall die” or 
“shall have died” in the War of 1812 “by reason of a wound received in 
the line of duty.”51 In April 1816, Congress retrospectively granted 
pensions to widows of soldiers of the regular army and militia who 
died “in service of the United States” during the War of 1812.52 In 
subsequent decades, Congress episodically (but consistently) provided 
pensions to widows of soldiers of ongoing naval encounters, military 
efforts to settle the frontier, and the Mexican-American War.53 By the 
 
 50. MAYO & MOULTON, supra note 42, at xxvii. Military subsidies for soldiers and veterans 
followed a similar trajectory. Although invalid pensions were made available to disabled soldiers 
early on, service-based pensions were initially awarded to Revolutionary War officers only. 
Congress gradually equalized service-based military pensions for Revolutionary War veterans by 
expanding the classes of servicemen who were eligible. See generally GLASSON, FEDERAL 
MILITARY PENSIONS, supra note 39, at 64–97 (describing the enactment of service-pension 
statutes for the rank-and-file during the early nineteenth century); JENSEN, supra note 22, at 
88–109 (describing the petitioning and lobbying efforts of veterans, which contributed to 
Congress’s decision to broaden the veterans’ pension program); RESCH, supra note 22, ch. 4 
(detailing the legislative and political history of the 1818 Pension Act, which provided a means-
tested service-based pension to Revolutionary War veterans of all ranks). 
 51. Act of Mar. 4, 1814, ch. 20, § 1, 3 Stat. 103, 103. 
 52. Act of Apr. 16, 1816, ch. 55, §§ 1–2, 3 Stat. 285, 285–86. 
 53. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 60, § 1, 3 Stat. 373, 373–74 (providing five-year half-
pay pensions to the widows of Navy officers, seamen, and marines who died or die in the line of 
duty after June 18, 1812); Act of Apr. 16, 1818, ch. 65, § 1, 3 Stat. 427, 427–78 (granting five-year 
extension of pensions awarded to widows pursuant to the Act of Mar. 4, 1814); Act of Apr. 20, 
1818, ch. 101, 3 Stat. 459 (granting five-year half-pay pension to widows of militia who 
“prosecut[ed] the war against the Seminole tribe of Indians”); Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 60, 3 Stat. 
502 (granting five-year extension of pensions awarded to widows of all “officers, seamen, and 
marines” killed in the War of 1812); Act of Jan. 22, 1824, ch. 15, § 1, 4 Stat. 4, 4 (granting five-
year extension of pensions awarded to widows of all “officers, seamen, and marines” killed in the 
War of 1812); Act of Apr. 9, 1824, ch. 34, 4 Stat. 18, 18 (granting five-year extension of pensions 
awarded to widows of “persons slain in the public or private armed vessels of the United States”); 
Act of May 23, 1828, ch. 72, 4 Stat. 288, 288 (granting five-year extension of pensions awarded to 
widows of all “officers, seamen and marines” killed in the War of 1812); Act of June 28, 1832, ch. 
151, 4 Stat. 550 (granting five-year extension of pensions awarded to widows of all “officers, 
seamen, and marines, who were killed in battle” in the War of 1812); Act of June 19, 1834, ch. 55, 
4 Stat. 679 (granting five-year extension of pensions awarded to widows pursuant to the Acts of 
Mar. 4, 1814 and Apr. 16, 1818); Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 134, § 1, 4 Stat. 714, 714 (granting 
five-year half-pay pension to widows of all “officers, seamen, and marines” who “died in the naval 
service” after Jan. 1, 1824); Act of Mar. 19, 1836, ch. 44, §§ 1, 5, 5 Stat. 7, 7 (granting five-year 
half-pay pensions to the widow of any “officer, non-commissioned officer, artificer or private,” of 
volunteer and militia corps, “who shall die in the service of the United States”); Act of July 4, 
1836, ch. 362, § 1, 5 Stat. 127, 127–28 (granting five-year half-pay pensions to widows of officers, 
non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates of the militia who died in the service of the 
United States after 1818); Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 38, § 1, 5 Stat. 180, 180 (providing a life-time 
pension to the widow of any “officer, seaman, or marine [who] have died, or may hereafter die, in 
the naval service”); Act of Mar. 3, 1845, ch. 41, 5 Stat. 731, 731 (granting five-year extension of 
pensions awarded to widows of “officers, seamen, and marines” who died in the line of duty); Act 
of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 49, § 2, 9 Stat. 174, 174 (granting five-year extension “to all pensions of 
similar kind” to those extended by the Act of Mar. 3, 1845); Act of July 21, 1848, ch. 108, §§ 1–2, 
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1830s, it had become fairly standard practice for the national 
government to award pensions or land bounties to the traditional war 
widows of the rank-and-file.54 
As significant as it was for Congress to extend pensions to the 
war widows of soldiers, perhaps even more notable was Congress’s 
retrospective award of service-based pensions to the widows of 
Revolutionary War veterans (of all ranks). These women, like 
Thankful Reynolds, were not traditional war widows—the young 
widows of fallen soldiers. Rather, they were the elderly surviving 
widows of men who, like Daniel Reynolds, had served in the 
Revolutionary War and died of unrelated causes decades after the war 
ended. The Act of July 4, 1836 created the first service-based pension 
for the widows of veterans, granting lifetime pensions to widows of 
“any person” who had served in the Revolutionary War for at least six 
months; whose husbands had died any time prior to 1836; who had 
been married to the soldier during the war (and who therefore 
presumably had suffered the hardships of war); and who had never 
remarried.55 
 
9 Stat. 249, 249–50 (granting five-year half-pay pensions to widows of “officers, non-
commissioned officers, musicians, and soldiers” of the United States army who served at any 
time in the Mexican-American War); Act of Aug. 11, 1848, ch. 155, §§ 1–2, 9 Stat. 282, 282–83 
(granting five-year extension of pensions awarded to widows “under any of the laws of Congress” 
enacted after 1841 and extending widows’ half-pay pensions to Navy engineers, firemen, and 
coal-heavers); Act of Feb. 3, 1853, ch. 41, § 1, 10 Stat. 154, 154 (granting five-year extension of 
pensions awarded to widows of numerous military encounters, including “various Indian wars”). 
 54. See sources cited supra notes 51–53 and infra note 60; see also GUSTAVUS A. WEBER, 
THE VETERANS’ ADMINISTRATION: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES, AND ORGANIZATION 18–19 (1934) 
(“Although provision was made as early as 1802 for the widows and orphans of commissioned 
officers of the Regular Establishment who died as a result of their service, no such provision was 
made for the surviving dependents of enlisted men until 1836.”). Weber’s characterization is 
slightly misleading. Although Congress did not provide for the traditional war widows of the 
rank-and-file as a routine matter until 1836, it did provide for specific classes of traditional war 
widows of soldiers starting in the 1810s. See sources cited supra notes 51–53. 
 55. See Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 362, § 3, 5 Stat. 127, 128. The technical operation of the 1836 
Act was complex. Section 3 granted service-based pensions to Revolutionary War widows and is 
intelligible only by reference to the veterans’ pension act of 1832, which granted service-based 
pensions to nearly all Revolutionary War veterans of any rank, regardless of need. Act of June 7, 
1832, ch. 126, § 1, 4 Stat. 529, 529–30. Section 3 of the 1836 Act awarded pensions to all widows 
whose husbands had been receiving a pension under the 1832 Act. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 362, § 
3, 5 Stat. 127, 128. Section 2 of the 1836 Act also applied to Revolutionary War widows, granting 
arrears to those widows whose husbands had been pensioned under the 1832 Act but had died 
subsequent to its enactment. Id. § 2. Section 1 of the 1836 Act did not apply to Revolutionary 
War widows. Rather, it awarded pensions to traditional war widows of militia (of all ranks) who 
had “died while in the service of the United States” after April 20, 1818. Id. § 1, at 127–28; see 
also Letter from J. L. Edwards, Comm’r of Pensions, to Hon. Joel R. Poinsett, Sec’y of War (July 
24, 1837), in PENSION LAWS NOW IN FORCE, H.R. DOC. NO. 25-118, at 109–10 (2d Sess. 1838) 
(observing that the “pension of July, 1836, was intended as a reward for the sufferings of those 
women who had husbands in the service during the revolutionary struggles”). 
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Over the following seventeen years, Congress gradually 
expanded the class of widows who qualified for service-based pensions 
under the 1836 Act to include virtually any widow of a Revolutionary 
War veteran, regardless of when the couple had married (which 
partially explains why the last Revolutionary War widow died in 
1906),56 and regardless of whether the widow had remarried (as long 
as she had been widowed again).57 Hence, with the 1836 Act, and the 
subsequent early nineteenth-century statutes expanding the 
categories of widows eligible for service-based pensions, Congress 
promised cash assistance to tens of thousands of women who had been 
married at some point to a Revolutionary War veteran. The women 
pensioned by Congress under these acts were mostly aging widows 
who can be compared to today’s recipients of Social Security survivors’ 
benefits.58 As one committee report explained, “[T]he provisions of the 
act [of 1836] were clearly intended to sustain the widow in her 
declining life.”59 
 
 56. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 42, § 2, 5 Stat. 187, 187 (granting life-time pensions to 
widows who had married a Revolutionary War veteran prior to 1783); Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 
189, § 1, 5 Stat. 303, 303 (granting five-year pensions to all widows who had married a 
Revolutionary War veteran prior to 1794); Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 102, § 1, 5 Stat. 647, 647 
(granting one-year extension of pensions awarded to widows pursuant to the Act of July 7, 1838); 
Act of June 17, 1844, ch. 102, §§ 1–2, 5 Stat. 680, 680 (granting four-year extension of pensions 
awarded to widows pursuant to the Act of July 7, 1838); Act of Feb. 2, 1848, ch. 8, §§ 1–2, 9 Stat. 
210, 210–11 (transforming widows’ pensions awarded under the Act of July 7, 1838, into life-time 
pensions); Act of July 29, 1848, ch. 120, § 1, 9 Stat. 265, 265–66 (granting life-time pensions to all 
Revolutionary War widows married prior to 1800); Act of Feb. 3, 1853, ch. 41, §2, 10 Stat. 154, 
154 (granting life-time pensions to all Revolutionary War widows, regardless of when their 
marriage to a veteran took place). The last “Revolutionary War widow,” Ester S. Damon of 
Vermont, died in 1906. GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY PENSIONS, supra note 39, at 94; see also 
File of Nina Alverson, W10365, Roll 48, Letter from G.G. Dibr[elt] to George C. Whiting, Comm’r 
of Pensions (Mar. 27, 1858); id., Decl. of Nina Alverson (Mar. 5, 1866) (widow born in 1811 and 
married at age sixteen to veteran aged sixty-three); File of Rachel Arey, Roll 72, W9335, Decl. of 
Rachel Arey (Aug. 11, 1857); id., Decl. of Nathan Underwood (Aug. 10, 1857) (widow born in 1792 
and married to Revolutionary War veteran in 1828); File of Martha Rice, W11133, Roll 72, Decl. 
of Martha Rice (Apr. 6, 1855) (widow born eighteen years after the end of the Revolutionary 
War). 
 57. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 42, § 1, 5 Stat. 187, 187 (extending the Act of July 4, 
1836 to those Revolutionary War widows who had remarried and then became widowed again); 
Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 191, 5 Stat. 521, 521 (stating that under the Act of July 7, 1838, “the 
marriage of the widow, after the death of her husband . . . shall be no bar to the claim of such 
widow to the benefit of that act, she being a widow at the time she makes an application for a 
pension”).  
 58. This is the case because widows of Revolutionary War veterans were awarded pensions 
starting fifty-three years after the close of that war. Based on my sample set, this large class of 
widows had a median age of seventy-nine at the time of their initial subsidy applications.  
 59. HOUSE COMM. ON REVOLUTIONARY PENSIONS, HEDULA PENNYMAN, H.R. REP. NO. 24-
235, at 1 (2d Sess. 1837). The pensions awarded to widows varied with their husband’s rank, the 
military division in which he served, and, in certain cases, his length of service. For example, 
while a widow of a high-ranking Navy officer could receive as much as fifty dollars per month, a 
widow of a seaman or low-ranking officer might receive only five dollars per month. Compare 
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While the national legislators gradually expanded the 
demographic reach of war widows’ pensions and extended those 
pensions to the aging widows of veterans, they also tapped into the 
country’s significant but contested land holdings to award land 
bounties to military widows—both traditional war widows and widows 
of veterans. Congress provided land bounties for war widows of 
officers and soldiers of the War of 1812 and the Mexican-American 
War.60 Congress also retrospectively provided land bounties for 
various classes of widows of veterans based on the deceased husband’s 
service in virtually any military encounter on behalf of the United 
States.61 Most widows who received land bounties never acquired title 
to an actual parcel of land. Instead, they sold the land bounty 
warrants for cash on an established secondary market—a transaction 
that made the warrants a valuable source of financial assistance for 
widows.62 
Although widows’ military subsidies were by no means 
universal entitlements, they constituted a far-reaching program of 
social provision that benefited a significant number of women. Due to 
imperfect record keeping by the Pension Office then, and the limited 
resources available to the National Archives today, it is difficult to 
identify the total number of women who received pensions or land 
 
CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 1600 (1856) (observing that the widow of commodore 
Stephen Decatur had collected a pension of fifty dollars per month under the Act of Mar. 3, 1837, 
ch. 38, § 1, 5 Stat. 180), with File of Catharine Barr, NARA, Records of the Dep’t of Veterans’ 
Affairs, RG 15, Old Wars Pension Files, Widow’s File 322, Letter from Catharine Barr to Sec’y of 
Navy (Feb. 14, 1842) (explaining that she had received a pension of five dollars per month 
following the death of her first husband). Thus, even as Congress significantly leveled the 
military pension system by awarding pensions to the rank-and-file, it did not completely 
eradicate the status-based nature of the system. However, especially given that many widows 
were eligible for substantial one-time arrears payments, even the smallest widows’ pensions 
were comparable to the support available through local poor relief systems. See J.V.N. YATES, 
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN 1824 ON THE RELIEF AND SETTLEMENT OF THE POOR, 
reprinted in THE ALMSHOUSE EXPERIENCE, COLLECTED REPORTS 1106 (David J. Rothman ed., 
1971) (reporting that Richmond, Virginia, provided poor families with “between $1.50, to $4 and 
$5” per month, depending on the size of the family). 
 60. For examples of statutes granting land bounties to traditional war widows, see Act of 
Dec. 10, 1814, ch. 10, § 4, 3 Stat. 146, 147; Act of Mar. 5, 1816, ch. 25, § 1, 3 Stat. 256, 256–57; 
Act of Feb. 11, 1847, ch. 8, § 9, 9 Stat. 123, 125–26. 
 61. For examples of statutes granting service-based land bounties to widows, see Act of 
Mar. 5, 1816, ch. 25, § 2, 3 Stat. 256, 257; Act of Feb. 11, 1847, ch. 8, § 9, 9 Stat. 123, 125–26; Act 
of Aug. 14, 1848, ch. 180, 9 Stat. 332, 332; Act of Sept. 28, 1850, ch. 85, § 1, 9 Stat. 520, 520–21; 
Act of Mar. 3, 1855, ch. 207, §§ 2, 8, 10 Stat. 701, 702. 
 62. See OBERLY, supra note 38, at 106 (observing that in the 1840s and 1850s “warrantees 
overwhelmingly chose to sell their [land] warrants for cash”); id. ch. 5 (describing the secondary 
market for land bounty warrants); Robert P. Swierenga, The “Western Land Business”: The Story 
of Easley & Willingham, Speculators, 41 BUS. HIST. REV. 1, 4 (1967) (describing the business of 
frontier land investment firms that speculated in land warrants). 
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bounties under these public laws. Nevertheless, based on careful study 
of Pension Office records, we can calculate that between 1836 and 
1860 at least 47,000 widows were granted pensions.63 This calculation 
omits all widows awarded pensions prior to 1836, many of whose 
records were lost or destroyed, and about whom the Pension Office did 
not collect reliable data.64  
It is also worth observing just how much time and energy 
Congress dedicated to widows’ pensions. By the outbreak of the Civil 
War, Congress had enacted over ninety public law statutes 
authorizing and regulating the award of pensions and bounty lands to 
large classes of military widows. This tally does not account for the 
private relief statutes enacted for the benefit of individual women who 
sought pensions directly from Congress.65 The result of this legislative 
effort was an entrenched and pervasive system of social provision for 
widows. In 1854, Triplett observed that the military subsidy system 
was “thoroughly incorporated into our policy,” and that “there is 
hardly a neighbourhood in the United States which does not contain 
 
 63. My estimate that at least 47,000 widows collected pensions from 1836 to 1860 exceeds 
estimates offered by Glasson and Resch, both of whom placed the number at approximately 
23,000. See GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY PENSIONS, supra note 39, at 95–96; RESCH, supra note 
22, at 203, app. A. In large part, this is because Glasson and Resch included only Revolutionary 
War widows in their estimates, while my calculation includes at least certain classes of 
traditional war widows who received pensions between 1836 and 1861. The vagaries of early 
nineteenth-century recordkeeping make any estimation imperfect, and when in doubt I erred on 
the side of undercounting the number of widows receiving pensions. My calculation is based on 
careful examination of data contained in reports by the Commissioner of Pensions to Congress. 
See LOREN PINCKNEY WALDO, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 
33-1, vol. 1, at 488, 495 (1st Sess. 1853); LOREN PINCKNEY WALDO, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER 
OF PENSIONS, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 33-1, vol. 1, at 558–59 (2d Sess. 1854); J. MINOT, REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 34-1, vol. 1, at 594 (1st Sess. 1855); J. MINOT, 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 34-1, vol. 1, at 848 (3d Sess. 
1856); GEORGE C. WHITING, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 
35-2, vol. 2, at 706–09 (1st Sess. 1857); GEORGE C. WHITING, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF 
PENSIONS, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 35-2, vol. 2, at 676–79 (2d Sess. 1858); GEORGE C. WHITING, 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 36-2, vol. 2, at 825–28 (1st Sess. 
1859); GEORGE C. WHITING, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 36-1, 
vol. 1, at 470–73 (2d Sess. 1860).  
 64. Although inadequate recordkeeping poses the greatest barrier to calculating the 
number of widows’ pensions awarded prior to 1836, many of the pension records predating the 
War of 1812 were destroyed in a fire in November 1800 or during the invasion of the British 
army in August 1814. See File of Mary Hillyer, W92, Roll 1282, Unsigned Letter from Pension 
Office (Mar. 5, 1883) (noting the destruction of pension records due to the fire and the British 
invasion). 
 65. Although in Part II.B.3 I review some private bills for relief that were considered on 
appeal from the Pension Office, I primarily focus on the public laws that were enacted by 
Congress for the benefit of large classes of widows and administered by the Pension Office. For a 
discussion of the petitioning process used by widows who sought private relief because they did 
not qualify for a pension under a public law, see Collins, supra note 49, at 11–17. 
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one or more persons directly interested in some of the gratuities thus 
promised.”66 
In a world in which government assistance of any sort is 
believed to have been unusual, the fact that such provision was made 
for women on a significant scale in the early nineteenth century was 
an enormously important development in American social policy. Well 
before the emergence of the modern welfare state in the early 
twentieth century, Congress created a broad-scale, demographically 
far-reaching system of social provision that provided direct assistance 
to women. The existence of this system should lead us to revise the 
received wisdom concerning the origins of centralized social provision 
for women generally. Such provision did not begin with the Social 
Security Act of 1939, or the Mothers’ Aid statutes of the Progressive 
Era, or even the Civil War widows’ pensions.67 Rather, centralized 
social provision for women began in the early nineteenth century, as 
Congress created a significant system of cash and land subsidies for 
women awarded on the basis of marriage to a man who, at some point, 
had served in the nation’s military.68 
B. Marriage and Women’s Welfare in the Early Nineteenth Century 
If the story of widows’ military subsidies in the early 
nineteenth century is an underexplored chapter in the history of the 
development of social provision for women, it is also an important and 
unexamined aspect of the evolution of marriage’s socio-legal 
significance. From our perspective today, the notion that marriage can 
give a woman a claim on the public coffers seems commonplace, 
perhaps especially when that financial assistance is directed toward 
the “worthy widows” of soldiers and veterans. But it is all too easy for 
 
 66. TRIPLETT, supra note 43, at iii. 
 67. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.  
 68. Provision for widows and veterans is part of a larger web of social welfare policies in 
early nineteenth-century America, from disaster relief to homestead exemption acts, the full 
scope of which is just now coming to light through the efforts of scholars in law and other 
disciplines. See JENSEN, supra note 22, at 236 (observing that early nineteenth-century veterans’ 
military subsidies provide a “new origins story about the development of . . . the American 
welfare state”); Michele L. Landis, “Let Me Next Time Be ‘Tried by Fire’ ”: Disaster Relief and the 
Origins of the American Welfare State, 1789–1874, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 967, 969 (1998) (arguing 
that “the origin of the American welfare state is found in the narratives of blame and fate that 
surfaced originally in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century contests over ‘disaster’ relief”); 
Alison D. Morantz, There’s No Place Like Home: Homestead Exemption and Judicial 
Constructions of Family in Nineteenth-Century America, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 245, 250 (2006) 
(describing nineteenth-century homestead exemption acts as an early form of family welfare 
policy and noting that “scholars have only recently begun to recognize . . . that debate over the 
proper scope and aims of the ‘social safety net’ began long before the New Deal”). 
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us to view provision for widows as a natural function of government 
because, in our own time, widows (and now widowers) are routinely 
compensated for the deaths of their spouses through all manner of 
public and private law mechanisms, from marriage-based 
entitlements such as Social Security survivors’ benefits and workers’ 
compensation, to tort remedies in wrongful-death actions.69 However, 
in the early nineteenth century, marriage did not generally give 
widows a claim on the public purse. Rather, what little enforceable 
financial support marriage secured for women was effected through 
private law. As I demonstrate in this Section, widows’ military 
subsidies therefore marked the emergence of an unorthodox role for 
marriage: the creation of public liability for women’s support through 
marriage-based entitlements. 
As others have chronicled in great detail, a core socio-legal 
function of marriage in the nineteenth century was the creation of a 
private sphere in which women could be properly protected and 
governed, their energies directed to gender-appropriate tasks (such as 
motherhood and household labor), and their material needs provided 
for.70 Marriage, in other words, helped to both create and provide for 
women’s financial dependency. Once a woman married, the law 
limited her opportunities to engage in employment outside the home. 
A married woman could not enter a contract without her husband’s 
permission, and hence she could not engage in trade without a special 
license to do business as a “feme sole trader.”71 Marriage also resulted 
 
 69. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2006) (providing Social Security benefits for the widows and 
widowers of insured individuals); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-632 (LexisNexis 2008) 
(providing right to workers’ compensation for surviving spouses); N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 16 
(Consol. 2009) (workers’ compensation statute defining death benefit for surviving spouses); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 97-39 (2009) (presuming widow and widower dependent for purposes of determining 
workers’ compensation); VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 8.01-50 to -56 (2008) (providing wrongful-death 
action for surviving spouses); see also JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED 
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 127 (2005) (noting 
that “the problem of the ‘destitute widow and children’ [was placed] at the center of the 
workmen’s compensation movement” of the early twentieth century). 
 70. See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 67 (1982) (observing that during the antebellum period, the 
laws of coverture were rationalized as a form of guardianship of the husband over the wife); 
NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: “WOMAN’S SPHERE” IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780–1835, 
at 1–2 (2d ed. 1997) (observing that the “cult of domesticity . . . prescribed specific behavior for 
women in the enactment of domestic life”); Reva B. Siegel, Home As Work: The First Woman’s 
Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082 (1994) 
(“The common law charged a husband with responsibility to represent and support his wife, 
giving him in return the use of her real property and absolute rights in her personalty and 
‘services’—all products of her labor.”). 
 71. See MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 44 
(1986) (“If women lived in areas that recognized the law of feme sole traders . . . they could 
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in a nearly complete abdication of the wife’s property rights—
including rights to any property she owned prior to marriage and any 
wages she earned during marriage.72 As a consequence, the common 
law rendered women completely dependent upon their husbands for 
material support during marriage.73 
In exchange, the common law obligated a husband to support 
his wife and children. During his lifetime, that obligation was enforced 
indirectly through the “doctrine of necessaries,” which required a 
husband to pay merchants for his wife’s purchase of necessary goods.74 
The common law also secured at least some material support for a 
woman following the death of her husband. If a widow’s husband 
owned real property, she had a claim to “dower,” a life estate in one-
third of real property owned by her husband during marriage.75 With 
respect to the husband’s chattel property, after creditors took their 
 
execute binding contracts, sue, and be sued just as though they were single. Such rights were 
essential if women wanted to operate their own businesses . . . .”). 
 72. Marylynn Salmon provides a good synthesis of marriage’s impact on a woman’s property 
rights under the doctrine of coverture: 
After marriage, all of the personal property owned by a wife came under the exclusive 
control of her husband. He could spend her money, including her wages, [and] sell her 
slaves or stocks . . . . With regard to real property his rights were almost as extensive. 
He made all managerial decisions concerning her lands and tenements and controlled 
the rents and profits. 
Id. at 15; see also CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE IN AMERICA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 
THE PRESENT 36 (1987) (“Upon marriage, all of a woman’s personalty became her spouse’s. . . . 
She could only write a will bequeathing personalty if her husband gave his approval, and under 
the common law she had no power to devise land.”); TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND 
FEMME, ch. 2 (Amasa J. Parker & Charles E. Baldwin eds., 3d ed., Albany, William Gould 1862) 
(1816) (describing the husbands’ right to his wife’s property during coverture). With the 
enactment of married women’s property acts toward the end of the early nineteenth century, 
these rules slowly began to change. See Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married 
Women’s Property Law: Reception of the Early Married Women’s Property Acts by Courts and 
Legislatures, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3, 3–5 (1985) (describing “married women’s property reform” 
of the early nineteenth century). 
 73. For a rich examination of how marital property law helped to create and perpetuate 
women’s financial dependency, see Siegel, supra note 70, at 1082–89. Prior to marriage, and 
sometimes even after marrying, women could effectively contract around many of the restrictions 
on married women’s ownership and management of property using “marriage settlements” that 
were enforced in equity. For a detailed discussion of the use of marriage settlements in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see Marylynn Salmon, Women and Property in South 
Carolina: The Evidence from Marriage Settlements, 1730 to 1830, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 655, 656 
(1982) (“In their various forms, marriage settlements allowed women full or partial managerial 
rights over property.”). 
 74. See REEVE, supra note 72, at 160 (noting that a husband is “bound by his wife’s 
contracts for necessaries”). For a discussion of the doctrine of necessaries, see Twila L. Perry, The 
“Essentials of Marriage”: Reconsidering the Duty of Support and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 1, 11–12 (2003). 
 75. REEVE, supra note 72, at 102. For a probing discussion of dower, its shortcomings as a 
means of securing widows’ financial stability, and dower reform statutes of the early twentieth 
century, see Dubler, Shadow, supra note 10, at 1660–1700. 
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share the widow was entitled to a “widow’s third,” with the remaining 
portion divided among the husband’s children or other heirs.76 
Although there is reason to doubt its efficacy in securing 
women’s financial security,77 this complex web of laws both reflected 
and reinforced a deep ideological commitment to the private marital 
family as the normatively appropriate source of support for women 
and other family dependents. That commitment was reflected in and 
reinforced by the scarcity of government assistance available to 
women generally, including married women. If and when private 
liability rules failed to adequately provide for a married woman—and 
when the kindness of family, friends, and charity ran out—she could 
turn to municipal-based poor relief.78 Although there was significant 
variation in the treatment of paupers over the course of the early 
nineteenth century, as a general matter public, need-based sources of 
material support were reserved for only the poorest members of a 
community and were notoriously punitive and stingy.79 Women 
seeking poor relief might be “farmed out” and forced to live and labor 
in another’s home.80 They could be made to live and work in an 
 
 76. See REEVE, supra note 72, at 98. If the husband had no children, the widow was 
generally entitled to half of his personal property. Id. 
 77. See Dubler, Shadow, supra note 10, at 1662 (“A widow’s legal entitlements to dower and 
her paraphernalia, although framed by the law as protective measures . . . , did little 
systematically to alleviate her often precarious financial state after her husband’s death.”) 
 78. As Mimi Abramovitz has explained, “local government assumed responsibility [for the 
poor] only when . . . family members could not.” ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 16, at 84. 
 79. The poor laws enacted by municipalities provided subsistence-level support for the most 
destitute members of a community, including women and their children. See Alexander Keyssar, 
Widowhood in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts: A Problem in the History of the Family, 8 
PERSP. AM. HIST. 83, 112 (1974) (“In cases of extreme need, the town would even assume the 
burden of supporting an indigent widow.”). While poor relief did not turn on marital status, a 
woman’s marital status could potentially influence her poor relief eligibility in at least two ways. 
First, because municipalities provided poor relief only for those individuals domiciled in the 
town, determination of an individual’s domicile was central to determining which town would be 
liable for the individual’s support. Because a woman’s domicile followed that of her husband, a 
town might dispute whether it was liable for a married woman’s relief if her husband was 
domiciled elsewhere. See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 16, at 82 (discussing how a woman’s marital 
status played an important role under the provisions of colonial settlement laws). However, in 
such cases, marital status functioned less as an eligibility criterion than as a means to allocate 
liability among towns. Second, there is evidence suggesting that towns administered poor relief 
in a gender and marriage-salient manner, so that a more lenient standard was used to determine 
a widowed mother’s eligibility for poor relief, as compared with a similarly destitute man or 
unmarried mother. See id. at 81 (noting the particular difficulty for unwed mothers in receiving 
assistance under the poor laws). Evidence supporting a bias in favor of married mothers is 
inconsistent, however, see id., and in any event, marital status did not entitle a woman to poor 
relief. 
 80. See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 16, at 86–87 (explaining the process of “farming-out,” by 
which the services of female paupers were “auctioned-off to the lowest town bidder”). 
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almshouse.81 And in particularly punitive jurisdictions, women who 
became public charges could be subjected to physical punishment.82 
Their children, if any, would very possibly be “bound out” to servitude 
so that the town could avoid incurring charges for the children’s 
support.83 
In an era when marriage was intended in part to provide for 
women’s material needs within the private family, and when social 
provision was generally stigmatized, widows’ military subsidies are 
especially notable for employing marriage as a basis for women’s claim 
on the public coffers. Creation of a broad-scale marriage-based 
entitlement thereby altered, or broadened, the legal significance of 
marriage, both for the individual women involved and for the polity. 
With respect to a significant group of women, marriage no longer 
created only private liability; it could also generate public liability. If 
in the past marriage had functioned to insulate the polity from 
women’s financial needs (although not always particularly effectively), 
now, in certain circumstances, marriage could also render the state 
responsible for women’s support. 
C. Legislative Change, Legislative Resistance 
It is tempting to understand widows’ military subsidies as 
simply an extension of the private law regime described above. In 
other words, by creating military subsidies, Congress substituted the 
state for the husband-provider, thereby maintaining the marital 
family as the locus of women’s support. Under this logic, widows’ 
military subsidies were not a significant departure from the private 
law regime that traditionally provided for women within the marital 
family. While it is certainly the case that widows’ military subsidies 
tracked the private law in important ways—reproducing the 
provider/dependent model of the private law—we should not 
underestimate the novelty of publicly funded marriage-based 
entitlements in the early nineteenth century. They were novel, as I 
have argued above, because of the scarcity of government assistance in 
general, and because of the relatively limited nature of the private 
 
 81. See id. at 87–89 (describing the labor obligations of women who lived in almshouses). 
 82. See id. at 86 (discussing the “harsh physical punishment” that female paupers 
sometimes endured). 
83.    See id. at 92–93 (noting the orders of one colony’s officials):  
[T]hose that have relief from the town and have children and do not employ them that 
then it shall be lawful for the township to take order that those children shall be put 
to work in fitting employment according to their strength and abilities or placed out 
by the town. 
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law’s provision for married women’s financial security. As I show in 
this Section, that novelty is also reflected in the structure of subsidy 
statutes, and in the legislative record. Early nineteenth-century 
legislators could not and did not presume that marriage gave rise to 
public liability, even as compensation for a husband’s military services 
or his death in battle. Indeed, although by the mid-nineteenth century 
a significant system of marriage-based entitlements was entrenched 
as a form of social provision, opponents of widows’ military subsidies 
continued to challenge the propriety of such a system. 
On a technical level, the private law regime that governed the 
relations of husband and wife, and secured minimal financial security 
for wives, did not readily translate into a public law system of 
marriage-based entitlements. We can detect the problems that 
confronted national legislators in treatise writers Mayo and Moulton’s 
strained attempt to describe the legal principles undergirding widows’ 
military subsidies. On the one hand, they explained, widows were the 
“natural and civil dependents of their husbands” while living and 
“might therefore be considered as justly entitled to the continuance, 
nay the inheritance, of the right, virtually as a vested right, of pension, 
at the death of their said natural and civil protectors.”84 “But,” they 
explained, “inasmuch as they were not identical with the parties 
disabled, nor considered as the heir or inheritors of the vested right of 
pension, . . . it was deemed to require the action of Congress to 
recognize their right, and to prescribe at their option the amount of 
pension they might award them.”85 In other words, despite married 
women’s status as dependents, traditional legal principles and 
precedents did not give a widow a claim on the government for 
compensation based on her husband’s death in battle or his military 
service.  
Crafting a system that prioritized widows’ material well-being 
thus required significantly more legislative effort than simply 
substituting the state for the husband. It required Congress to 
abandon many of the fundamental principles of traditional intestacy 
law and design a new set of distribution rules. While the private law 
regime described above was intended, in part, to provide for the 
deceased husband’s widow, it was also designed to ensure satisfaction 
of creditors’ claims and the continuation of the family firm or farm, 
 
 84. MAYO & MOULTON, supra note 42, at xxvi–xxvii (emphasis in original). 
 85. Id. at xxvii. 
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largely through transfers to heirs.86 But in creating widows’ military 
subsidies, Congress focused primarily on widows’ welfare as well as 
that of any minor children. For example, under traditional intestacy 
law, the husband’s chattel property was first subject to creditors’ 
claims and then divided among the widow and the heirs. By contrast, 
the military pension statutes prioritized first the widow and then any 
children as the recipients of the cash subsidy, to the exclusion of 
creditors.87 Similarly, as early as 1814, military land bounty statutes 
prioritized first the widow and then any children as recipients of the 
military bounty land in the event of a soldier’s death, before other 
family members.88 This, too, marked a departure from traditional 
 
 86. As John Langbein has explained with respect to the widow’s right to dower, “the 
tendency both in intestacy and for testate estates was to limit the widow to a life interest, in 
order to assure continuity of the enterprise in the hands of the next generation.” John H. 
Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 
722, 726 (1988). 
 87. If the deceased soldier or veteran had children, they received nothing directly while the 
widow remained alive and unmarried. Only children under the age of sixteen were eligible to 
receive a pension, and then only in the event of the mother’s death or remarriage. See, e.g., Act of 
July 4, 1836, ch. 362, § 1, 5 Stat. 127, 127–28. Congress explicitly insulated many military 
subsidies from the claims of creditors, thus ensuring that these subsidies would be available for 
the support of the soldier’s or veteran’s widow or children and would not be used to pay his debts. 
See, e.g., Act of June 19, 1840, ch. 39, § 1, 5 Stat. 385, 385; Act of July 4, 1836 § 4; Act of May 6, 
1812, ch. 77, § 4, 2 Stat. 728, 729–30. Opinions issued by the Attorney General reiterate this 
policy. See Letter from W.M. Wilkins, War Dep’t, to James Edwards, Comm’r of Pensions (July 
18, 1844), in MAYO & MOULTON, supra note 42, at 555, 555–56 (“The policy of the act of Congress 
of the 7th of June, 1832, and of other pension laws, appears to be to keep from creditors and from 
the seizure of the law, in any way, the gratuities or pensions conferred upon revolutionary 
officers and soldiers.”); Letter from J.Y. Mason, Att’y General, to Sec’y of War (July 14, 1846), in 
MAYO & MOULTON, supra note 42, at 481, 481–82 (explaining that the Act of June 19, 1840 
directed administrators of veterans’ estates to make payment directly to the children of the 
veteran, even where intestacy law would normally require payment of debts of the estate); cf. 
WITT, supra note 69, at 53 (observing that New York’s mid-nineteenth-century wrongful-death 
statute excluded creditors as potential beneficiaries of claims brought by widows); Morantz, 
supra note 68 (analyzing middle and late nineteenth-century Homestead Acts as a social safety 
net for families). 
 88. Consistent with traditional intestacy law, until 1814 land bounty statutes tended to 
designate “heirs and representatives” of soldiers as the beneficiaries of the land bounty in the 
event of the soldier’s death, a designation that did not necessarily include the widow. See Act of 
July 5, 1813, ch. 4, § 2, 3 Stat. 3; Act of May 6, 1812, ch. 77, § 1, 2 Stat. 728, 728–29; Act of Feb. 
6, 1812, ch. 21, § 6, 2 Stat. 676, 677; Act of Jan. 11, 1812, ch. 14, § 12, 2 Stat. 671, 672–73; Act of 
Dec. 24, 1811, ch.10, § 2, 2 Stat. 669, 669–70. However, during the War of 1812, land bounty 
statutes began to explicitly designate the widows as the priority beneficiary of the bounty. An 
1814 bounty land statute identified “the widow and children, and if there be no widow nor child, 
the parents of every non-commissioned officer and soldier” as the recipients of the land bounty, 
and insisted also that “the same shall not pass to collateral relations.” Act of Dec. 10, 1814, ch. 
10, § 4, 3 Stat. 146, 147. An 1847 bounty land statute gave even more detailed distribution rules: 
“first, to the widow and to his children; second, his father; third, his mother.” See Act of Feb. 11, 
1847, ch. 8, § 9, 9 Stat. 123, 125. Consistent with the family welfare agenda of military subsidies, 
bounty land statutes were interpreted by the Attorney General to limit the divisibility of a 
bounty land warrant by the soldier himself, based on the understanding that “[t]he clear design 
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private law norms, under which widows received only a life estate in 
one-third of all real property owned by the husband during marriage, 
not a right to ownership in fee simple of an entire parcel. 
Unsurprisingly, the creation of a system that used marriage as 
a basis for public liability for women’s support, and did so in ways that 
abrogated traditional rights of heirs and creditors, gave rise to 
legislative debate. Given the sheer number of widows’ subsidy bills, 
both public and private, that came before Congress over the course of 
the early nineteenth century, national legislators had numerous 
occasions to debate the propriety of providing for women based on 
their marriage to a soldier or veteran. Although particular bills 
presented to Congress raised issues specific to the individual widow or 
widows who would benefit, general fault lines emerged in these 
debates. Because military subsidies smacked of government handouts, 
not all legislators were comfortable with the use of public assets to 
provide for widows—not even “worthy widows”—and certainly not to 
the degree that pro-subsidy legislators contended. Echoing objections 
that were levied against the military pension system generally 
(including veterans’ pensions), opponents of widows’ subsidies claimed 
that the military pensions were a weakly disguised form of “charity.”89 
Pension naysayers in Congress insisted that government provision for 
widows was contrary to republican principles of self-support, and at 
odds with America’s constitutional design.90 
The charge of “charity” caught pro-pension legislators in 
something of a bind. Widows’ champions in Congress routinely called 
attention to widows’ poverty and need as a justification for creating a 
subsidy—a defense that indeed made widows’ military subsidies seem 
like a form of charity.91 In an effort to justify widows’ military 
 
[of the statutes] was to secure the bounty for the family of the deceased.” Letter from Johnson, 
Att’y Gen.’s Office, to Sec’y of the Interior (June 28, 1850), in MAYO & MOULTON, supra note 42, 
at 518, 518. 
 89. CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1841) (statement of Sen. Calhoun) (“[T]he 
pension list was no more than a great system of charity. . . . It went under the name of charity, 
but its true name was plunder.”); see also id. (“Plunder, and not pension, was the proper word to 
apply to many of the sums claimed as navy pensions; and in this class [i.e., Revolutionary 
War].”); see also JENSEN, supra note 22, at 75–78. 
 90. CONG. GLOBE, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1834) (statement of Rep. Pinckney) (arguing 
that the “whole pension system was established without constitutional authority”). Fifteen years 
later, in the context of debating a widow’s pension petition, one Senator went so far as to declare 
that “if the Republic is destined to go to ruin . . . it is to be more in consequence of the manner in 
which the public funds are used than any other cause”–suggesting that pensions, not slavery, 
would bring down the Union. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 540 (1849) (statement of Sen. 
Metcalfe). 
 91. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 932 (1848) (statement of Rep. 
Silvester) (describing Revolutionary War widows as “a modest and retiring class of persons, 
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subsidies as something other than “mere gratuity,” pro-pension 
legislators positioned widows’ pensions as a form of remuneration, not 
only for their husbands’ military services,92 but, as I have 
demonstrated elsewhere, also and especially for the widows’ own 
services as wives.93 For example, while advocating for the extension of 
a widows’ subsidy act in 1818, Representative Harrison of Ohio 
explained that “[t]he pious and patriotic mothers to whom [the 
pension] will be given will employ it in the education of their sons, and 
they will never cease to remind them of the obligations they owe to 
their country.”94 Legislators also routinely called attention to widows’ 
service to the nation in wartime, and their caregiving services to their 
husbands as a justification for subsidies.95 In these legislators’ 
accounts, marriage to a soldier or veteran functioned as a proxy for 
women’s services of various sorts, whether to country or to husband. 
But for adamant opponents of widows’ subsidies, marriage to a 
soldier or veteran—and the different forms of labor and sacrifice 
marriage regularly entailed for women—did not justify government 
assistance, in part because marriage itself was intended to provide for 
women’s financial security. In 1843, in the course of contesting the 
legitimacy of certain service-based pensions for widows, Senator 
George McDuffie demanded to know “upon what principle of policy or 
justice a claim could be set up by a widow, . . . unless it were shown 
that she had participated in the struggle, and had been subjected to 
 
unable to help or provide for themselves, and who have been cast by adversity and misfortune 
upon the protection and charity of their country”); CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 389 (1843) 
(statement of Sen. Buchanan) (“Every person could point to cases, within his own immediate 
vicinity, of destitute widows of revolutionary soldiers, who are supported by the liberality of their 
friends; and who, in case the bill did not pass, must go to the poor-house.”). 
 92. For an example of justifications of widows’ pensions based on husbands’ service as 
soldiers, see, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 535 (1844) (statement of Rep. 
Seymour):  
[Widows’ pensions are] founded on the well-known fact, that their husbands, whose 
surviving representatives they are, were in truth the creditors of the government, and 
had a just claim upon its bounty; and that this claim was not discharged by the death 
of the pensioned husband, but remained to his widow, who had shared with him the 
privations and destitution consequent upon his services. 
 93. See Collins, supra note 22, at 1795 (“[I]n their effort to justify a claim on the public 
coffers . . . widows could not allude to valorous deeds in battle or courageous conduct in the face 
of grievous wounds, but they could, and did, invoke their service to the nation as mothers.”). 
 94. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 381 (1818). 
 95. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 388 (1843) (statement of Sen. Smith) 
(supporting a widows’ pension bill “not on the ground of a gratuity, but because the females of 
that day were all more or less compelled to make sacrifices, and had besides rendered material 
services”); CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 681 (1850) (statement of Rep. Venable) (“It was 
right to give to the widow something, some compensation for the years of anxiety and care spent 
over her husband who fell under the effects of . . . wounds received in the service.”). 
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the privations incident to the time[?]”96 His colleague Senator Rufus 
King put the point more bluntly by questioning the deservingness of 
the widows in question: “[T]he widows, who seemed to claim so large a 
share of the gentleman’s attention, never did any service. . . . These 
old women had married over and over again, and now came to claim 
pensions from the Government.”97 Marriage, he reasoned, was a 
source of financial gain for “these women,” not a status that warranted 
compensation by the federal government: 
What merit was there in these women marrying officers and soldiers of the Revolution 
after the war, that they should be entitled to pensions? Matches with officers were 
desirable. . . . Did they suffer any losses from the marriage after the close of the war and 
as late as 1794? Or were they harassed by revolutionary troubles? No, sir. Go to the 
Pension Office, and you will find that most of these widows who had married those old 
revolutionary officers, soon after their deaths provided themselves with young 
husbands.98 
According to these legislators, marriage to a soldier or a veteran was 
itself a source of pecuniary gain for widows, one that need not be 
subsidized by the government. “These were beautiful times,” King 
proclaimed, “to make gratuities of a half a million dollars to old 
women who never rendered any service whatever to the country.”99 
Senators McDuffie and King and others who spoke out against 
widows’ military subsidies clearly held a minority view. By the middle 
of the nineteenth century, provision for military widows had become 
commonplace and pro-pension legislators reasoned comfortably about 
widows’ subsidies in terms acknowledging that marriage could give 
women a special claim on the polity for material support. This way of 
reasoning about women’s legal rights as wives was reflected in one 
widow’s spirited proclamation: “It is no more than right that our 
Country should allow us that mite for our own Exclusive use.”100 It 
was also reflected, of course, in the marriage-based entitlements 
themselves. 
But the ultimate creation of a significant system of widows’ 
military subsidies should not obfuscate what careful attention to the 
structure of the subsidy statutes and the legislative history reveals: 
the use of marriage as a basis for redistributive policy was by no 
means inevitable or predetermined in the early nineteenth century. At 
 
 96. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 388 (1843). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 389. 
 99. Id. at 388. 
 100. File of Catherine Barr, NARA, Records of the Dept of Veterans’ Affairs, RG 15, Old 
Wars Pension Files, Widow’s File 322, Letter from Catharine Barr to Comm’r of Pensions (June 
20, 1858). 
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a time when social provision was largely limited to poor relief, the 
development of widows’ military subsidies gave rise to substantial 
debate over whether, in fact, they were a form of government 
“charity.” And at a time when marriage was understood as a status 
that secured material support for women within the marital family, 
widows’ military subsidies challenged the core vision of the private 
marital family as an adequate source of women’s financial support. 
As I explain in the next Part, resistance to the use of 
government assets to provide for military widows was not limited to a 
handful of legislators. Careful examination of widows’ military subsidy 
applications reveals that the federal administrators assigned the task 
of implementing this complex system of marriage-based entitlements 
also resisted public liability for women’s support. And they did so not 
by objecting to widows’ military subsidies in principle, but by 
effectively narrowing the legal definition of marriage. 
II. CONSTRUCTING MARRIAGE IN EARLY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
[W]hat constitutes a legal marriage[?] It is impossible that any question should be more 
important to any one in itself, or in the consequences which it involves, than whether he 
or she is or is not a husband, or a wife; and yet some uncertainty may often rest upon it, 
not merely from the peculiar facts of individual cases, but from a want of precision and 
certainty in the principles or rules which decide this question.101 
The military subsidy statutes enacted by Congress granting 
large classes of widows an enforceable right to cash and land subsidies 
ushered in a new kind of social provision for married women and, 
importantly, a new adjudicative process for resolving widows’ legal 
claims. Eligibility determinations for military subsidies were not made 
in courts; they were made through a relatively elaborate federal 
administrative system that developed over the course of the early 
nineteenth century. Through these processes, low-level administrators 
were required to implement the innovative form of social provision 
that Congress had created: the marriage-based entitlement. In that 
role, administrators had to contend with a significant problem in 
nineteenth-century family law: What constituted a legal marriage? 
Histories of the legal regulation of marriage in the nineteenth 
century have traditionally focused on courts and have demonstrated 
how early nineteenth-century judges tended to employ a broad 
definition of legal marriage through liberal evidentiary requirements 
 
 101. 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 557 (3d ed., Boston, Little, Brown 
1857). 
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and the common law marriage doctrine.102 In this Part, I depart from 
this traditional, court-centered approach by shifting the focus from 
private law to public law, from judges to administrators. I then 
consider whether the legal construction of marriage differed in an 
alternative institutional context. Did it matter to the legal 
construction of the family that this system of provision was a product 
of public law rather than private law? Did it make a difference that 
women claiming military subsidies were required to establish the 
validity of their marriages with administrative officials rather than 
judges? 
Careful examination of over 300 widows’ military subsidy 
applications reveals that institutional context and fiscal incentives did 
indeed make a difference to how marriage was defined in and through 
the law. While early nineteenth-century judges tended to stretch legal 
standards in order to find the existence of a legal marriage in the 
context of private law litigation, administrative officials tended to be 
suspicious, rather than solicitous, of widows’ alleged marital status. 
The records show that pension administrators stalled and thwarted 
women’s pension claims by employing a narrow, bureaucratic 
definition of marriage. And they did so even as Congress and high-
ranking executive branch officials pushed the Pension Office to apply 
the broader definition of marriage used in courts, making this a story 
about bureaucratic disentitlement: administrators’ use of procedural 
hurdles to delay or deny benefits to eligible persons.103 
The fundamental question I consider in this Part is why did 
these administrators resist the capacious definition of marriage used 
in the courts? One important part of the answer lay in the fiscal 
incentives created by a broad-scale system of marriage-based 
entitlements. Where government funds, rather than private assets, 
were at stake, legal officials charged with allocating marriage-based 
entitlements tended to emphasize marriage’s role as a system of 
closure rather than inclusion, thereby limiting the public costs of 
 
 102. See infra Part II.A. 
 103. See Michael Lipsky Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 SOC. 
SERV. REV. 3, 3 (1984) (defining “bureaucratic disentitlement” as a mode of “programmatic 
retrenchment” in which “obligations to social welfare beneficiaries are reduced . . . through 
largely ‘bureaucratic’ actions and inactions of public authorities”). In certain respects, the 
pension clerks resembled the legalistic administrators described by William Simon in his 
discussion of modern welfare workers. See William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class 
in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1198–99 (1983). For a recent discussion of modern-day 
desk clerks’ power to effectively make law concerning marital name changing, even absent 
delegated discretion, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the 
Future of Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 823–27 (2008). 
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women’s dependency by manipulating the operative legal definition of 
marriage. However, this is not exclusively a story about fiscal 
incentives. As I show below, in the context of administering the first 
broad-scale marriage-based entitlement program, a combination of 
ideological, fiscal, and institutional pressures led to the development 
of a license-based definition of legal marriage well over half a century 
earlier than is generally thought. 
First, I provide a brief overview of the legal regulation of 
marriage in early nineteenth-century courts—courts known for their 
capacious definition of marriage. Next, I turn to the contemporaneous 
experience of women who sought military subsidies, and particularly 
to their difficulties in proving marriage in administrative proceedings. 
The resulting picture is of two very different doctrinal conceptions of 
legal marriage, which, when applied in their respective institutional 
contexts, served a similar fiscal and ideological end: limiting the 
polity’s liability for women’s dependency. 
A. Courts, Private Contracting, and Public Marriages 
To understand the significance of the Pension Office’s general 
resistance to widows’ claims of marital status, one must first know 
something about the regulation of marriage in the early nineteenth 
century in other institutional contexts. Federal administrators’ refusal 
to recognize the marriage of Thankful Reynolds—the widow described 
in the opening vignette of this Article—may seem quite sensible to us 
today, given that paperwork, licenses, and registration have become 
part and parcel of what we understand as legal marriage.104 
However, marriage was not always such a clearly demarcated 
and well-documented legal status. In the early nineteenth century, 
licensing and registration schemes were often optional and 
underutilized.105 Legislatures tended to play a secondary role in the 
regulation of marriage, as statutes regulating marriage were 
frequently underenforced. Instead, the common law judge—the central 
figure in nineteenth-century legal history—played the leading role in 
 
 104. For an engaging and edifying exposition on the rise and function of the marriage 
license, see Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758 (2005). 
 105. See GROSSBERG, supra note 10, at 64–78. In this Article, I focus on the laws and 
practices governing marriage in those states that, generally speaking, followed the English legal 
tradition (even if they departed from specific English doctrines of marriage law). For discussions 
of marriage law in regions following the Spanish and French legal traditions, see Hans W. 
Baade, The Form of Marriage in Spanish North America, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1975); Hans W. 
Baade, Marriage Contracts in French and Spanish Louisiana: A Study in “Notarial” 
Jurisprudence, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
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the regulation of marriage. Most courts of the period demonstrated a 
strong bias toward recognizing the legitimacy of a given marriage, 
both through the application of liberal evidentiary standards and, in a 
majority of states, the recognition of common law marriage.106 The 
legal maxim semper praesumitur pro matrimonio, always presume 
marriage, fairly characterized the judicial posture toward marriage.107 
According to Chief Justice James Kent’s leading 1809 opinion on the 
subject, marriage could “be proved . . . from cohabitation, reputation, 
acknowledgment of the parties, reception in the family, and other 
circumstances from which a marriage may be inferred. . . . No formal 
solemnization of marriage was requisite.”108 As Ariela Dubler has 
explained, “Common law marriage, as a doctrine, took a 
nonsolemnized relationship and granted it the legal title of marriage 
because, in a social sense, the parties to the relationship acted like 
they were married.”109 
Historians have offered different explanations for early 
nineteenth-century judges’ liberal approach to marriage. In part, 
judicial recognition of common law marriage grew out of the fact that 
many local governments lacked mandatory licensing or registration 
systems during the early nineteenth century, and even where such 
systems were in place, couples often lacked access to officials qualified 
to perform marriage ceremonies.110 But it was not simply necessity 
that led to the recognition of common law marriage. According to 
Michael Grossberg, judges contributed to the underenforcement of 
marriage regulations by treating licenses as “administrative aids 
instead of regulatory devices.”111 Grossberg characterizes debates over 
 
 106. See GROSSBERG, supra note 10, at 73–83. It is important to note that there was another 
model of marriage regulation available in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Liberal 
judicial regulation of marriage in America contrasted with the rigid statutory regime that the 
English Parliament put in place in 1753, which required compliance with strict licensing, 
ceremonial, and registration procedures. See Lord Hardwicke’s Marriage Act, 1753, 26 Geo. 2, c. 
33 (Eng.); LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1500–1800, at 35–37 
(1977). 
 107. See 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 
374 (6th ed., Boston, Little, Brown 1881) (1852) (“Every intendment of the law is in favor of 
matrimony.”). 
 108. Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52, 52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (per curiam); GROSSBERG, supra 
note 10, at 70. 
 109. Dubler, Wifely Behavior, supra note 10, at 963; see also COTT, supra note 25, at 39 
(“Except in the few states that absolutely prohibited or nullified self-marriage by law, courts 
were generally satisfied when a couple’s cohabitation looked like and was reputed in the 
community to be marriage, whether or not authorized ceremonies could be documented.”). 
 110. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law 
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 722–23 (1996). 
 111. GROSSBERG, supra note 10, at 77; see also Bowman, supra note 110, at 723–32.  
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regulation of marriage and marriage rites as reflecting a tension 
between contractual freedom and state intervention, in which judicial 
recognition of common law marriage was an instance of deference to 
the “private nature of contracts” that “relied on the self-regulation 
implicit in such agreements for nuptial supervision.”112 As such, he 
argues, recognition of common law marriage betrayed “a republican 
ethos that weakened public regulation of matrimony, whether by 
parents, the local community, or the state” and revealed support for 
the view that “the commonwealth was better served by judicially 
supervised self-regulation than by public scrutiny.”113 
Others have eschewed contractual and privacy-based 
explanations of the common law marriage doctrine, emphasizing 
instead its ascriptive dimensions. For example, Nancy Cott argues 
that “although state authority seemed to back away in the acceptance 
of common-law marriage, the result of this acceptance was to widen 
the ambit of the state’s enforcement of marital obligations, duties, and 
rewards and to reinforce state support for monogamous marriage as 
an institution.”114 Similarly, Dubler shows how the rhetoric of the 
sanctity of private contract found in many judicial opinions defending 
common law marriage was in part driven by an effort to broaden the 
regulatory reach of marriage. She contends that “[t]hrough the 
labeling of unsolemnized sexual unions as marriages, [courts] affirmed 
state support for the institution of marriage and all its attendant 
obligations.”115 According to Dubler, the judiciary’s readiness to bring 
unsolemnized relationships within the ambit of legal marriage was 
animated by both moralist and materialist concerns. Many of the 
cases in which marital status was litigated were brought by women 
seeking support from a would-be husband or his estate. In this 
context, rather than face the “spectacle of women in potential 
relationships of dependency with the state,” judicial enforcers of 
common law marriage preferred to shift “such dependencies back to 
what was perceived to be their natural and proper place.”116 Thus, 
Dubler reasons, “[W]ithin the framework of contract, courts effectively 
privatized the dependencies of women and children within the private 
sphere of the family.”117 
 
 112. GROSSBERG, supra note 10, at 69–70. 
 113. Id. at 70. 
 114. Cott, supra note 10, at 120. 
 115. Dubler, Governing, supra note 10, at 1906. 
 116. Id. at 1918. 
 117. Id. at 1908. 
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Not all early nineteenth-century judges recognized common 
law marriage in the broad terms propounded by James Kent. 
Massachusetts jurist Theophilus Parsons, for example, insisted that 
lawful marriage “must be celebrated before a clergyman in orders,” 
thereby rejecting the doctrine of common law marriage.118 But 
Parsons’s view remained a decidedly minority one among judges 
throughout the early nineteenth century and into the post-Civil War 
period. The doctrine of common law marriage was widely adopted by 
state courts through the 1850s and 1860s, and in 1877 the Supreme 
Court of the United States recognized and enforced the doctrine in 
Meister v. Moore.119 
As it turned out, however, the Supreme Court’s imprimatur 
was a swan song of sorts for common law marriage. During the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, robust judicial recognition 
of common law marriage and underutilization of licensing and 
registration schemes came under fire from various groups—including 
marriage moralists and eugenicists—who sought to clarify the 
distinction between marriage and non-marriage and to strengthen the 
government’s role in the regulation of marriage, especially with 
respect to regulating who could marry whom.120 Notably, the 
establishment of programs such as workmen’s compensation in the 
early twentieth century is believed to have added to concerns about 
the common law marriage doctrine. Cynthia Bowman contends that, 
“with the growth of new benefits programs, the courts began to add 
concerns about administrative convenience and fraud in relation to 
government benefits” to mounting criticism of common law 
marriage.121 Whatever the precise causes, the common law marriage 
doctrine experienced a swift decline in the early twentieth century, as 
stricter state licensing and registration procedures were in the 
 
 118. Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 53 (1810). Justice Parsons’s son, the Dane Professor of 
Law at Harvard, took a similar view. See PARSONS, supra note 101, at 558–61 (discussing the 
validity of common law marriage). For a discussion of Parsons-the-elder’s and Parsons-the-
younger’s views on common law marriage, see GROSSBERG, supra note 10, at 71–74. 
 119. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 80 (1877). 
 120. See GROSSBERG, supra note 10, at 86–94 (describing criticism of the common law 
marriage doctrine); Bowman, supra note 110, at 732–40 (describing efforts to abolish common 
law marriage); see also Part III.C. 
 121. See Bowman, supra note 110, at 746 (“The typical case raising the validity of a common 
law marriage in the latter part of the twentieth century concerns claims for workers’ 
compensation or social security benefits, not inheritance.”). Early nineteenth-century pension 
clerks’ resistance to the common law marriage doctrine shows that administrative convenience 
and fraud were concerns well before the twentieth century. See infra Part II.B–C. 
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ascendancy.122 According to Grossberg, such direct regulation of 
marriage through licensing and registration systems “shifted 
governance of nuptials away from self-policing [of marriage] toward 
bureaucratic supervision. . . . The state had become an interested, 
active third party.”123 
Although these accounts of the rise and decline of common law 
marriage differ in important respects, some commonalities are worth 
highlighting. First, and most obviously, all of these accounts 
emphasize marriage doctrine’s expansive dimensions in the early 
nineteenth century. While different authors assign different political 
valences to this broad conception of marriage, in all of these accounts 
the emphasis is on marriage as an instrument of legal and social 
inclusion—sometimes coercive inclusion—rather than exclusion. 
Second, many of the underlying legal disputes in which the issue of 
marital status emerged involved private law claims in which a woman 
sought legitimation of her relationship with a man in order to secure 
financial support from him or his estate, such as a widow’s claim to 
inheritance or dower. In this context, marriage operated to secure a 
private source of support for women. Thus, although the public fisc 
was not directly at stake, judicial recognition of women’s marital 
status in these cases protected the polity from having to assume 
liability for women’s support through, for example, poor relief. Finally, 
these accounts of the legal regulation of marriage, and particularly the 
common law marriage doctrine, capture a view of marriage regulation 
through a specific institutional frame—one focused on the role of 
courts, or, to use Grossberg’s phrase, the “judicial patriarchy.”124 It 
was the judge—simultaneously empowered and constrained by the 
conventions of his office—who answered the question of “what 
constitutes marriage.” 
B. Marriage Law Outside the Courts 
Scant attention has been given to how administrative officials 
construed marriage law in the early nineteenth century, in part 
because it is frequently presumed that there was little in the way of 
centralized administration during this period known for “court and 
 
 122. By the early 1920s, eight states had abolished common law marriage, and ten more 
states abolished the practice prior to 1960. Bowman, supra note 110, at 715 n.24; see also 
GROSSBERG, supra note 10, at 93–102. 
 123. GROSSBERG, supra note 10, at 102. 
 124. Id. at 290 (“Judicial domination was one of the most fundamental realities of 
nineteenth-century domestic-relations law.”). 
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parties,”125 and also because we generally tend to look for the law in 
judicial opinions. But the administration of military subsidies reveals 
a parallel world of adjudication of women’s marital status. Over the 
course of the early nineteenth century, well over fifty thousand women 
navigated this judgeless branch of the legal world and encountered a 
very different legal official: the pension clerk. Pension clerks had a 
different approach to marriage law, and to the women who sought the 
legal protections of widowhood, than that of their contemporaries on 
the bench. 
In this Section, I show how pension clerks, working to allocate 
public funds rather than determine private liability, attempted to 
restrain the relatively unruly approach to the legal construction of 
marriage used in the courts. Operating largely free of judicial review, 
these clerks implemented a bureaucratized, “state-centered” definition 
of marriage that is generally identified with the early twentieth 
century. First, I describe an alternative adjudicative world in which 
the forebears of modern administrative law judges determined 
women’s marital rights in concrete ways. Next, I demonstrate how 
administrative adjudication of military subsidy claims in the early 
nineteenth century led to bureaucratic disentitlement as pension 
clerks stalled, delayed, and denied women’s access to marriage-based 
entitlements by imposing a legal definition of marriage that many 
women simply could not satisfy. 
1. The Judgeless World of Military Subsidy Adjudication 
What exactly did this judgeless world of adjudication look like? 
Depending on when in the early nineteenth century a widow sought a 
pension, it would have looked more or less like a modern 
administrative procedure. In the Federalist period, veterans and 
 
 125. Stephen Skowronek has argued famously that the antebellum period was one of “courts 
and parties,” during which national institutions played an “innocuous role” and “the most 
fundamental social choices—from the organization of capitalism to the regulation of family life—
[were] firmly lodged in state legal codes” administered by state judges. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, 
BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 
1877–1920, at 23 (1982). Others have challenged aspects of Skowronek’s characterization. See 
John, supra note 23; Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative 
Law From Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1574–85 (2008) [hereinafter 
Mashaw, Administration]; Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: 
Federalist Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258 n.3 (2006); Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 
1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1639–47 (2007) [hereinafter Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists]. 
Writing before Skowronek, Matthew Crenson focused important attention on the development of 
centralized bureaucracy in the Jacksonian period. MATTHEW A. CRENSON, THE FEDERAL 
MACHINE: BEGINNINGS OF BUREAUCRACY IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1975). 
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widows sought financial relief directly from Congress, regardless of 
whether they sought such relief under a general pension statute or in 
the hope of a private bill enacted by congressional grace.126 In 1793 
Congress sought to enlist the assistance of Article III federal judges in 
the adjudication of pension claims, but that plan was famously 
rejected by federal judges in Hayburn’s Case.127 By the early 1800s, 
unable to saddle federal judges with the work of pension claim review, 
Congress had all but officially delegated review of pension and land 
bounty claims to the Department of War, which was to make a 
preliminary determination of subsidy applications, subject to final 
congressional approval.128 In 1833, in response to Secretary of War 
Lewis Cass’s complaint that the Department had assumed a level of 
responsibility unauthorized by statute, Congress created the Pension 
Office, housed first within the War Department, and later within the 
Department of the Interior.129 It was through the administrative 
system codified in 1833 that Thankful Reynolds sought a pension in 
1837. 
Reynolds, like most widows and veterans, did not navigate this 
system alone. She retained a private pension claims agent. Pension 
claims agents worked as intermediaries between the applicant and the 
federal government and were often empowered by the applicant to 
 
 126. See, e.g., 1 AM. STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 196–97, No. 85 (1797) (report of the Committee 
on Claims recommending denial of the petition of Anna Welsh, widow of a captain of the 
Marines); 1 AM. STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 222, No. 108 (1800) (report by the Committee on Claims 
recommending denial of the petition of Susannah Fowle, widow of a deceased Army officer). For a 
general account of Congress’s oversight of individual claims against the federal government 
during the early nineteenth century, see Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the 
United States: The Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. 
REV. 625, 643–53 (1985). 
 127. 2 U.S. (1 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
 128. See Act of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 17, § 2, 1 Stat. 324, 325 (ordering that “the Secretary [of 
War] shall make a statement of the cases of the said [pension] claimants to Congress, with such 
circumstances and remarks, as may be necessary, in order to enable them to take such order 
thereon, as they may judge proper”); see also LEONARD D. WHITE, JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 1829–1861, at 535–36 (1954) (describing the process for review of 
pension claims by the Secretary of War). 
 129. LEWIS CASS, LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, RECOMMENDING THE 
ESTABLISHMENT, BY LAW, OF A BRANCH OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT, TO BE DENOMINATED “THE 
PENSION OFFICE,” H.R. DOC. NO. 22-34 (2d Sess. 1833); see Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 54, 4 Stat. 
619, 622 (creating the Pension Office and the Office of the Commissioner of Pensions); Act of 
Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, §§ 1, 6, 9 Stat. 395, 395 (establishing the Department of the Interior and 
making the Pension Office a bureau of that Department); see also GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY 
PENSIONS, supra note 39, at 84–86 (discussing Cass’s recommendations to Congress for the 
creation of a Pension Office within the War Department). Despite its name, once the Pension 
Office was moved to the Department of the Interior, it was also charged with responsibility for 
the administration of military bounty lands. See, e.g., LOREN PINCKNEY WALDO, REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 33-1, vol. 1, at 489–90 (1st Sess. 1853) 
(reporting on bounty lands). 
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collect the pension payments if the claim was successful.130 Pension 
agents tended to live in the vicinity of the widow, not in Washington, 
D.C.131 Some were trained as attorneys, but there is nothing to 
suggest that legal training was required.132 By advertising their 
services in newspapers and by soliciting clients, pension claims agents 
disseminated information about widows’ new statutory rights.133 They 
then helped women realize those rights by collecting relevant 
evidence, presenting it to the Pension Office in a manner that 
complied with the Office’s elaborate certification requirements, 
following up on delayed claims, and sometimes pressing 
administrative and congressional appeals.134 Of course, pension claims 
agents did not assist their clients for free; they generally collected a 
sizable percentage of the pension as payment for their services. In his 
1854 hornbook on pension and bounty land laws, Triplett explained 
that “[t]he prosecution of these claims has grown into a regular 
profession, to which many intelligent gentlemen have devoted 
 
 130. See TRIPLETT, supra note 43, at v. Pension claims agents should not be confused with 
pension bank agents. Pension bank agents were appointed by the Secretary of War, through the 
Pension Office, and acted as the conduit for government payments to the pensioner. See generally 
JOEL POINSETT, REPORT FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, S. DOC. NO. 25-156 (2d Sess. 1838). The 
majority of bank agents were presidents of local banks, and because their banks derived some 
benefit from the pension funds provided to them by the U.S. Bank or the Treasury Department, 
their fees were set at a two percent commission for their services. Id. at 3–7; MAYO & MOULTON, 
supra note 42, at 462. In contrast, pension claims agents worked directly with the pension 
applicants, and were not selected by the government. Claims agents served as advocates for 
pension applicants throughout the process and generally charged a significant commission for 
their services. See TRIPLETT, supra note 43, at v. Both bank agents and claims agents were 
implicated in fraud scandals throughout the period. See, e.g., Frauds Upon the Treasury, N.H. 
PATRIOT, Oct. 20, 1834, at 2; Pension Fraud, BALT. PATRIOT, Oct. 17, 1834, at 2; Pension Frauds, 
BALT. PATRIOT, Oct. 14, 1834, at 2; Pension Frauds, NEWPORT MERCURY, Oct. 18, 1834, at 3. 
 131. If a widow decided to appeal her claim to Congress, she would sometimes enlist the 
services of an agent or attorney located in the Capital. See, e.g., File of Sarah Knight, R6030, Roll 
1502, Letter from Edmund F. Brown to Hon. Sam[uel] O. Peyton, House of Representatives (Jan. 
5, 1845) (letter from pension claims agent concerning status of widow’s petition, return address 
“Washington City, D.C.”). 
 132. Extant subsidy applications, newspaper advertisements, judicial opinions, and 
congressional debates over regulation of agents do not suggest that pension claims agents were 
necessarily trained or regulated as lawyers, although some agents clearly were lawyers. For 
example, part of Abraham Lincoln’s very lucrative law practice included representation of 
veterans and widows to the Pension Office. See Douglas L. Wilson, “Terrific in Denunciation”: 
Taking a New Look at Lincoln the Lawyer, 29 HUMAN. 17, 17 (2008), available at 
http://www.neh.gov/news/humanities/2008-01/Lincoln_the_lawyer.html (last visited Apr. 7, 
2009). 
 133. See, e.g., Military Forward March!: Chartered Money—Land and Pensions, for Officers, 
Soldiers, Widows and Orphans, AM. TELEGRAPH, July 2, 1817; Notice, N.H. SENTINEL, Mar. 30, 
1837; Pension Blanks for Widows, N.H. PATRIOT, Dec. 26, 1836; Revolutionary Soldiers—Attend, 
E. ARGUS, Apr. 14, 1835; Soldiers’ Claims, N.H. PATRIOT, Aug. 8, 1850; To Surviving Widows, 
Whose Husbands Served in the Revolutionary War, CONN. COURANT, June 3, 1837. 
 134. See TRIPLETT, supra note 43, at v. 
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themselves, not without the expectation of a remuneration for their 
services.”135 Such remuneration could be handsome. “If the agent be 
honest and trustworthy, he is satisfied with one-third or one-half of 
the amount recovered; if he is not, (as is sometimes the case,) he keeps 
it all.”136  
Triplett’s characterization of pension claims agents was 
relatively charitable. While instances of sharp dealing were likely 
more common, fraudulent conduct by pension claims agents could and, 
on occasion, did lead to criminal charges against individual agents, 
and to stricter regulation of agents by Congress.137 One congressional 
report described claims agents as “a class of persons . . . who hang like 
parasites upon [society’s] industry, and tend, by their daily practices, 
to poison the very sources of its prosperity.”138 Despite misgivings 
about their functions and fees, pension claims agents played a central 
role in the administration of military subsidies—a role that continued 
through the period because of the complexity of the administrative 
system that emerged to process veterans’ and widows’ claims. 
After amassing the voluminous documentation required to 
support a widow’s claim, the pension claims agent sent the application 
to the Pension Office in Washington, D.C., where pension clerks 
reviewed the applications and made initial determinations of 
eligibility. Although War Department clerks in the informally created 
Pension Office processed pension applications from at least the 1810s, 
the position of pension clerk was officially recognized and salaried in 
1833, when Congress created the Pension Office and appropriated 
money for the clerks’ salaries.139 The salaries, which in 1843 ranged 
from $800 to $1,400 per year, made them fairly well paid white-collar 
workers for the period.140 In any particular year, the Pension Office 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 65, § 18, 4 Stat. 115, 120 (criminalizing forgery of 
letters of attorney and false impersonation associated with pension applications); United States 
v. Staats, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 41, 43–44 (1850) (describing criminal charges against pension agents 
for commission of fraud upon the government); United States v. Wilcox, 28 F. Cas. 597, 598–99 
(N.D.N.Y. 1859) (No. 16,691) (concerning transmission of forged documents to the Pension 
Office); United States v. Waterborough, 28 F. Cas. 417, 418–19 (D. Me. 1841) (No. 16,648) 
(describing an action for pension fraud); COMM. ON REVOLUTIONARY PENSIONS, FRAUDS ON 
PENSION OFFICE, H.R. REP. NO. 23-37 (2d Sess. 1835) (describing instances of pension fraud). 
 138. SOLON BORLAND, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ABUSES, BRIBERY, OR FRAUD IN 
THE PROSECUTION OF CLAIMS BEFORE CONGRESS, S. REP. NO. 33-1, vol. 1, at 29 (Spec. Sess. 
1853).  
 139. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 54, 4 Stat. 619, 622. 
 140. LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, TRANSMITTING THE NUMBER, CLASSES, AND 
COMPENSATION OF PERSONS EMPLOYED IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR ON THE 1ST OF 
JANUARY, 1829, AND ON THE 1ST OF JANUARY, 1843, WITH THE COMPENSATION OF EACH AT THE 
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employed anywhere from six to eighty-five pension clerks, including a 
Chief Pension Clerk.141 A review of randomly selected applications to 
the War Department for employment as clerks suggests that the 
pension clerks were generally drawn from a pool of educated men but 
were not likely to have been trained as lawyers. For example, Lewis 
Bixby, a resident of Rochester, New York, sought a clerk position in 
1845. His letters of recommendation tell us that he was a graduate of 
Union College, a school teacher, and an active Democrat.142 Pension 
clerks were, in other words, men who prior to becoming clerks relied 
heavily on connections and general proficiency, rather than special 
training or expertise, to achieve professional status. 
As suggested in an 1832 report to Congress by Secretary Cass, 
once they assumed the job of pension clerk, these administrators had 
little, if any, autonomy in their offices. Cass described the pension 
clerks as men “who, from their experience, or other qualifications, are 
fully competent to the discharge of this duty, and who act under the 
more immediate direction of the faithful officer who has so long 
presided over the Pension Bureau.”143 The “faithful officer” in question 
was James Edwards, who worked in the Pension Office starting in the 
1810s—before the Office was officially recognized under law—and was 
 
RESPECTIVE PERIODS, H.R. DOC. 27-209, at 11 (3d Sess. 1843); see also ROBERT A. MARGO, 
WAGES AND LABOR MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1820–1860, at tab. 3A.7 (2000) (estimating 
the average nominal monthly wages for white-collar workers in the South Atlantic region to be 
$42.69 per month for the period 1841–1850). 
 141. See, e.g., LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, TRANSMITTING LISTS OF 
CLERKS AND OTHER PERSONS EMPLOYED IN THAT DEPARTMENT, H.R. DOC. 31-54, at 10–13 (2d 
Sess. 1851); LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, TRANSMITTING LISTS OF THE NAMES OF THE 
CLERKS EMPLOYED IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT, IN THE LAST YEAR, AND THE COMPENSATION 
ALLOWED TO EACH, H.R. DOC. 15-106, at 22 (2d Sess. 1819). 
 142. Application of Lewis Bixby, NARA, Register of Applications for Regular Army 
Commissions and Civilian Appointments, RG 107, Entry No. 258, Box No. 1; see also, e.g., 
Application of Daniel Boyd, NARA, Register of Applications for Regular Army Commissions and 
Civilian Appointments, RG 107, Entry No. 258, Box No. 1, Letter from William S. Amble to Hon. 
Lewis Cass (Oct. 27, 1832) (describing clerk applicant as a former merchant); Application of 
William H. Boswell, NARA, Register of Applications for Regular Army Commissions and Civilian 
Appointments, RG 107, Entry No. 258, Box No. 1, Letter from William H. Boswell to Hon. John 
H. Eaton (Mar. 16, 1829) (explaining that applicant is by training a printer); Application of Peter 
C. Bowne, NARA, Register of Applications for Regular Army Commissions and Civilian 
Appointments, RG 107, Entry No. 258, Box No. 1, Letter from H.[V.L.] Van der Beys to Sec’y of 
War (n.d.) (“I assure you upon my honor that Mr. B — is an accomplished young gentleman, and 
would honor any office to which young men are eligible . . . .”). It is possible that certain clerks 
were trained attorneys. For example, Francis Triplett, a Chief Clerk during the 1840s, appears 
to have been an attorney. After his tenure as Chief Clerk he became a pension and land bounty 
claims agent and in that capacity represented widows and veterans in the Claims Court. See, 
e.g., Ansart’s Heirs v. United States, 6 U.S. Cong. Rep. C.C. 165 (Ct. Cl. 1858) (noting F.F.C. 
Triplett as attorney for heirs of a veteran). 
 143. LEWIS CASS, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, H.R. DOC. NO. 22-2, at 31 (2d Sess. 
1832). 
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selected in 1818 by Secretary of War John Calhoun to run the Pension 
Office in the wake of a major pension fraud scandal.144 In 1833, when 
the Pension Office was codified by statute, Edwards was appointed as 
Commissioner, a position he held until 1850.145 
Commissioner Edwards appears to have had a heavy hand in 
virtually every aspect of the Office’s business. Widows’ military 
subsidy applications and other sources reveal that Edwards was 
regularly involved in deciding individual widows’ claims, either as a 
first reviewer or as an informal appellate adjudicator when an 
applicant was dissatisfied with an initial result.146 In addition to 
overseeing individual adjudications, Edwards also established Office 
policies regarding eligibility criteria, including criteria that would 
determine the validity of a widow’s marriage.147 These criteria were 
memorialized in the forms, circulars, and manuals that guided the 
everyday business of the individual pension clerks.148 
Edwards not only directed the decisionmaking processes of the 
Pension Office, but also protected the clerks from Congress’s frugality 
and, presumably, the rotation system. Starting in 1842, in virtually 
every annual report from the Department of War to Congress 
concerning the Departments’ employees, Edwards included a letter 
proclaiming the ongoing utility of the clerks: 
The clerks in this office have all been, and are still, usefully employed; and I cannot 
dispense with the services of any one of them at present without detriment to the public 
 
 144. RESCH, supra note 22, at 124–25. 
 145. Perhaps because of a general respect for Edwards’s integrity, Edwards escaped Andrew 
Jackson’s famed “rotation system.” For a discussion of the rotation system and its impact on the 
civil service, see CRENSON, supra note 125, at 48–71; see also Mashaw, Administration, supra 
note 125, at 1613–28 (describing the rotation system); discussion infra note 246. 
 146. See, e.g., File of Patsy Bass, W23482, Roll 169, Letter from J. Ewing, Dep’t of Interior, to 
J.L. Edwards, Comm’r of Pensions (June 27, 1850) (affirming Pension Office determination in 
individual widow’s case); File of Thankful Reynolds, W11118, Roll 2026, Letter from J.L. 
Edwards to Hon. J.C. Bates (Dec. 28, 1841) (urging against congressional reversal of Pension 
Office’s denial of widow’s pension application). 
 147. See infra Part II.C. At least in theory, Edwards set Pension Office policies in conformity 
with the policies and interpretations provided by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Interior, 
the Attorney General, and Congress. See MAYO & MOULTON, supra note 42, at lxii (observing 
that an 1815 opinion by Secretary of War Dallace endorsed the principle that “[t]he opinion of 
the Attorney General is to govern in all applications for pensions,” but noting that such opinions 
are now “advisory only, yet they are as scrupulously conformed to, as the law itself”). However, 
as I demonstrate below, Edwards did not always adhere to his superiors’ policy directives in 
practice. 
 148. See, e.g., MAYO & MOULTON, supra note 42, at 601–702 (reproducing REGULATIONS, 
FORMS, AND INSTRUCTIONS BY SECRETARIES OF WAR, NAVY, TREASURY, INTERIOR, AND THE 
COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS, IN THE EXECUTION OF THE PENSION LAWS AND LAND BOUNTY LAWS); 
see also sources cited infra note 220. 
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service. I do not think that the removal of any one of them is necessary, or that any 
other change is required for the better dispatch of business.149  
In short, the world that widows navigated in pursuit of a military 
subsidy was a bureaucratic hierarchy overseen by a particularly 
powerful Commissioner. 
Eligibility determinations by the Pension Office were not 
subject to judicial review as we understand that concept today.150 But 
that did not mean the disappointed widow had no recourse. If an 
individual widow’s claim was rejected by the Pension Office, she could 
first appeal to the Secretary of War or the Interior, and finally to 
Congress.151 An 1846 opinion of the Attorney General is especially 
 
 149. LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, TRANSMITTING A LIST OF CLERKS AND ALL OTHER 
PERSONS EMPLOYED IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT DURING THE YEAR 1842, H.R. DOC. 27-117, at 8 (3d 
Sess. 1843); see also LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, TRANSMITTING A LIST OF 
CLERKS AND OTHERS EMPLOYED IN HIS DEPARTMENT, H.R. EXEC. DOC. 31-79, at 21 (1st Sess. 
1850); REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, OF THE NAMES OF THE CLERKS AND OTHER PERSONS 
EMPLOYED IN THE BRANCHES OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT, EXCEPT OFFICERS OF THE ARMY, DURING 
THE YEAR 1848, S. EXEC. DOC. 30-11, vol. 1, at 13 (2d Sess. 1849); LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY 
OF WAR, TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT SHOWING THE NAMES OF THE CLERKS AND OTHER PERSONS 
EMPLOYED IN ALL THE BRANCHES OF THAT DEPARTMENT, H.R. DOC. 29-40, at 4 (2d Sess. 1847); 
LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT SHOWING THE NAMES OF THE 
CLERKS AND OTHER PERSONS EMPLOYED IN ALL THE BRANCHES OF THAT DEPARTMENT, H.R. DOC. 
29-56, at 19 (1st Sess. 1846); LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, TRANSMITTING STATEMENTS 
OF NAMES OF CLERKS AND OTHER PERSONS EMPLOYED IN THAT DEPARTMENT DURING THE YEAR 
1844, H.R. DOC. 28-37, at 3 (2d Sess. 1845); LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, 
TRANSMITTING REPORT AND STATEMENTS, SHOWING THE NUMBER OF CLERKS AND OTHER 
PERSONS EMPLOYED IN THAT DEPARTMENT DURING THE YEAR 1843, H.R. DOC. 28-48, at 4 (1st 
Sess. 1844). 
 150. According to Jerry Mashaw, judicial review in the Jacksonian era was “as confused and 
conflicted as the political history of the period. The Court redeemed Marshall’s promise of 
mandamus review in Marbury v. Madison and then immediately limited it to an almost 
vanishing category of purely ministerial actions.” Mashaw, Administration, supra note 125, at 
1683. Additionally, under certain circumstances, individuals aggrieved by a federal 
administrator’s conduct could pursue common law damages actions in state court. See id. at 
1669–84 (describing judicial review of administrative action during the Jacksonian period); 
Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists, supra note 125, at 1674–96, 1725–36 (describing judicial review 
of embargo and public land claims in the Republican era). As a practical matter, however, 
judicial review of claims denials by the Pension Office was almost nonexistent. I have located 
only one such action brought by a widow, and that was the case of Susan Decatur, widow of the 
famous commodore Stephen Decatur. Decatur’s case was unusual in many respects, including 
the fact that she sought a writ of mandamus to force the Secretary of the Navy to pay her a 
pension. Her pursuit of a writ of mandamus failed. See Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 
497, 523 (1840). For sustained discussions of Susan Decatur’s case, see Mashaw, Administration, 
supra note 125, at 1673–77; Collins, supra note 49, at 22–27. It was not until 1855 that Congress 
created the Court of Claims to review certain kinds of claims against the federal government, but 
even then Congress retained ultimate authority over all claims upon the public treasury, 
including individual pension claims. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 9, 10 Stat. 612, 618–19; 
Shimomura, supra note 126, at 652–53. 
 151. 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 515 (1846) (describing the appeal process and opining that the 
President lacked the power to correct errors of the Pension Office); see also File of Patsy Bass, 
W23482, Roll 169, Letter from J.E. Heath, Comm’r of Pensions, to A.H.H. Stuart, Sec’y of the 
Interior (Dec. 3, 1850) (reporting an appeal from an adverse decision of the Commissioner of 
1B. Collins_PAGE 6/15/2009 12:33:42 PM 
1130 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:4:1085 
instructive in this regard. The question posed to the Attorney General 
was whether a widow had a right “to an appeal to the President from a 
decision of the Commissioner of Pensions, which had been approved by 
the Secretary of War.”152 The answer was clear: disgruntled pension 
applicants “can apply for relief to Congress, whose power cannot be 
doubted.”153 Apparently, the widow had not raised the possibility that 
the Pension Office’s decision could be appealed to a court of law, nor 
did the Attorney General see fit to preempt such an argument—an 
omission that suggests courts of law played an extremely tangential 
role in the review of military subsidy claims. 
In the absence of meaningful judicial review, women’s 
navigation of the military subsidy system is truly an example of the 
law’s life outside the courts, and, more specifically, of family law’s life 
outside the courts. Judges were not the only legal officials entrusted 
with establishing the legal metes and bounds of marriage in this 
period. With the creation of broad-scale marriage-based entitlements 
in the early nineteenth century, this administrative world—peopled by 
pension agents, pension clerks, and a very powerful Commissioner—
became a site of contest concerning the legal definition of marriage. 
For the woman seeking a marriage-based entitlement, it was the 
distant bureaucrat in Washington, not “judicial patriarchs” in black 
robes, who would make a legal determination of whether she had been 
legally married to her husband. 
2. Widows, Pension Clerks, and Proving Marriage 
When seeking a military subsidy through this relatively 
complex administrative process, a widow was required to submit proof 
of her husband’s service in the military and of the legality of her 
marriage. Many women had problems producing proof of either kind, 
but satisfying the pension clerks’ standards for proof of marriage 
posed particular difficulties for widows. As was sensible at a time 
when marriage licensing and registration procedures were 
underutilized, statutory and administrative rules promulgated during 
the period required the Pension Office to recognize common law 
marriage and to take a generous view of what constituted a legal 
 
Pensions to the Secretary of the Interior); id., Letter from J. Ewing, Dep’t of Interior, to J.L. 
Edwards, Comm’r of Pensions (June 27, 1850) (affirming Pension Office determination); File of 
Joanna Brown, W8386, Roll 359, Pet. of Joanna Brown for a Pension Under the Act of 4th July 
1836 to the Comm. on Revolutionary Pensions (Jan. 18, 1849) (appealing to Congress by petition 
after her pension claim was rejected by the Pension Office). 
 152. 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 515, 515 (1846). 
 153. Id. at 518. 
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marriage.154 Thus, under applicable statutes and regulations, pension 
clerks were supposed to evaluate claims to marital status using the 
same liberal standards as judges of the period. In practice, however, 
women who had not used municipal schemes to license and register 
their marriages faced significant, often insurmountable 
administrative resistance to the recognition of their marriages.155 
One pension agent’s letter to the Pension Office provides an 
entrée into the pension clerks’ resistance to women’s assertions of 
marital status. The agent, frustrated by the pension clerks’ refusal to 
accept the evidence that he had gathered to prove Catharine Baer’s 
marriage, challenged the Pension Office’s failure to follow the 
standards used in courts of law: 
In Feuder v. Bower . . . it is held that for civil purposes that reputation and cohabitation 
are sufficient evidence of marriage. . . . Indeed decisions of similar authority can be 
found[,] as you are no doubt aware, in the judicial records of every state wherever the 
question has come up — In the absence of other evidence is the War Department 
governed by the rules in force before judicial tribunals?156 
This agent’s letter raised an issue that dogged many women seeking 
military subsidies. Careful examination of hundreds of widows’ 
pension and land bounty applications suggests that proving marital 
status was a Herculean task. 
Pension clerks’ overwhelming preference for registered 
marriages was manifest by their insistence that a widow provide 
record evidence of her marriage to a soldier or veteran if such evidence 
was available. As explained in Pension Office instructions for 
applicants: “The legality of the marriage . . . must be clearly 
established. Record proof, as to the marriage, is always required 
whenever it can be obtained.”157 In theory, this seems like a 
reasonable standard. If a widow possessed formal record proof of her 
marriage, she was required to provide it. However, in the actual 
implementation of the rule, Pension Office administrators seemed to 
equate record evidence with legal marriage. 
 
 154. See infra text accompanying notes 230–33.  
 155. See, e.g., File of Eve Awalt, W326, Roll 97, Letter from John Bruce to J.L. Edwards (Dec. 
22, 1845) (inquiring as to status of delayed pension claim of widow who could not provide record 
evidence of marriage); File of Angelica Bond, R997, Roll 284, Letter from G.F. Yates to J.L. 
Edwards, Comm’r of Pensions (Jan. 18, 1843) (inquiring as to status of delayed pension claim of 
widow who could not provide record evidence of marriage and explaining that “there are quite a 
number of pension applications forwarded by me many years since”). 
 156. File of Catharine Baer, R364, Roll 106, Letter from J.M. Boughner to Hon. J.L. Edwards 
(Oct. 23, 1849). 
 157. Rules of Evidence in Widows’ and Orphans’ Claims, in PENSION LAWS NOW IN FORCE, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 25-118, at 103 (2d Sess. 1838); see also MAYO & MOULTON, supra note 42, at 616; 
TRIPLETT, supra note 43, at 35. 
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Even those widows who could produce official record evidence 
of their marriages faced searching scrutiny by administrators if their 
submission at all deviated from the expected form of such records. For 
example, in her application for a pension, Mary Asbury provided a 
copy of a 1785 letter signed by her father authorizing the filing of a 
marriage license and a copy of a marriage bond of the same date, both 
of which had been filed with the county clerk.158 Copies of both 
documents were accompanied by a sealed certification by the county 
clerk declaring that the actual documents were on file in his office.159 
One might expect that the Pension Office would consider these official 
records to be adequate evidence of the couple’s marital status. But the 
Pension Office was unconvinced, and required additional evidence, 
including a statement as to whether or not the marriage had been 
otherwise recorded.160 
Susanna Angell found herself similarly embattled with the 
Pension Office when she submitted an original certificate of marriage 
provided by the officiant of her marriage.161 The Office rejected her 
application on the ground that such evidence was implicitly called into 
question by an affidavit from the town clerk stating that there was no 
record of the marriage on file.162 Incensed by the Pension Office’s 
legalism and refusal to recognize the certificate, the agent fumed that 
“[t]here is no further nor can there be any better evidence than the 
original certificate of marriage . . . .”163 
Even a state court record certifying the legality of a marriage 
for other purposes, such as probate, was not necessarily sufficient 
evidence of marriage as far as the Pension Office was concerned. 
Rachel Anderson’s pension agent complained when the Pension Office 
refused to accept a probate court’s certification of Rachel’s status as a 
widow:  
You say . . . that it will be necessary for Mrs. Rachel Anderson to prove by two credible 
witnesses [before a court of record] that she is a widow & c. all of which was proven to 
the satisfaction of the Probate Court which is now of record. . . . [B]ut if such proof as 
was sufficient 3 or 4 weeks ago will [it] not do now[?] [T]he old lady will send on the 
 
 158. File of Mary Asbury, W5644, Roll 81, Certified Reproductions of Marriage Bond and 
Letter dated May 24, 1785 (Nov. 9, 1843). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id., Decl. of Sally Patterson Sale (Aug. 21, 1844); id., Decl. of Henry Hatcher (Aug. 20, 
1844). 
 161. File of Susanna Angell, W1353, Roll 66, Decl. of Susanna Angell (Mar. 3, 1853). 
 162. Id.; id., Decl. of Raymond G. H[aus], Town Clerk (Aug. 4, 1853); id., Letter from 
B[enjamin] Cowell to Hon. L.P. Waldo (Aug. 13, 1853). 
 163. Id., Letter from B[enjamin] Cowell to Hon. L.P. Waldo (Aug. 13, 1853). 
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proof required although it will cost her about as much as she will get when it is 
allowed.164 
For many women, administrators’ searching scrutiny of official 
record evidence was of little moment, as no such contemporaneous 
documentation had been made. Nevertheless, pension clerks’ 
preference for official record evidence of marriage was so 
overwhelming that widows were required to provide a certified 
statement as to the absence of official record evidence. Therefore, 
widows who could not produce official record evidence of their 
marriages had to provide a declaration, preferably from the town 
clerk, certifying that the records of the town had been searched and no 
such record existed. As advised by Mayo and Moulton in their guide to 
the pension and bounty land laws: 
The [widow’s] declaration must be accompanied by satisfactory proof of the marriage . . . 
. If married in any State or county where any public records of marriages are kept, the 
marriage should be proved by a duly certified copy of the record . . . . If it is shown, by 
affidavit, that no record evidence or testimony of eye-witnesses can be procured, the 
claimant may then produce the best other evidence in her power . . . .165 
One Massachusetts newspaper went so far as to publish the dates 
during which marriages were routinely recorded in the state, 
presumably in an effort to make a public record of the futility of 
searching for marriage records.166 However, public proclamation of the 
unavailability of a licensing and registration system was inadequate 
as far as the Pension Office was concerned, as confirmed by individual 
widows’ experiences.167 Rachel Atwood’s application was initially 
rejected because “it must be shown by the certificate of the resident 
clergyman, and the town clerk of the town where it took place, what 
 
 164. File of Rachel Anderson, W513, Roll 56, Letter from A.G. Matthews to Comm’r of 
Pensions (Aug. 24, 1853). 
 165. MAYO & MOULTON, supra note 42, at 662 n.*; see also id. at 671 n.*; Letter from Pension 
Office to Ness[in], Kain & Jones (Sept. 21, 1853), NARA, Records of the Dep’t of Veterans’ 
Affairs, RG 15, NN No. 22, Entry No. 1, Original & General Corresp. of the Pension Office, 
Letters Sent, vol. 434 (letter advising representatives of widows that the widow “must establish 
her marriage by public or private record or show that evidence of that grade does not exist”). 
 166. For the Sun.: Records of Marriages in Massachusetts, PITTSFIELD SUN (Mass.), Mar. 16, 
1837. 
 167. See, e.g., File of Susan Ashburn, W5649, Roll 81, Decl. of Robert J. Dunaway, Clerk of 
the County Clerk of Lancaster County, Virginia (n.d.) (certifying “that there are no lists of 
marriage recorded in this Court previous to the 21st day of July 1793 . . . and that such lists 
were not so recorded generally till the year 1794”); File of Love Butler, R1547, Roll 436, Decl. of 
Isaiah D. Pease, Clerk of Town of Edgartown, Mass. (Aug. 20, 1839) (certifying that he searched 
the record of marriage for Love Butler and “cannot find any such marriage on record,” and 
further explaining that “the Records are not so regular and full as to raise a presumption against 
the validity of a Marriage not recorded therein”); File of Catharine Baer, R364, Roll 106 (pension 
agent and Pension Office engaged in prolonged correspondence regarding the sufficiency of 
evidence of widow’s marriage even after proving absence of record evidence). 
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evidence, if any, is to be found there, before parole evidence on that 
point could be received.”168 
Friends of widows and pension agents enlisted to help usher 
subsidy applications through the Byzantine application process 
complained bitterly about pension clerks’ focus on official records to 
establish the legality of a marriage, frequently drawing attention to 
the significant disparity between the standards employed by courts 
and those used by administrators in the Pension Office. In the 
application of Bethiah Bagnell, the pension agent explained to the 
Pension Office that record evidence was unavailable for 
Massachusetts marriages performed prior to 1786 and, quoting an 
1813 Massachusetts Supreme Court opinion, asserted that “a copy of 
such record is not so satisfactory evidence [of marriage] as the 
testimony of witnesses.”169 Likewise, the pension agent for Elizabeth 
Bemensderfer complained that the Pension Office’s request for record 
evidence was inappropriate because “in Pennsylvania, proof of that 
kind is not necessary to establish a marriage—Common reputation & 
cohabitation as man & wife, are sufficient under our laws.”170 In 
response to an inquiry sent by the Department of the Navy, a lawyer 
for one widow assured the Department that “there never was any 
certificate of the marriage aforesaid in existence,” and that such 
documents are “not considered as any evidence of the fact of marriage 
by the courts of law in the state of New York, and are for all local 
purposes of a legal character wholly useless.”171 Instead, he explained,  
[T]he evidence of marriage required and admitted in all cases of a merely civil nature in 
the courts of the state of New York is either the oath of some person who saw the parties 
married, or proof or oath that the parties lived together as man & wife, treated each 
other as such, cohabited and were generally reputed and believed to be, and that either 
mode of proof may be adopted as the party may think proper.172 
These agents’ and lawyers’ characterizations of different state law 
standards were indeed accurate, but this did not stop the Pension 
Office from continuing to demand official records.  
 
 168. File of Rachel Atwood, W17222, Roll 89, Letter from Elias Holliday to James L. 
Edwards, Comm’r of Pensions (June 7, 1839). 
 169. File of Bethiah Bagnell, W2578, Roll 106, Letter from William Thomas to James L. 
Edwards, Comm’r of Pensions (Aug. 24, 1836) (quoting Commonwealth v. Norcross, 9 Mass. 492 
(1813)). 
 170. File of Elizabeth Bemensderfer, R736, Roll 209, Letter from Edward P. Pearson to J.L. 
Edwards (Apr. 20, 1839). 
 171. File of Dorothea Cooper, NARA, Records of the Dep’t of Veterans’ Affairs, RG 15, Old 
Wars Pension Files, Widow’s File 272, Decl. of Daniel Robert (June 8, 1819) (emphasis added). 
 172. Id. 
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  In the absence of official records, the Pension Office demanded 
unofficial record evidence. Church registers, declarations from clergy, 
family bibles, and even hand-stitched “samplers” and illustrated 
keepsakes evidencing family history were all submitted to support 
claims of marriage, becoming part of the legal record.173 Many widows 
lacked even such unofficial record evidence, however, either because 
no such unofficial record had been made, or because it had been lost or 
was otherwise unavailable.174 In any case, although production of 
unofficial record evidence of a ceremony helped a widow’s claim, such 
evidence was decidedly second best as compared with official record 
evidence and was therefore subject to probing review. Pension clerks 
carefully scrutinized records from churches and declarations by 
ministers or other officiants. According to Mayo and Moulton, “A 
certificate from the clergyman or magistrate who solemnized the 
marriage is not competent evidence, unless the genuineness of the 
certificate be proved, and the person who gave it be shown to have 
been authorized to solemnize marriages.”175 
Angelica Bond’s experience confirms this practice. Angelica 
was married to Richard Bond by an itinerant preacher and thus had 
much explaining to do when she sought a pension under the Act of 
July 4, 1836.176 Her pension agent explained to the Pension Office that 
the minister who married the couple “was an itinerant preacher 
employed to preach for a length of time in that vicinity, but no regular 
church or society, was, or has since been formed from the 
Congregation to whom he preached; consequent[ly] no records are in 
existence.”177 Five years after she submitted her application, Angelica 
was dead and her claim was still pending.178 
 
 173. See Jennifer Davis Heaps, “Remember Me”: Six Samplers in the National Archives, 34 
PROLOGUE 52 (2002). Family events were also recorded in intricately illustrated booklets. 
Constance B. Schultz, Daughters of Liberty: The History of Women in the Revolutionary War 
Records, 16 PROLOGUE 142 (1984). 
 174. See, e.g., File of Catharine Baer, R364, Roll 106, Letter from J.M. Boughner to Pension 
Office (Nov. 24, 1849) (explaining that the applicant lacked a family record of the marriage and 
births of the children because the record was taken by a person purporting to be a pension 
agent); File of Sarah Knight, R6030, Roll 1502, Decl. of Sarah Knight (Feb. 18, 1847) (explaining 
that all of the family papers, including the family Bible, were destroyed in a fire). 
 175. MAYO & MOULTON, supra note 42, at 662 n.*; see also id. at 672 n*; File of Mary 
Burgharett, W21730, Roll 413, Letter from W[illiam] B. Pierce to Hon. J.L. Edwards (Feb. 13, 
1845); id., Letter from J.L. Edwards, Comm’r of Pensions, to W.B. Pierce (Nov. 22, 1844); File of 
Mary Bowers, W23646, Roll 302, Decl. of Mary Bowers (Aug. 13, 1838). 
 176. File of Angelica Bond, R997, Roll 284, Letter from G.F. Yates to J.L. Edwards, Comm’r 
of Pensions (Aug. 12, 1841); id., Decl. of Nancy Bond (Jan. 5, 1838). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id., Letter from G.F. Yates to J.L. Edwards, Comm’r of Pensions (Jan. 18, 1843). 
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This level of scrutiny was not reserved for church records. So 
discerning was the Pension Office’s review of family records, another 
form of unofficial record evidence, that pension clerks required 
production of the “original record,” which had to be “sworn to by the 
person in whose possession it has been kept.”179 William Archer’s 
experience is illustrative. On behalf of his mother, Jane Archer, 
William first submitted a transcription of a family Bible recording his 
parents’ marriage, declaring that the copy “from the said family record 
is a true copy.”180 That did not satisfy the Pension Office, so William 
then submitted the actual page from the family Bible, with a full 
explanation of its provenance:  
[T]he sheet or leaf of paper hereto annexed below and marked A at the head thereof 
is . . . part of the family record of Zachariah Archer, now deceased, and Jane Archer, his 
wife, that said leaf or sheet of paper was cut by this affiant out of the family Bible of the 
said Zachariah and Jane Archer on this day; that said Bible & Record is yet remaining 
in the possession of the remaining part of the family of the said Zachariah & Jane 
Archer of which this affiant is a member.181 
After production of a page torn from the family Bible, and certification 
of its origin, Jane Archer’s application was granted. 
Those widows who lacked either official or unofficial record 
evidence of their marriages were left to rely on the good word of the 
community to support their claims to marital status. But reputation 
evidence, a hallmark of legal marriage under the common law 
marriage doctrine, was by far the weakest form of evidence as far as 
the Pension Office was concerned. Certainly, administrative officials 
did not “presume marriage,” as was the tendency in courts of law.182 
Friends, family members, neighbors, and adult children filed 
declarations of their recollections of the couple’s reputed marital 
status, a ceremony, or other factual details relevant to the widow’s 
marital status, but the veracity of such declarations was constantly 
called into question. Simple statements as to the couple’s marital 
relationship or the woman’s status as a widow were not sufficient: “In 
no case,” Mayo and Moulton tell their readers, “will the mere 
statement of the witnesses, that the claimant is the widow of the 
deceased, be taken as evidence of the marriage; but the witnesses 
must state the facts and circumstances from which they derive their 
knowledge or opinion that she is the widow of the deceased.”183 
 
 179. TRIPLETT, supra note 43, at 35. 
 180. File of Jane Archer, W23462, Roll 72, Decl. of William B. Archer (Oct. 18, 1841). 
 181. Id., Decl. of William B. Archer (Nov. 11, 1841). 
 182. See supra Part II.A. 
 183. MAYO & MOULTON, supra note 42, at 662 n.*; see also id. at 672 n.*. 
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Moreover, all reputation evidence of marital status required at 
least two levels of official verification. First, the declarant had to 
obtain certification from a magistrate or judge, in which he testified as 
to the declarant’s identity and good standing in the community.184 In 
turn, a town or county clerk was required to add another certification 
confirming that, in fact, the magistrate was who he claimed to be.185 
Thus, layer upon layer of community testimony was required to vouch 
for each fact asserted. Even then, and despite the Office’s stated policy 
of accepting reputation evidence of marriage, the Pension Office 
frequently rejected such evidence as proof of marriage. An 1849 letter 
from Commissioner Edwards to Catharine Baer’s pension agent 
exemplifies the Pension Office’s stance toward reputation evidence: “If 
there be no Church, Parish, or Family register of the marriage, and 
there be a register of the births of the children made at or about the 
time of their births it should be produced. Proof of cohabitation as man 
and wife for fifty years back is not sufficient.”186 Sarah Knight’s 
experience corroborates this quasi-official policy of refusing to accept 
reputation evidence. According to no fewer than nine certified 
declarations submitted to the Pension Office, Sarah had been the wife 
of John Knight.187 Nevertheless, the Pension Office denied her 
application and she died pensionless after eight years of pursuing her 
claim.188 
Pension clerks’ skepticism of marriages proven by reputation 
evidence potentially affected all women, but it may have particularly 
 
 184. See, e.g., Regulations and Forms for Widows and Orphans’ Pensions, Under the Act of 
Feb. 3, 1853, reprinted in MAYO & MOULTON, supra note 42, at 757 (explaining that an applicant 
must make a declaration “before some magistrate in the county where the declarant resides . . . . 
The official character of the magistrate must be duly certified by the proper officer under his seal 
of office, and the magistrate . . . must certify that the declarant is personally known to him”). 
 185. See id.; see also Rules of Evidence in Widows’ and Orphans’ Claims, in PENSION LAWS 
NOW IN FORCE, H.R. DOC. NO. 25-118, at 103 (2d Sess. 1838) (requiring certification that person 
certifying declaration was, in fact, a judicial officer).  
 186. See File of Catharine Baer, R364, Roll 106, Letter from J.L. Edwards to J.M. Boughner 
(Oct. 27, 1849). 
 187. See File of Sarah Knight, R6030, Roll 1502, Decl. of F.P. Pennington (Sept. 9 1842); id., 
Decl. of Joseph Newton (Sept. 9, 1842); id., Decl. of William Crabtree (Sept. 9, 1842); id., Decl. of 
Jesse F[ox] (Oct. 5, 1842); id., Decl. of Jacob Oglesby, William Oglesby, and James Harkin[sen] 
(Dec. 25, 1845); id., Decl. of Jonathan Clark (Jan. 22, 1846); id., Decl. of Jacob Ogelsby, Elizabeth 
Fox, and John Knight (Feb. 18, 1847); id., Decl. of Lewis D. Scarlet (Aug. 14, 1849); id., Decl. of 
James Knight (Sept. 17, 1849). 
 188. Sarah Knight initiated her claim no later than 1842. Id., Decl. of Sarah Knight (Sept. 9, 
1842). The last notation in her application file is dated 1850. Id., Pet. of Sarah Knight (clerk’s 
notation dated 1850). In June of 1852, Jesse Fox, likely Sarah’s son-in-law, filed a power of 
attorney declaration in her case, thus suggesting that her heirs were pursuing payment of 
pension arrears. Id., Decl. of Jesse Fox and Elizabeth Fox (June 14, 1852). Accordingly, it 
appears that Sarah died between 1850 and 1852. 
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disadvantaged women who were less likely to have had the means to 
hold a ceremony or pay a registration fee. Elizabeth Barker’s 
experience serves as a case in point.189 She could provide no 
documentary evidence of her marriage “near the close of the 
Revolutionary War” to Edward Barker, a private in that war.190 In a 
letter to the Pension Office, her pension agent, John Stevens, 
complained at length about the Office’s demand for record proof of 
marriage and witnesses to events that had taken place at least fifty 
years earlier, in part because widows who sought the benefit of the 
pension laws generally came from society’s lower ranks: 
It is well known, in our struggle for a National Existence, the Ranks of Our Army was 
principally composed of men from the Humble walks of life, they more poor, without 
Education, but rich, with a noble and constant patriotism and love of Country. . . . [A]nd 
is it at all surprising, after the lapse of a half century, Mrs Barker should be unable to 
prove by living Witnesses, her marriage to Edward Barker.191 
Notwithstanding these appeals to the national conscience, and despite 
the fact that Elizabeth had provided two declarations reporting that 
she and her husband, Edward, “passed as man and wife, and always 
lived together as such,”192 her application for a pension under an 1848 
pension statute was denied. 
Administrative skepticism of reputation evidence may have 
also particularly disadvantaged the relatively few women of color who 
applied for military subsidies.193 Pursuant to Pension Office policy, 
African-American widows and other non-white widows were not 
barred from collecting military subsidies.194 However, it may have 
 
 189. File of Elizabeth Barker, R496, Roll 141, Letter from John W. Stevens to Pension Office 
(May 9, 1853). 
 190. Id., Decl. of Elizabeth Barker (May 23, 1848).  
 191. Id. 
 192. Id., Decl. of John Clark (May 23, 1848); see also id., Decl. of John Price (May 23, 1848).  
 193. I do not undertake a more extensive examination of the role of race in the widows’ 
military subsidy system in this Article, largely because of the very small number of African-
American widows’ subsidy applications in my randomly selected sample. Relatively few African-
Americans served in the military during this period, and therefore, given extant legal and 
cultural limitations on interracial marriage, relatively few widows of color seem to have applied 
for subsidies. See BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, at ix (1961) 
(estimating that 5000 black men served in the patriot forces). Lori Finklestein examines the 
rhetorical conventions of African-American Revolutionary War widows’ pension applications, 
finding a disproportionate emphasis on their work ethic as a basis for their worthiness. See 
Finklestein, supra note 22, ch. 5. As others have demonstrated, race played a central part in the 
creation and administration of Civil War pensions for the widows of Union soldiers in the 
“colored regiments.” See REGOSIN, supra note 22, ch. 3; Franke, supra note 22, at 268–90. 
 194. See, e.g., Letter from William Wirt, Att’y General, to Hon. J. C. Calhoun, Sec’y of War 
(Mar. 27, 1823), in PENSION LAWS NOW IN FORCE, H.R. DOC. NO. 25-118, at 38 (2d Sess. 1838) 
(“Negroes, if in military service, [are] entitled to gratuities as other soldiers.”); File of Dinah 
Blackman, W23627, Roll 254, Letter from J.C. Stuhuey to J.L. Edwards, Comm’r of Pensions 
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been particularly difficult for widows of color to secure testimony by 
“respectable” members of the community to support their claims. 
While the Pension Office does not appear to have excluded 
declarations submitted by non-whites, bias against testimony by 
persons of color may have weighed against African-American widows’ 
applications.195 
The pension application of Dorothea Cooper, the widow of 
William Cooper, a seaman killed in the War of 1812 while serving on 
the USS Constitution, suggests as much.196 According to a declaration 
filed in support of her pension application, Dorothea was a “mulatto 
woman” and William was an “Indian,” and both had worked for the 
Robert family of Brookhaven, New York.197 In a declaration submitted 
by Daniel Robert, the adult son of the Robert family, he explained that 
the couple had been married 
at a place called Poospatuck, an Indian Settlement or neighborhood about 2 miles from 
the house of deponent’s mother, by a person professing to be a minister of the gospel, 
who was a colored man or an Indian, . . . who was well known among the colored people 
and the Indians in Suffolk County by the appellation of Minister Paul.198 
Apparently, Dorothea could provide neither records of her marriage to 
William nor any declarations by eyewitnesses to the ceremony.199 
Robert Rupell, presumably a pension agent retained to help process 
her claim, assured the Department that no “great confidence could be 
placed in the affidavit of any person present at the marriage,” as 
“most of the persons present if not all were doubtless persons of color 
and very illiterate.”200 In the end, Cooper received her pension, but 
likely only because she was able to rely on the testimony of Daniel, by 
that time a lawyer in New York City, who declared that William and 
“the said Dorothea always passed for man and wife, and were always 
so considered by the family.”201 
Some of the widows who relied solely on testimony evidence to 
support their claims to marital status were eventually successful in 
 
(Oct. 3, 1839) (describing Blackman, a pensioned widow, as a “colored woman”); File of Barsheba 
Benson, R775, Roll 221, Decl. of Job Congdon (Oct. 25, 1844) (noting that “Charles and Barsheba 
his wife were both coloured persons”). 
 195. Cf. LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790–1860, 
at 93 (1965) (discussing bias against the testimony of African Americans in courts of law). 
 196. File of Dorothea Cooper, NARA, Records of the Dep’t of Veterans’ Affairs, RG 15, Old 
Wars Pension Files, Widow’s File 272. 
 197. Id., Decl. of Daniel Robert (June 8, 1819). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id., Letter from Rob[ert] M. Rupell to Hon. Smith Thompson, Sec’y of Navy (June 7, 
1819). 
 200. Id.  
 201. Id., Decl. of Daniel Robert (June 8, 1819). 
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obtaining the subsidy they sought, but the process was frequently a 
prolonged one and the outcome extremely uncertain. By insisting on 
official record evidence of marriage, and resisting community 
testimony as evidence of the legitimacy of women’s relationships, the 
Pension Office rejected the vision of legal marriage that dominated the 
courts—a vision that focused on the social facts of marriage.202 
Instead, the Pension Office embraced and implemented a top-down 
bureaucratic conception of marriage that has been identified as an 
early twentieth-century phenomenon.203 In so doing, the Pension 
Office alienated the very women for whom it was intended to provide. 
In the words of one pension agent: “This department then if it expects 
to exonerate itself from blame should show a more plausible reason for 
setting aside” reputation evidence provided by widows.204 
3. Widows, the President, and Congress 
The question, of course, is why were pension clerks so skeptical 
of widows’ assertions of marital status, especially if common law 
marriage was widely recognized in the courts? One possible answer is 
that the clerks were simply asking a different question, in two senses. 
First, one could argue that the pension clerks were not charged with 
determining widows’ marital status as a court of law might, but were 
simply evaluating evidence of marriage en route to a determination of 
a subsidy claim, and in that context were free to use more rigorous 
evidentiary standards. Second, one might reason that the technical 
standards of some of the military subsidy statutes required the 
pension clerks to be more demanding than the courts. As discussed 
above, certain statutes required the widow to prove that she was 
married as of a certain date, and therefore the Pension Office was 
justified in demanding record evidence in satisfaction of that 
requirement.205  
Although both of these explanations appear to have some force, 
upon closer analysis they fail to adequately explain the Pension 
Office’s resistance to women’s assertions of marital status, especially 
when considered in light of the responses of Congress and high-level 
officials to the Pension Office’s extremely cabined vision of marriage. 
As I show in this Section, the Pension Office struggled over the legal 
 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 105–24.  
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 120–22. 
 204. File of Elizabeth Anthony, W3914, Roll 68, Letter from A.A. Longg[e]s to J.L. Edwards, 
Comm’r of Pensions (July 15, 1845). 
 205. See sources cited supra note 56. 
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definition of marriage not only with widows and their agents, but also 
with Congress, which sought to require the Pension Office to use a 
more liberal definition of marriage. The Pension Office demurred, 
revealing a deep resistance to widows’ claims to marriage that cannot 
be fully attributed to technical or evidentiary requirements of the 
subsidy statutes.206 
Widows whose claims were denied by the Pension Office 
generally could not turn to the courts for assistance, but they could 
and did regularly turn to Congress to appeal the Pension Office’s 
decisions.207 In its capacity as an appellate adjudicator of pension 
claims, Congress frequently reversed the Pension Office’s denial of 
widows’ claims, employing a “liberal construction of the testimony” 
with regard to marriage.208 For example, the Pension Office denied 
Thankful Reynolds’s pension application because she had no record of 
her marriage, and because in declarations submitted in support of her 
claim she inadvertently gave two different dates for her marriage.209 
Commissioner Edwards took Reynolds’s inconsistency as an indication 
of her untrustworthiness, explaining to Congress that “the 
department is justified in distrusting any parol evidence produced by 
a claimant who by that evidence stultifies herself upon oath and 
contradicts witnesses previously relied upon.”210 But on appeal to 
Congress, the Senate Committee on Pensions rejected Edwards’s 
skeptical stance and his narrow reading of the pension statute. The 
Committee explained in plain terms that Reynolds had provided 
“ample evidence of a cohabitation between herself and her alleged 
husband, as man and wife, for a period of forty years or more.”211 In 
other words, she had satisfied the general definition of common law 
marriage. 
Reynolds’s experience was not exceptional. Susanna Rowe 
sought a pension under the Act of 1836, but was denied by the Pension 
Office when she could not provide record evidence of her marriage. In 
lieu of record evidence, she provided testimony by “nineteen citizens of 
the county of Harrison, all of whom are known to be respectable,” as 
 
 206.  Widows encountered difficulty proving marriage to the Pension Office even when the 
statute under which they sought a subsidy contained no date-of-marriage limitation. See, e.g., 
File of Susanna Angell, W1353, Roll 66; File of Rachel Anderson, W513, Roll 56. 
 207. See sources cited supra notes 151–53. 
 208. COMM. ON REVOLUTIONARY PENSIONS, MARY B. PERRY, AND OTHERS, H.R. REP. NO. 28-
331 (1st Sess. 1844). 
 209. COMM. ON PENSIONS, REPORT, S. REP. NO. 26-160 (2d Sess. 1841). 
 210. File of Thankful Reynolds, W11118, Roll 2026, Letter from J.L. Edwards to Hon. J.C. 
Bates (Dec. 28, 1841). 
 211. COMM. ON PENSIONS, REPORT, S. REP. NO. 26-160 (2d Sess. 1841). 
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well as a declaration by the Clerk of Harrison County testifying to the 
satisfactory nature of the evidence provided.212 The members of the 
House Committee on Revolutionary War Pensions were “unanimous in 
the opinion that the applicant is entitled to a pension.”213 Similarly, 
the Pension Office denied Elizabeth Hillsman’s application for a 
pension due to her inability to procure a marriage certificate, 
notwithstanding the declaration of a “highly respectable witness” 
regarding her marriage.214 Again, the Committee disagreed.215 Mary 
Updegraph—who declared herself “poor, without any property, 
helpless, and dependent on the charity of the neighborhood for 
support”—also sought a pension, but the Pension Office denied her 
application because she had “no family Bible or record of her 
marriage.”216 The Committee rejected the Pension Office’s 
determination and, based on testimony that Mary and Isaac 
Updegraph “lived together as man and wife, and [that] it was 
understood and believed they were married,” reported a bill in Mary’s 
favor.217 
One might reason that Congress’s decision to use a liberal 
standard in assessing individual widows’ appeals is of little 
significance. After all, legislators had the authority to depart from the 
evidentiary and statutory standards that bound the pension clerks. 
Although Congress sometimes did use its discretion to depart from the 
strict requirements of the subsidy statutes, in many cases Congress 
made clear that it was rejecting the Pension Office’s understanding of 
 
 212. COMM. ON REVOLUTIONARY PENSIONS, SUSANNAH ROWE, WIDOW OF JOHN ROWE, H.R. 
REP. NO. 25-713 (2d Sess. 1838). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See COMM. ON REVOLUTIONARY PENSIONS, REPORT, H.R. REP. NO. 27-913 (2d Sess. 1842) 
(referring to Richard Borum, who certified the validity of Elizabeth Hillsman’s marriage); see 
also File of Elizabeth Hillsman, W7854, Roll 1282, Decl. of Richard Borum (Feb. 4, 1840). 
 215. COMM. ON REVOLUTIONARY PENSIONS, REPORT, H. REP. NO. 27-913 (2d Sess. 1842). 
Interestingly, even after a successful appeal to Congress, Edwards insisted that Elizabeth 
procure a statement from the clerk of Amelia County, Virginia, regarding a record of her 
marriage, taking the step of requesting the evidence himself on a pre-printed War Department 
form designed specifically for that purpose. See File of Elizabeth Hillsman, W7854, Roll 1262, 
Letter from J.L. Edwards to the Clerk of Amelia County (Mar. 3, 1843). 
 216. COMM. ON REVOLUTIONARY PENSIONS, MARY UPDEGRAFF, H.R. REP. NO. 25-178 (3d Sess. 
1839). 
 217. Id.; see also, e.g., COMM. ON REVOLUTIONARY PENSIONS, TABITHA BOSWORTH, H.R. REP. 
NO. 24-132 (2d Sess. 1837) (reciting witness testimony as adequate evidence of marriage); COMM. 
ON PENSIONS, REPORT, S. DOC. NO. 26-337 (1st Sess. 1840) (relying on witness testimony as 
adequate evidence of widow Pamela Allen’s marriage); COMM. ON PENSIONS, REPORT, S. REP. NO. 
30-31 (1st Sess. 1848) (rejecting the Pension Commissioner’s determination, remarking that “the 
committee have examined the evidence with great care, and cannot resist the conclusion that the 
petitioner [Abigail Garland] was the lawful wife of said Jacob”). 
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what constituted a legal marriage.218 Moreover, and of even greater 
significance, efforts to clarify and liberalize the legal definition of 
marriage used by the Pension Office were not limited to claim-by-
claim review of widows’ military subsidy applications. Both the 
President’s office and Congress issued directives setting forth the 
standards to be used by pension clerks. Acting pursuant to the 1836 
Act,219 in 1838, 1840, 1846, and 1849, the President prescribed rules of 
evidence to be used in widows’ pension claims: “The legality of the 
marriage may be ascertained by the certificate of the clergyman who 
joined them in wedlock, or the testimony of respectable persons having 
knowledge of the fact.”220 Despite these directions to allow use of 
reputation evidence as proof of marriage, widows struggled to obtain 
recognition by the Pension Office. 
In 1846, following on “great complaints that applicants had 
been unjustly kept out of pensions by the fact that evidence clearly 
unreasonable and unjustified by law was required,”221 Congress 
responded by enacting a statute directing the Office to use a more 
liberal standard for assessing widows’ marital status and other 
required evidence.222 The House debate leading to a vote on the 1846 
statute is revealing. As an initial matter, it demonstrates that 
members of Congress were well aware of the problems facing widows 
seeking military subsidies. Prior to the debate, Representative McKay, 
Chairman of the House Committee of Ways and Means, solicited a 
 
 218. Some committee reports make clear that the legislators believed the Pension Office to 
have erred in refusing to credit the widow’s evidence of marriage, as in the claims of widows 
Rowe, Hillsman, Updegraff, and Garland, see sources cited supra notes 212 (Rowe), 214 
(Hillsman), 216 (Updegraff), 217 (Garland), while others make clear that the legislators were 
granting a pension despite the applicant’s failure to perfectly satisfy the statutory requirements, 
see, e.g., COMM. ON PENSIONS, REPORT, S. REP. NO. 30-28 (1st Sess. 1848) (awarding pension 
denied by Commissioner due to “sufficiently strong” evidence of widow Elizabeth Pistole’s 
marriage even though evidence did not perfectly comply with requirements); COMM. ON 
REVOLUTIONARY PENSIONS, HANNAH ELDRIDGE, H.R. REP. NO. 24-124 (2d Sess. 1837) 
(acknowledging widow did not fit within exact language of the statute, but finding her entitled to 
a pension). 
 219. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 362, § 5, 5 Stat. 127, 128. 
 220. Rules of Evidence in Widows’ and Orphans’ Claims, in PENSION LAWS NOW IN FORCE, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 25-118, at 102 (2d Sess. 1838); Rules of Evidence in Widows and Orphans’ Claims, 
in PENSION LAWS NOW IN FORCE, H.R. DOC. NO. 26-126, at 101 (1st Sess. 1840); Rules of 
Evidence in Widows and Orphans’ Claims, in PENSION LAWS NOW IN FORCE, H.R. DOC. NO. 29-
95, at 139 (1st Sess. 1846); Rules of Evidence in Widows’ and Orphans’ Claims, in PENSION LAWS 
NOW IN FORCE, S. Doc. 30-54, at 48 (2d Sess. 1849). 
 221. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 385 (1846) (statement of Rep. Tibbatts). 
Congressmen were concerned about both the Pension Office’s requirement that the widow 
produce “evidence of [her deceased husband’s] service notwithstanding the department has the 
evidence in file” and its requirement that she “produce record of the marriage.” See id. 
 222. See Act of May 7, 1846, ch. 13, § 2, 9 Stat. 5, 6. 
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letter from Commissioner Edwards to explain exactly how the Pension 
Office evaluated widows’ claims.223 In his letter, Edwards assured the 
legislators that “we do not require any proof of the fact of marriage, 
more than a court of justice would deem necessary,” but then defended 
the Pension Office’s rigid approach on the grounds that some widows’ 
military pension statutes required that the widow be married as of a 
certain date.224 
But the majority of the legislators disagreed with the 
Commissioner. They rejected his contention that the Pension Office’s 
approach to widows’ marital status conformed to the standards used 
by courts.225 And, as important, they found the Pension Office’s 
approach to marital status to be inconsistent with their own 
understandings of what constituted marriage.226 At least one 
particularly outraged representative, Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, 
complained that the Pension Office’s treatment of widows generally 
was “wrong in spirit, wrong in substance, and wrong from beginning 
to end.”227 Other legislators were more measured in their criticism of 
Commissioner Edwards’s approach to widows’ claims, but they 
nevertheless lamented his narrow construction of the law of 
marriage.228 Their sustained debate concerning Pension Office 
procedures and the standard used by courts to evaluate the lawfulness 
of marriage—going so far as to consult a well-known evidence treatise 
during the floor debates—suggests that the legislators recognized that 
the statutory rights they created for widows were only as good as the 
administrative system that implemented them.229 
Explicitly rejecting the Pension Office’s defense of its narrow 
bureaucratic approach to marriage, Congress enacted a statute 
directing that widows be required to provide “such proof as would be 
sufficient to establish the marriage between the applicant and the 
 
 223. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 384 (1846) (statement of Rep. McKay). 
 224. Id. (reprinting letter from J.L. Edwards to Rep. McKay). 
 225. Id. (statement of Rep. Jones):  
It was not the law that record evidence was required in courts of justice, unless it be 
proved to the court that there is record evidence. Record evidence was the higher 
evidence; then the evidence of persons present at the marriage; then evidence by 
reputation–to wit: that the parties had been living together as man and wife. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. (statement of Rep. Hamlin). 
 228. See, e.g., id. at 385 (statement of Rep. Adams) (describing Commissioner Edwards as an 
“admirable officer,” but objecting to the evidentiary burdens imposed on widows by the Pension 
Office). 
 229. See id. at 386 (statement of Rep. Jenkins) (consulting 2 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AND DIGEST OF PROCESS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS (London, 1824)). 
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deceased pensioner in civil personal actions in a court of justice.”230 
The 1846 Act provided a clear message: the Pension Office should 
comply with the governing legal standards articulated by courts, 
including courts’ recognition of common law marriage, in order to 
effectuate Congress’s efforts to provide for these women. And, indeed, 
the Attorney General understood this to be the case. In a formal 
opinion issued in June of 1846, Attorney General John Mayson 
advised Secretary of War Marcy that 
The 2d section of the act of May 7, 1846, was intended to facilitate applications of 
widows to pensions founded on their marital relations, by operating on the proof 
required. . . . General reputation and cohabitation are, in general, sufficient evidence of 
marriage; but as this is only presumptive, it may be rebutted by countervailing 
testimony. The law should be construed liberally and favorably towards applicants.231  
Accordingly, he continued, the 1846 Act explicitly barred the Pension 
Office from requiring widows to provide record evidence: 
The general rule is “that in all civil personal actions . . . general reputation and 
cohabitation are sufficient evidence of marriage” . . . . Under this section [of the 1846 
Act], therefore, to establish the relation of widow, proof of a marriage in fact cannot be 
required—that is, by witnesses present at the ceremony, or by official records: general 
reputation and cohabitation are sufficient, prima facie. . . . [T]he proof ought to be 
considered in the spirit in which this law has been passed, of liberality to the 
applicant.232 
Despite these directions from the President, Congress, and the 
Attorney General—all designed to bring the Pension Office in line 
with judicial definitions of marriage—the Pension Office continued to 
block widows’ subsidy applications by demanding record evidence of 
marriage, and remained suspicious of reputation evidence. In 1850 the 
Acting Secretary of the Department of the Interior had to remind 
Commissioner Edwards once again that “[t]he continuous cohabitation 
of the parties as man and wife for so many years, and the birth of so 
many children, consecutively acknowledged and treated as legitimate, 
being prov[ed], the marriage might well be presumed, aside from the 
direct affidavit of [the widow] herself.”233 
Even then, however, the Pension Office continued to insist on 
record evidence and required widows to provide an official accounting 
of the absence of such evidence. Thus, following his immediate 
 
 230. Act of May 7, 1846, ch. 13, § 2, 9 Stat. 5, 6. 
 231. 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 496, 496–97 (1846). 
 232. Id. at 498–99. 
 233. Letter from D.C. Goddard, Acting Sec’y of the Dep’t of the Interior, to James L. 
Edwards, Comm’r of Pensions (Sept. 13, 1850), quoted in MAYO & MOULTON, supra note 42, at 
581, 582. By 1850, the Pension Office was housed in the Department of the Interior. See supra 
note 129. Thus, Goddard was Edwards’s direct superior when he wrote this letter. 
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predecessor’s model carefully, in 1850 newly appointed Pension 
Commissioner James Heath issued “Circular No. 3,” which pension 
clerks were to send to “claimant(s) or agent(s),” providing the following 
guidance regarding proof of marriage: 
[A] copy of the public or private record of her marriage . . . with a certificate of its 
correctness, and of the genuineness of the original. If there is no such record of this 
event, she must furnish an affidavit to that effect, and adduce the positive testimony of 
persons certified to be credible and disinterested, fully proving it. If the marriage is 
proved by the person who solemnized it, his authority to act in the premises must be 
produced. Parol testimony of the marriage of the parties will not be considered till the 
absence of record proof of the fact is accounted for. In all cases where the testimony is 
taken before a magistrate, his official character must be certified by the clerk of the 
proper court, under seal.234 
The Pension Office remained set in its ways with respect to the 
definition and proof of marriage. Bureaucratic resistance to widows’ 
claims was chronic, and mandates from on high seem to have had 
little impact on the Office’s practices. Instead, the Pension Office 
engaged in bureaucratic disentitlement, using procedural hurdles to 
delay or deny widows’ claims in a manner that ran directly counter to 
congressional intent. Susanna Angell’s pension agent suggested as 
much in a letter to the Pension Office in which he specifically invoked 
the 1846 statute, reminding the Pension Office that “by the 2[nd]  
Section of the act of May 7, 1846 relative to the proof of marriage of 
widows to deceased pensioners, such evidence of marriage is required 
as would be satisfactory in a Court of Justice.”235 By requiring 
significantly more of widows, the agent argued, the Office had 
“repudiated” Congress’s will.236 
C. Bureaucracy, Ideology, and Marriage Law 
We return, then, to the question of why the pension clerks 
consistently “repudiated,” on a broad scale, both the reigning 
definition of legal marriage and Congress’s specific will with respect to 
the administrative adjudication of widows’ marital status. Perhaps the 
most obvious answer is that the Pension Office was charged with 
protecting government assets and sought to restrict allocation of those 
assets by using a narrow definition of marriage, which would 
minimize the number of women who were subsidy eligible. This is an 
 
 234. Circular No. 3, Widow’s Claim Suspended, and this Circular Sent to Claimant or Agent, 
on Account of Defective Evidence, reprinted in MAYO & MOULTON, supra note 42, at 676. 
 235. File of Susanna Angell, W1353, Roll 66, Letter from Ben[jamin] Cowell to Hon. L.P. 
Waldo (Aug. 13, 1853). 
 236. Id. 
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important part of the answer, but it is too simple an account to 
capture the complicated ideological, political, and institutional 
pressures that shaped the administration of widows’ military 
subsidies. 
As an initial matter, when one considers why the Pension 
Office imposed and implemented a limited and bureaucratized 
definition of marriage, it is important to account for the deeply 
ingrained norms concerning women’s marital dependency that 
simultaneously informed and were challenged by the creation of 
marriage-based entitlements. The administrative system that 
developed to facilitate the distribution of widows’ military subsidies 
did not develop in an ideological vacuum. Rather, it existed in a world, 
described above, in which social provision for women on the basis of 
marriage marked a departure from the longstanding view that 
marriage was a source of private, rather than public, support for 
women.237 Due to the highly stylized nature of widows’ military 
subsidy applications, and the often formulaic nature of the pension 
clerks’ correspondence with widows and their agents, the applications 
themselves rarely betray the clerks’ or Commissioner Edwards’s 
reasoning about the propriety of public subsidies for widows. 
Nevertheless, the Pension Office’s resistance to widows’ claims of 
marital status was certainly consistent with a normative conception of 
marriage that located the material well-being of family dependents, 
including widows, as the responsibility of the private family—a vision 
that led at least some national legislators to contest the propriety of a 
broad-scale system of widows’ subsidies.238 
Against this ideological backdrop, one can better understand 
how the complex political economy of military subsidies functioned to 
narrow the Pension Office’s operating definition of marriage. On the 
one hand, the President and Congress directed the Pension Office to 
accept reputation evidence of marital status. Congress also repeatedly 
expanded the class of widows who were to receive pensions and 
frequently reversed the Pension Office’s individual determinations 
when the Office refused to recognize women’s claims to widowhood.239 
An opinion by the Attorney General’s Office also directed the Pension 
Office to employ a broader conception of marriage.240 One would think 
that such direct pressure from above would have led the Pension 
 
 237. See supra Part II.A. 
 238. See discussion of legislative resistance to widows’ military subsidies supra Part II.C. 
 239. See supra Part I.A and text accompanying notes 208–18. 
 240. See 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 496 (1846). 
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Office to be more generous toward the women who sought the benefit 
of the subsidy statutes, notwithstanding the novel nature of a public 
marriage-based entitlement. 
But the Pension Office’s predicament was not so 
straightforward. As is common today, as the front-line officials in 
charge of distributing public funds, administrators in the Pension 
Office operated under conflicting pressures from Congress. Although 
Congress wanted to bring significant numbers of worthy widows into 
the military subsidy system, it also wanted to protect the government 
coffers against both meritless and fraudulent claims. At least two 
significant fraud crises had shaken the military subsidy system by the 
mid-1830s.241 The first, in 1818, had led to the dismissal of the head of 
the Office for misfeasance and the appointment of James Edwards, 
first as Chief Clerk and then, in 1833, as Commissioner.242 Allegations 
of widespread fraud also drove Congress to take significant oversight 
measures. Hearings regarding the Pension Office’s operation were not 
unusual, and as of 1835, Congress required comprehensive annual 
reports from the Office and additional reports as to issues as mundane 
as staffing.243 
From the perspective of Commissioner Edwards, originally 
tapped to run the Office in the wake of a fraud scandal, and the 
individual clerks, these two considerations—liberal provision of 
subsidies to widows and efficient and accurate sorting of claims—were 
not likely to have been equally weighted. While a widow could appeal 
an adverse determination to Congress and, if she was fortunate, 
receive the benefit of Congress’s munificence, the Pension Office’s use 
of a liberal standard would have arguably swollen the pension rolls 
and exposed the Office to charges of mismanagement of government 
funds and potentially even more onerous oversight by Congress. In 
this micro-institutional context, it is far less surprising that Edwards 
would create eligibility criteria most likely to protect the federal 
coffers, and least likely to imperil the Office’s institutional standing. 
 
 241. See RESCH, supra note 22, at 124–25 (discussing veterans’ pension scandals); sources 
cited supra note 130. 
 242. See RESCH, supra note 22, at 124–25. 
 243. See, e.g., REPORT FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR IN OBEDIENCE TO RESOLUTIONS OF THE 
SENATE OF THE 5TH AND 30TH OF JUNE, 1834, AND THE 3D OF MARCH, 1835, IN RELATION TO THE 
PENSION ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. 23-514 (1st Sess. 1835); LETTER FROM 
THE SECRETARY OF WAR, TRANSMITTING A LIST OF THE NAMES OF THE CLERKS EMPLOYED IN THE 
DEPARTMENT OF WAR DURING THE YEAR 1830, AND THE COMPENSATION OF EACH, H.R. DOC. NO. 
21-45, at 1 (2d Sess. 1830) (reporting of clerks in War Department pursuant to Act of Apr. 20, 
1818). This kind of congressional oversight was not unusual during the period. Mashaw 
discusses a similar trend with respect to the Land Office in the 1830s. See Mashaw, 
Administration, supra note 125, at 1668–69. 
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And, in fact, Edwards’s 1846 letter to Congress concerning the 
Pension Office’s standards clearly indicates that Edwards himself 
erred on the side of excluding widows’ claims.244 It is also little 
surprise that the pension clerks—appointees who worked under 
Edwards’s “immediate direction” and whose livelihoods depended on 
his continuing approval245—adopted the decisional path that limited 
the government’s liability for women’s material support.246 
The generous and flexible definition of marriage used by judges 
was also contrary to the bureaucratic culture of the Pension Office. 
Although it was among the first federal administrative agencies, by 
the time it was statutorily authorized in 1833, the Pension Office had 
already become a complex bureaucracy of the sort described by the 
great early twentieth-century sociologist Max Weber: a hierarchically 
organized office that undertook specialized administrative functions 
and rendered decisions pursuant to rigidly formulated rules. Pension 
clerks were archetypal bureaucrats. It appears that they had little 
discretion and were directly accountable to their immediate 
supervisor, Edwards. Moreover, although the pension clerks made 
individual eligibility determinations, the sheer volume of claims they 
handled necessitated that they make those determinations according 
to “calculable rules [discharged] without regard for persons.”247 
Pension clerks were not just legal officials with an institutional 
incentive to cabin the government’s obligation to absorb the costs 
associated with women’s dependency. They were also rule-bound 
 
 244. See supra text accompanying notes 221–29. 
 245. LEWIS CASS, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, H.R. DOC. NO. 22-2, at 31 (2d Sess. 
1832); see also supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 246. It is interesting to speculate whether the pension clerks’ decisions on widows’ subsidy 
claims were influenced by pressure created by patronage politics and the rotation system. Under 
this theory, the pension clerks were pressured into deciding pension claims in a certain way due 
to the threat of dismissal that often loomed in a system in which civil servant positions were 
controlled by the party in power. That theory is at the core of Theda Skocpol’s explanation for the 
expansion of the Civil War pension system in the late nineteenth century. See SKOCPOL, supra 
note 16, at 120–30. Upon closer inspection, however, the political patronage theory holds little 
explanatory power for the phenomenon I describe here. First, Skocpol seeks to explain why 
pension administrators were more liberal in the award of pensions. She reasons that pension 
administrators were under pressure from legislators, who sought to secure electoral support by 
securing pensions for constituents through intervention in the administrative process. Id. By 
contrast, I describe administrative resistance to Congress’s efforts to liberalize the widows’ 
pension system. Moreover, and just as important, although the rotation system and patronage 
politics began to take shape in the 1830s, see CRENSON, supra note 125, at 48–71; Mashaw, 
Administration, supra note 125, at 1613–28, as I explain above, Commissioner Edwards seems to 
have been insulated from the rotation system. See discussion supra note 145. 
 247. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 975 
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968) (1922). Weber considered “calculable rules” to be the 
most important element of modern bureaucracy. See id. 
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bureaucrats whose discretion was circumscribed by internal 
department memoranda, circulars, and the direct oversight of the 
Pension Commissioner.248 
The bureaucratic restraints on pension clerks’ adjudicative 
powers come into relief when contrasted with the institutional 
decisionmaking conditions of common law judges, who tended to 
decide legal claims pursuant to precedent rather than rules.249 
Perhaps more so than today, judges in the nineteenth century were 
empowered by their office and the common law method. They could 
and did use their office to shape the contours of legal marriage in a 
manner that gave deference to the sanctity of private contracting and 
secured for women what little material security marriage had to 
offer.250 Implicit in this account is that the common law judge had the 
authority to employ a definition of marriage that was broad and 
highly discretionary. Certainly, judicial decisionmaking was limited 
by all manner of official and unofficial constraints: precedent, 
appellate oversight, and institutional and cultural values. But the 
hierarchical power structure of judicial systems was (and is) relatively 
weak in contrast with that of bureaucratic organizations.251 
Unlike a common law judicial system in which decisionmaking 
is based on precedent and analogical reasoning, the strict rule-based 
approach to marriage used by the Pension Office—the privileging of 
record evidence that conformed with the Office’s particular 
standards—presumably allowed for efficient resolution of military 
subsidy claims and also protected the pension clerks from charges of 
irresponsible management of public funds or, worse, complicity with 
fraud.252 As Jerry Mashaw has observed, “Administrators . . . shrink 
from unconstrained discretion in themselves and fear the centrifugal 
 
 248. See sources cited supra notes 148–49, 157 and 220. 
 249. Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s own account of common law adjudication suggests a similar 
vision of common law methodology—one in which analogy, historical development of the law, 
justice, morals, mores, and social welfare would all play a part in the decision making process. 
See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9 (1921) (discussing common 
law adjudication and the evolution of precedent). 
 250. See supra Part II.A. 
 251.  It is little wonder that, in his study of legal bureaucracy, Weber explicitly excluded 
English and American courts from his description of bureaucracy precisely because common law 
judges rendered judgments not according to rules, but “by depending upon and interpreting 
concrete ‘precedents,’ ” exercising what he called “empirical justice.” See WEBER, supra note 247, 
at 976; see also Owen Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1444 
(1983) (describing the judicial system as relatively non-bureaucratic). 
 252. The rule-based approach to the legal definition of marriage may have been particularly 
suited to a federal administrative setting in which the pension clerks lacked the benefit of 
judicial process where legal theory and evidence are subject to the adversarial process and 
witnesses are subject to credibility determinations. 
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effects of discretion in subordinates. If for no other reason than self-
protection, they often seek to establish guidelines for their own 
discretionary judgments.”253 The institutional conditions under which 
pension clerks worked—a hierarchically organized office charged with 
the individualized adjudication of thousands of claims—discouraged 
discretion by the individual clerk, while the ideological norms, fiscal 
pressures, and political economy of the Commissioner’s position led 
him to mandate a narrow, bureaucratic definition of marriage. 
As I explain in greater detail below, despite the very different 
legal definitions of marriage that emerged in the judicial and 
administrative contexts, and the disparate financial incentives and 
institutional conditions that shaped judges’ and clerks’ adjudicative 
practices, their determinations regarding marital status were 
consistent in one important regard: both effectively limited the 
public’s liability for what was traditionally a private liability. Thus, 
although they were doctrinally distinctive, the liberal definition of 
marriage employed by the courts and the narrow definition of 
marriage used by the Pension Office both reaffirmed the core liberal 
vision of the private family as the proper source of women’s support. 
III. INSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM 
Women’s experiences navigating the military subsidy system 
provide a very different view of the legal construction of marriage—
how intimate heterosexual relationships were marked as legitimate by 
the state—than is generally associated with the early nineteenth 
century. According to the traditional story of common law marriage in 
that period, most courts were solicitous of women’s claims to marital 
status, as epitomized by James Kent’s 1809 opinion recognizing 
common law marriage.254 This story is by no means wrong, and it 
accounts for extremely important and influential statements of the 
law of marriage at the time. However, if, as Christopher Tomlins has 
argued, law is generated in part through “professional juridical 
(official) discourse and the institutional locales in which it is 
spoken,”255 then we need to account for the multiple locales from 
which such discourse emanated at any given moment. The 
administrative processes that were used to decide widows’ military 
 
 253. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists, supra note 125, at 1685. 
 254. Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52, 52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1809) (per curiam); see also supra text 
accompanying note 108. 
 255. Christopher Tomlins, Subordination, Authority, Law: Subjects in Labor History, 47 
INT’L LAB. & WORKING CLASS HIST. 56, 67 (1995). 
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subsidy claims introduced new procedures and players into the mix. 
Judges, the elite legal officials in most accounts of nineteenth-century 
law, receded to the margins, and a different set of legal actors 
appeared. Congress was surely involved—as master of the statutory 
subsidy scheme, as appellate adjudicator of claims brought under 
those statutes, and as a fairly weak overseer of the administrative 
processes used to evaluate widows’ claims. The Attorney General’s 
Office routinely opined on the proper construction of the military 
subsidy statutes. The President even played a part, both in the 
legislative process and in the promulgation of evidentiary rules. And a 
new legal actor emerged: the pension clerk authorized to adjudicate 
individual claims against the government. 
Now, one way to understand the pension clerks’ resistance to 
the reigning judicial definition of marriage is that the pension clerks 
were simply wrong-headed with respect to the legal definition of 
marriage at the time. By this account, whatever its causes, the 
Pension Office’s bureaucratic conception of marriage was a departure 
from the authoritative standard—“the law,” or the “law in the 
books”—and represented a failure of implementation.256 From this 
perspective, the Pension Office’s narrow definition of marriage was no 
more than a context-specific phenomenon with little significance to the 
legal history of the regulation of marriage. 
But such an explanation errs in at least two respects. First, it 
minimizes the important ways in which administrators not only 
enforced legal principles as propounded by judges and lawmakers, but 
also generated law in their front-line interactions with citizens.257 In 
other words, the Pension Office’s rule-based approach to marital 
status and effective repudiation of the broad definition of marriage 
used by judges was an example not of bureaucracy’s tension with law, 
but of bureaucracy’s force in shaping law. As I argue in this Part, the 
Pension Office’s definition of marriage should not be understood as 
 
 256. Cf. Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 899, 924, 934–35 (1985) 
(arguing that “gap analysis” fails to adequately explain the differences between “law-in-action” 
and “law-in-the-books”). In addition to its theoretical limitations, any defense of the proposition 
that a judicial definition of marriage represented “the law” of marriage would need to account for 
the fact that judicial embrace of common law marriage sometimes entailed resistance to efforts 
by legislators and municipal officials to define marriage differently. From the perspective of 
legislators, then, it would appear that the judicial standard constituted a departure from “the 
law.” Cf. GROSSBERG, supra note 10, at 87–100 (discussing judicial resistance to legislatures’ 
efforts to formalize and standardize the legal definition of marriage). 
 257. Cf. Barbara Yngvesson, Making Law at the Doorway: The Clerk, the Court, and the 
Construction of Community in a New England Town, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 409, 410 (1988) 
(examining how “exchanges between [court] clerk and citizens produce legal and moral 
frameworks”). 
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aberrant, but as constituting an alternative, state-centered vision of 
marriage, one that was doctrinally in tension with, but, in important 
respects, functionally and ideologically consistent with, the judicial 
construction of legal marriage. Second, an explanation that portrays 
the pension clerks’ bureaucratic vision of marriage as simply wrong 
also obfuscates the hitherto unexamined pluralism in nineteenth-
century marriage law—a pluralism that was generated, in part, by 
pressures created by the administration of the first broad-scale system 
of marriage-based entitlements. 
A. Administering and Constituting Marriage Law 
How did the Pension Office’s adjudication of marital status 
help constitute the legal status of marriage? As scholars of law and 
society have long insisted, law informs social knowledge and 
influences behavior in myriad ways. Most dramatically, the law wields 
its authority through violence (or the threat of violence), the use of 
which is often subject to judicial approval.258 But law also shapes 
knowledge and behavior. It gives legal meaning to everyday 
interactions and relationships by rewarding certain behaviors with 
social, political, or material goods. It labels certain practices and 
values as conventional and others as antisocial, and, on a fundamental 
level, it provides a vocabulary through which everyday practices can 
be imagined and discussed in legal terms.259 Hence, the law’s power 
derives in part from its capacity to shape the way people articulate 
claims concerning the most rudimentary aspects of their lives, 
including claims based on marriage.260 And it exerts such power in the 
context of multiple legal and nonlegal interactions, including the 
routine administrative procedures that often remain invisible 
precisely because we tend to look for “the law” in judicial opinions. 
 
 258. As Robert Cover famously observed, “Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain 
and death. . . . Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others: 
A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his 
property, his children, even his life.” Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 
1601 (1986). 
 259. For a very good summary of constitutive theories of law, see Sarat & Kearns, supra note 
31, at 27–32; see also Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Conformity, Contestation, and 
Resistance: An Account of Legal Consciousness, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 731, 732, 736–43 (1992) 
(“We do not see the law as something outside of social life, acting on or being acted upon; rather 
we are attempting to find the threads of law and legality within the tapestry of ordinary lives 
and everyday events.”). 
 260. This theory of law’s power is traceable to social theorist Antonio Gramsci’s theory of 
ideology. See ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 375–77 (Quintin 
Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., trans., International Publishers 1971). 
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In the early nineteenth century, both courts and the Pension 
Office provided institutional frameworks in which women crafted and 
articulated claims for the legality of their marriages. But in each 
institutional setting, widows were prompted to conceive of their 
marital relationships in different ways.261 If a widow asserted her 
legal status as a wife or widow in a court of law, evidence of the 
community’s recognition of the couple’s marital relationship, and the 
pair’s conformity with the social practices and gender roles generally 
associated with marriage, were readily accepted as evidence of a legal 
marriage.262 In this scenario, the state responded to and legitimized 
the claims of women who sought legal recognition of the “social facts of 
their relationship,” as acknowledged by the community.263 Katharine 
Silbaugh has described this as a bottom-up, or “polycentric,” marriage 
regime, one in which the state recognizes and legitimizes the 
community’s social practice of marriage.264 
By contrast, in the context of seeking military subsidies, 
women were given material incentive to craft their claims to marital 
legitimacy in a significantly different manner. Certainly, widows 
called on their neighbors to testify to their marriages, but under the 
Pension Office’s standards, the community’s recognition of a couple’s 
marriage lost much of its legal salience.265 Over such community-
based indicia of marriage, the Pension Office privileged official 
licensing and recording processes and the couple’s conformity with 
those processes. The difference may appear evidentiary rather than 
substantive. But that distinction is inaccurate for two reasons. First, 
dismissing the distinction between how administrators and judges 
 
 261. For a wonderfully rich discussion of nineteenth-century women’s consciousness of their 
rights as married women as legal rights, see Hendrik Hartog, Mrs. Packard on Dependency, 1 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79 (1988). 
 262. See Dubler, Wifely Behavior, supra note 10, at 968 (“Courts . . . could grant a couple 
marital status if they had cohabited like a married couple, if they had held themselves out to 
their community as married, and if their community had accepted them as such.”). By 
foregrounding a legally recognizable definition of law, I do not mean to suggest that when 
imagining what it meant to be married, an individual in the nineteenth century might not have 
first and foremost described his or her relationship as one that was sanctioned by church, God, 
and community. 
 263. Katharine B. Silbaugh, The Practice of Marriage, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 189, 195 (2005); 
see supra text accompanying note 8. 
 264. See Silbaugh, supra note 263, at 194: 
During this time, the marriage name and symbol were known to be social as well as 
legal judgments, and the authority over the label was polycentric: when a couple used 
the term “marriage” to describe themselves to others, consistently, and lived together 
in a social practice thought of culturally as marriage, that marriage became a legal 
fact. 
 265. See supra Part II.B. 
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evaluated the legality of a marriage as simply evidentiary 
misconceives the centrality of evidence law to the doctrine of common 
law marriage generally.266 Second, such a distinction fails to 
acknowledge that the law exerts its influence in part by shaping the 
way people make claims about the legal significance of their everyday 
lives and practices. The Pension Office’s insistence on official record 
evidence of marriage pushed women to describe their marriages in 
terms that privileged official license over community recognition. By 
seeking recognition of their status as wives and widows in the terms 
dictated by the Pension Office, these women reinforced a state-
centered construction of marriage, even as they resisted that 
construction in their applications. This, in turn, helped shape how 
marriage was understood as a legal status and as a source of legal 
rights. 
It is, of course, impossible to ascertain with precision how the 
experiences of tens of thousands of women seeking subsidies might 
have shaped a collective or even individual understanding of what 
constituted legal marriage. It is worth recalling, however, that the 
phenomenon of women applying for military subsidies was by no 
means unusual or unknown, and as a formal legal process it may very 
well have been at least as common as private law litigation in which a 
woman was required to prove her marital status in order to prevail on 
a claim for, say, dower or inheritance. Thousands of copies of 
commercial military subsidy guides were sold for the benefit of 
pension agents, local officials, and the would-be pensioners 
themselves, and those guides described the standards actually used by 
the Pension Office to determine the legality of a marriage.267 When a 
new widows’ pension statute was enacted, widows and pension claims 
agents promptly wrote to the Pension Office and Congress seeking 
information about the statute and the administrative process for 
obtaining a subsidy.268 In the process of seeking out eligible widows 
 
 266. See Dubler, Wifely Behavior, supra note 10, at 970: 
A court within a common law marriage jurisdiction still had to adjudicate in each 
specific case whether the particular plaintiff before it deserved recognition as a party 
to a valid common law marriage. In this respect, evidence law took its place next to 
contract law as a critical piece of the doctrine. 
 267. In 1854, three commercial guides appeared on the market: Mayo and Moulton’s 900-
plus-page volume, Triplett’s slimmer but less comprehensive 270-page guide, and a 500-plus-
page volume by C.W. Bennett. See C.W. BENNETT, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS OF 
CONGRESS RELATIVE TO PENSIONS, BOUNTY LANDS, ETC. (Wash., D.C., Holman, Gray & Co. 1854); 
MAYO & MOULTON, supra note 42; TRIPLETT, supra note 43. 
 268. Letter from Geo[rge] J. Curtis to N. Moulder (Nov. 4, 1836), NARA, Records of the 
Accounting Officers of the Dep’t of the Treasury, RG 217, Records of the Office of the Second 
Comptroller, Army Pension Div., Entry No. 202 (pension claims agent “requesting the favor of a 
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and working with individual women to develop their applications, 
pension claims agents necessarily conveyed information to widows 
regarding how to establish the legality of a marriage, including the 
central importance of record evidence. Throughout the administrative 
ordeal of proving their marital status, women enlisted the help of all 
manner of people, including town officials, family members, neighbors, 
old acquaintances, and ministers.269 Surely the difficulty of 
establishing the legal status of their marriages, and the Pension 
Office’s skepticism of reputation evidence, was not unknown to these 
participants in the process. Through these various channels, news of 
the Pension Office’s bureaucratic definition of marriage—experienced 
by tens of thousands of women directly and likely shared with tens of 
thousands of others—narrowed the socio-legal conception of what 
constituted a marriage in the early nineteenth century. 
B. Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century Marriage Law 
By arguing that the bureaucratic conception of marriage 
generated by the administrative processes of the Pension Office 
informed the socio-legal construction of marriage, I do not contend 
that this vision of marriage replaced the generous conception of 
marriage prevalent in the courts. But I do urge that we account for 
marriage law’s implicit and explicit pluralism as it functioned as a 
source of, and limitation on, women’s rights, privileges, and 
obligations. At the most basic level, the concept of legal pluralism 
refers to a “situation in which two or more legal systems coexist in the 
same social field.”270 At a deeper level, the theory of legal pluralism 
challenges what Harry Arthurs has termed “legal centralism,”271 the 
notion that law could (or should) be adequately accounted for by 
attention to the legal decisions and purportedly neutral principles 
 
Circular . . . by the Department in relation to the Act of Congress of 4th July 1836” and noting 
that “it will be of service to many aged persons in this neighborhood”); cf. CONG. GLOBE, 29th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 284 (1846) (statement of Rep. Hopkins) (“It was known that every member of the 
House had constituents constantly writing for information in relation to these pension laws.”). 
 269. See supra Part II.B. 
 270. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 870 (1988). Legal 
pluralism is often associated with studies of the relationship between colonial and indigenous 
forms of law and ordering, and is also identified with social and legal ordering in international 
law and federated legal regimes. Id. at 869. However, the concept of legal pluralism has a long 
history, and found a happy intellectual home in legal realism, and a more recent roost in the law-
and-society movement. Id.; see also Robert W. Gordon, Without the Law II, 24 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 421, 429–30 (1986) (reviewing H.W. ARTHURS, “WITHOUT THE LAW”: ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUSTICE AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1985)). 
 271. ARTHURS, supra note 270, at 2. 
1B. Collins_PAGE 6/15/2009 12:33:42 PM 
2009] ADMINISTERING MARRIAGE 1157 
emanating from the state, and particularly courts.272 Thus, as applied 
to administrative law, legal pluralism rejects the notion that decisions 
and principles of administrative agencies are simply enforcement tools 
that can or should be brought within a singular or “central” legal order 
governed by judges.273 
From this perspective, the question posed by Theophilus 
Parsons in 1853—“What constitutes a legal marriage?”—admitted of 
no singular answer. It was the generous vision of marriage used by 
the courts that favored couples’ private contracts, as captured in the 
maxim semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It was the polycentric 
notion of marriage that privileged the community’s understanding of 
the practices of marriage. It was also, however, the rigid, legalistic 
vision of marriage that turned to the (often nonexistent) official record 
to distinguish between those intimate heterosexual relationships that 
merited recognition under the law and those that did not. Contrary to 
claims today that marriage has had an enduring socio-legal form, 
marriage law of the early nineteenth century was informed by 
multiple sources of legal authority emanating from different 
institutional contexts. 
Such pluralism in the legal definition of marriage should not be 
confused with the modern understanding of pluralism as a source of 
liberation.274 In modern debates over same-sex marriage, for example, 
legal pluralism has been described as a phenomenon with liberatory 
potential, especially in the family law context. Thus, Amy Wax 
describes the concept of pluralism as “the notion that individuals are 
free to choose how to construct their ‘family of choice.’ ”275 Similarly, 
Katherine Franke has evaluated the possibility that legal pluralism 
could be useful to “those who seek the expansion of sexual liberty 
through the vehicle of same-sex marriage.”276 But regardless of the 
emancipatory potential of pluralism, the plural marriage law regimes 
 
 272. Gordon, supra note 270, at 421. 
 273. See ARTHURS, supra note 270, at 132, 164. 
 274. For a discussion of this pluralist tradition, see Gordon, supra note 270, at 429 
(describing the “political Pluralists,” such as Harold Laski and F.W. Maitland, as being 
“concerned with vindicating, against the intensifying power of a centralizing state on the one 
hand and of an atomizing individualism on the other, the claims to self-government of 
associations . . . and to enlarge the opportunities for people to realize their political and spiritual 
goals through participation in such groups”). 
 275. Amy L. Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 
377, 380–81 (2007). 
 276. Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2690 (2008). 
Franke ultimately declares her “pessimis[m] about the utility that legal pluralism scholarship 
can bring to the project of rescuing sexual liberty from the vice of liberal same-sex marriage 
arguments.” Id. at 2692.  
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of the early nineteenth century did not provide “choice” to individuals; 
rather, these multiple regimes enhanced the power of the state to 
control the institution of marriage. Differing institutional incentives 
generated conflicting legal standards for the individual women who 
sought the benefits of marriage’s protection and, viewed systemically, 
gave the state latitude to manipulate the contours of legal marriage. 
In saying as much, I do not suggest that the law is simply an 
imposed ordering mechanism that individuals play no role in creating. 
To the contrary, as Barbara Yngvesson has observed, law “is neither 
‘from above’ nor ‘from below’ but simultaneously separate and 
immanent, imposed and participatory.”277 As discussed above, women 
were themselves participants in the creation of marriage as a legal 
status. But their role was a heavily scripted one, drafted largely by 
various legal officials—agents, lawyers, clerks, judges—who pressed 
women to articulate their claims to marital status in particular ways. 
Individual women both complied with and resisted these scripts. 
Whether in court or in administrative processes, some women were 
able to negotiate the various available definitions of marriage, making 
best use of the facts of their particular circumstances to avail 
themselves of whatever private or public law benefits a legal finding of 
marriage offered. In the context of military subsidies in particular, 
widows, or agents acting on their behalf, routinely objected to the 
Pension Office’s definition of marriage and treatment of widows.278 
The widows sought intervention by their senators and representatives, 
and they formally appealed denials by the Pension Office by 
petitioning Congress.279 Such resistance sometimes paid off, as when 
widows were fortunate enough to appeal successfully to Congress. 
Nevertheless, it would be a mischaracterization to suggest that 
the pluralism I am describing in early nineteenth-century marriage 
law facilitated women’s legal self-determination in any robust sense. 
This was a legal pluralism created by the very different political, 
institutional, and fiscal pressures that informed the private law of 
marriage implemented by judges, on the one hand, and public law 
marriage-based entitlements administered through a bureaucracy, on 
the other. It was a pluralism that was consistent with, if not animated 
by, a deep ideological commitment to the ideal of a self-sustaining 
family unit, and a parallel suspicion of government “charity” 
generally. And, ultimately, it was a pluralism that gave legal officials, 
 
 277. Yngvesson, supra note 257, at 412. 
 278. See supra Part II.B.2–3. 
 279. See supra text accompanying notes 208–18. 
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not women, the ability to provide different answers to the question of 
“what constitutes a marriage,” thereby enabling the state to better 
control marriage as a legal status and, with sensitivity to the 
particular institutional context and fiscal incentives, to insulate the 
polity from women’s financial needs. 
C. Administering Marriage in the Late Nineteenth  
and Early Twentieth Centuries 
Looking beyond the early nineteenth century, the pluralism 
that characterized American marriage law in the context of allocating 
liability for women’s dependency continued as a fundamental tension 
for many decades. Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, marriage-based entitlements became a commonplace 
feature of the various redistributive programs that formed the 
patchwork of American social welfare policy. Thus, even as marriage 
law continued to assign liability for married women’s support to 
husbands, thereby protecting the polity from women’s dependency, 
marriage increasingly served as a means for redistributing public 
assets in the form of marriage-based entitlements: Civil War widows’ 
pensions, workmen’s compensation for widows, and Social Security 
benefits for wives and widows. Although a full assessment of the 
treatment of marriage in the administration of such programs is 
beyond the scope of this Article, even a brief examination 
demonstrates that marriage-based entitlements have tended to 
generate the same question: What constitutes a marriage? And 
because common law marriage was recognized in many states until 
the early twentieth century, arguably unruly (and un-rule-like) judge-
created definitions of marriage continued to complicate the 
administration of marriage-based entitlements. 
Beginning in 1862, Congress enacted pension statutes for the 
benefit of traditional war widows of the Civil War.280 And then, in 
 
 280. See Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, § 2, 12 Stat. 566, 567 (granting pensions to widows of 
veterans who died after March 4, 1861, as a result of injuries or illness suffered “while in the 
service of the United States”). Notes in Pension Office ledgers reveal that, in fact, the Pension 
Office began awarding pensions to Civil War widows prior to congressional enactment of specific 
Civil War pension statutes. See Regulations, Decisions, &c., Concerning the Payment of Pensions, 
with Forms, Provisions of Statute Law, &c., &c., Appertaining to the Business, Generally, of the 
Pension Branch of the Second Comptroller’s Office (1862), NARA, Records of the Accounting 
Officers of the Dep’t of the Treasury, RG 217, Records of the Office of the Second Comptroller 
Army Pension Div., Entry No. 203, vol. 1, index (noting that pensions for the “Present War for 
suppression of the Rebellion . . . payment authorized out of the appropriations under 1st section 
of Act of July 4, 1836; July 21, 1848; 1st Sec. Act Feb. 3d, 1853; and Act of June 3d, 1853 
(Decision of the Sec’y of Interior)”). 
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1890, following the pattern established by the creation of service-
based pensions for the aging widows of veterans of the Revolutionary 
War and the War of 1812, Congress created service-based pensions for 
the surviving widows of Civil War veterans.281 The legal construction 
of marriage in the administration of these statutes was a significant 
issue for legislators and administrators. As Elizabeth Regosin has 
shown, during the late nineteenth century, Congress worked to 
expand the reach of the Civil War pension system, especially to 
include recently emancipated African-American widows who had been 
unable to marry legally prior to emancipation.282 By employing a 
broad definition of marriage and by pushing former slaves to ratify 
their familial relationships through formal processes, Congress, the 
Freedmen’s Bureau, and the Pension Office helped to secure for all 
women the rights and benefits of citizenship, while also bringing them 
within the normatively appropriate bounds of a marital 
relationship.283 
Certainly this is an important part of the story, but recent 
scholarship suggests that women’s experience navigating the Civil 
War pension system was no more straightforward than that of their 
pre-Civil War forebears. Although it is true that the Pension Office, in 
conjunction with Freedmen’s Bureau officials, sometimes recognized 
nonformalized coupling, as in the pre-Civil War period, administrators 
preferred record evidence, thus calling into question a generous 
understanding of marriage and of widows’ claims on the polity. As 
Diana Williams has demonstrated, “When Freedmen’s Bureau and 
Army Officials left [the South], they took with them both the 
administrative ledgers in which they had recorded ex-slave marriages 
[conducted by the Bureau], and the political will to regard such 
ledgers as documenting legal events.”284 Thus, “federal officials’ 
 
 281. Act of June 27, 1890, ch. 634, § 3, 26 Stat. 182, 182–83. In 1871, Congress created 
service-based pensions for the aging widows of War of 1812 veterans. Act of Feb. 14, 1871, ch. 50, 
16 Stat. 411. 
 282. See REGOSIN, supra note 22, at 83–85 (discussing statutory amendments to the Civil 
War pension laws that allowed widows of “colored soldiers” who lived in states where slave 
marriages had been illegal to prove marriage by evidence of cohabitation as husband and wife); 
Franke, supra note 22, at 268 (same). 
 283. See REGOSIN, supra note 22, at 85 (noting that “white society sought to transform slaves 
into citizens by imposing the traditional marriage relationship”); Franke, supra note 22, at 289–
90 (“The Freedmen’s Bureau, working in tandem with local law enforcement authorities, 
undertook an aggressive campaign to force freed men and women to comply with the 
requirements of local marriage laws.”) 
 284. Diana Williams, “Proof of the Due and Formal Celebration”: What the Widows’ Pension 
Claims of Women of Color Can Tell Us About Changing Legal and Social Norms of Marriage 
Following the Civil War (Oct. 5, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Vanderbilt Law 
Review). 
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increasingly positivistic approach to marriage law marked an official 
end to their previous support of black women’s civil identities and 
status entitlements as wives.”285 
World War I gave bloody birth to a new generation of war 
widows, and Congress once again provided widows’ pensions.286 By 
this time, opposition to common law marriage was fully organized and 
mobilized by marriage moralists and eugenicists who wanted the state 
to draw a clear line between marriage and non-marriage, between licit 
and illicit relationships.287 Partially as a result of the success of the 
anti-common law marriage campaign, mandatory licensing and 
registration schemes were much more prevalent by the early 
twentieth century.288 But administrators charged with the task of 
implementing the military pension system continued to struggle with 
and against informal marriage. In fact, informal marriage remained a 
significant enough socio-legal phenomenon in 1919 to warrant the 
Treasury Department’s publication of the Digest of the Law Relating 
to Common Law Marriage, a volume that was necessary, according to 
its ghostwriter Otto Koegel, “for use in connection with hundreds of 
[military pension] claims founded on alleged common law 
marriages.”289 
Koegel, then a young lawyer in the Veterans’ Bureau, became a 
vocal and prolific opponent of common law marriage, authoring 
several articles and an often-cited treatise explaining why common 
law marriage was equivalent to “living in adultery.”290 Koegel’s 
strident opposition to common law marriage was undoubtedly 
informed by his experience at the Veterans’ Bureau—which he once 
 
 285. Id. 
 286. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 105, § 301, 40 Stat. 398, 405.  
 287. See GROSSBERG, supra note 10, at 77–78 (emphasizing marriage moralists’ and social 
scientists’ roles in the demise of common law marriage); Matthew J. Lindsay, Reproducing a Fit 
Citizenry: Dependency, Eugenics, and the Law of Marriage in the United States, 1860–1920, 23 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 541, 554–59 (1998) (discussing the formation and tenets of the marriage 
reform campaign). 
 288. See Bowman, supra note 110, at 731–54 (describing the movement to abolish common 
law marriage and the simultaneous increase in mandatory marriage licensing and registration 
schemes). 
 289. OTTO E. KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 8 (1922) (citing U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BUREAU OF WAR RISK INS., DIGEST OF THE LAW 
RELATING TO COMMON LAW MARRIAGE IN THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND DEPENDENCIES OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1919)). 
 290. Otto E. Koegel, Common Law Marriage and Its Development in the United States, in 
SECOND INT’L CONGRESS OF EUGENICS, EUGENICS IN RACE AND STATE 252, 252 (1921). Based on 
his experience in the Veteran’s Bureau, Koegel was convinced that common law marriages were 
largely “meretricious relationships,” and that “very few, if any, of these persons really believe 
they are married.” Id. at 260. In 1922, he elaborated his analysis of common law marriage into a 
freestanding treatise. KOEGEL, supra note 289. 
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called “the largest court of domestic relations in the world”291—and 
was knit neatly with his eugenicist beliefs.292 Eugenicists typically 
sought greater government control over marriage, particularly with 
respect to interracial marriage and marriage involving “imbeciles,” 
and hence they generally opposed common law marriage.293 For 
Koegel, the administrative complications caused by common law 
marriage in the context of administering marriage-based entitlements, 
and the ideological imperative that the state control marriage, led him 
to insist upon a singular, state-centered conception of marriage.294 
The administrative and ideological resistance to informal 
marriage continued as the trappings of the modern welfare state 
emerged, including marriage-based entitlements for wives and widows 
in the workmen’s compensation statutes of the 1910s and the Social 
Security Act of 1939.295 Government officials (this time, lawyers for 
the Social Security Board) once again wrestled with how to manage 
the untidiness of marriage in the context of the administration of a 
modern system of social provision.296 
Gradually, however, the disparity between judicial and 
administrative constructions of legal marriage began to disappear, 
and the bureaucratic, state-centered vision gained hold as the 
dominant understanding of marriage. Under pressure from different 
but complementary sources—agitation by marriage moralists and 
eugenicists who campaigned against common law marriage in the late 
 
 291. Koegel, supra note 290, at 259. 
 292. Koegel was a member of the Central Committee on Hereditary Defects of the Second 
International Congress of Eugenics and, while still working in the Veterans’ Bureau, published 
an article in the proceedings of the Second International Congress of Eugenics arguing that 
common law marriage should be abolished because it allows “defectives” to “simply declare 
themselves married.” Id. at 261 (quoting an uncited committee report). 
 293. See Lindsay, supra note 287, at 571–80 (discussing eugenic marriage laws and citing 
examples from several states). 
 294. A New York Times reporter writing in 1920 proposed a very different solution to the 
question of “[w]hen is a widow not a widow?” At the end of story detailing the administrative 
difficulties military widows faced proving marital status, the Times reporter suggested that 
“What is needed is action by Congress modifying the existing law in some such way so as to 
grant recognition of widowhood in all cases where the widow and the old soldier have lived 
together as man and wife for a specified number of years.” Rene Bache, Widows of Our Wars, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1920, at 8.  
 295. See, e.g., Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360, 1364–65 
(extending Social Security benefits to wives and widows); 1910 N.Y. Laws 1948–49, § 219-a; see 
also WITT, supra note 69, at 132–33 (discussing the history of workmen’s compensation for 
widows of workers killed in work accidents); Kessler-Harris, supra note 17 (discussing the 
history of the Social Security Amendments of 1939). 
 296. See, e.g., Thomas Clifford Billig & James Phillip Lynch, Common Law Marriage in 
Minnesota: A Problem in Social Security, 22 MINN. L. REV. 177 (1938); James P. Lynch, Social 
Security Encounters Common-Law Marriage in North Carolina, 16 N.C. L. REV. 255 (1938). 
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nineteenth century, changing conceptions of femininity, and 
administration of an expanding range of public marriage-based 
entitlements—judges in the majority of states gradually abandoned 
the expansive vision of marriage that grounded the common law 
marriage doctrine.297 
IV. CONCLUSION: SOCIAL PROVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, AND THE 
MODERN FAMILY 
The story of early nineteenth-century widows’ military 
subsidies provides a window into a world of women’s lived experience 
of the law that, until now, has remained an unexplored aspect of 
American legal history. At the most basic level, widows’ military 
subsidies tell a story about the development of marriage as a basis for 
women’s public law claims on the polity for material support. That 
development ushered in a legal role for marriage as a source of broad-
scale systematic public entitlements, opening up a new dimension in 
women’s relationship with the polity. In the hands of early nineteenth-
century administrators, this development in marriage’s significance 
also shaped the legal contours of marriage itself, giving rise to a 
narrow, bureaucratic vision of marriage in an era that is known for 
the generous legal definition of marriage used by judges. Widows’ 
military subsidy claims thus demonstrate marriage’s plural and 
protean nature in the early nineteenth century and highlight the ways 
that different legal officials transformed the legal definition of 
marriage in response to ideological, institutional, and fiscal pressures 
and norms. 
Although this legal history cannot resolve modern debates 
concerning the proper role of marriage in redistributive social policy, it 
does shed critical light on modern dilemmas concerning the 
relationship between social welfare policy and the legally recognized 
family. First and foremost, the experiences of women seeking early 
nineteenth-century military subsidies reveal that the use of marriage 
as a conduit for social provision is a longstanding and central feature 
of American social policy. It is a feature that continues today. Despite 
persistent criticism of government assistance for “unwed” mothers, the 
 
 297. For fuller discussions of the various causes of the demise of common law marriage, see 
GROSSBERG, supra note 10, at 90–95 (emphasizing marriage moralists’ and social scientists’ role 
in the demise of common law marriage); Bowman, supra note 110, at 731–54 (discussing the 
roles of racism, the eugenics movement, and administration of large-scale benefits programs in 
the decline of common law marriage); Dubler, Wifely Behavior, supra note 10, at 996–1003 
(discussing the relationship between changing conceptions of femininity and the demise of 
common law marriage). 
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federal government redistributes far more money to women by way of 
marriage-based entitlements such as Social Security than through 
need-based “welfare.”298 The emphasis on women as recipients of 
marriage-based entitlements is apt. Notwithstanding their formal 
gender neutrality, marriage-based entitlements in the United States 
remain gender salient: ninety-eight percent of all recipients of Social 
Security survivors’ benefits are women, and over forty percent of all 
women who receive Social Security benefits receive them as wives 
rather than as workers.299 Thus, while marriage is indeed a 
“mechanism through which we can avoid assuming collective (or state-
assumed) responsibility for dependent members of our society,”300 it is 
also a major conduit for government assistance for women as familial 
dependents.  
Once we call attention to the legally recognized family’s dual 
function in the context of public redistributive programs, we can begin 
to theorize the mutually constitutive relationship between welfare 
policy and family law with greater sensitivity to the protean and 
plural qualities of the legal family. Although marriage per se takes a 
fairly singular form today, the state continues to rely on the pluralism 
of the legally recognized family when confronted with women’s 
financial needs. On the one hand, a host of scholars have 
demonstrated how, in the context of need-based social provision, legal 
officials tend to invoke broad conceptions of legally recognized family 
affiliations (both marital and non-marital) in order to protect the 
polity from women’s claims to financial need. For example, efforts to 
locate women’s dependency within the private family have 
precipitated “man in the house” rules,301 the much-discussed marriage 
 
 298. See sources cited supra note 15. One might quarrel with the implicit characterization of 
Social Security as a redistributive program, contending instead that Social Security benefits are 
an earned right or annuity. But even if one takes this position with respect to benefits paid to 
workers, Social Security benefits paid to spouses and children are difficult to characterize as 
anything other than redistributive, as they are paid to families of married workers without any 
additional contribution by the worker. To take the traditional scenario, married men do not pay 
greater Social Security contributions than unmarried men, but their wives are eligible to receive 
Social Security benefits additional to those paid to the husband. See COTT, supra note 25,  
at 177–78. 
 299. See sources cited supra note 13. 
 300. Martha A. Fineman, Roundtable: Opportunities for and Limitations of Private Ordering 
in Family Law, 73 IND. L.J. 535, 541–42 (1998). Of course, critics of the use of marriage as a 
substitute for social provision also recognize that “[m]arriage plays a significant role in the 
delivery of social goods from the state to individuals” in the form of “benefits and subsidies.” 
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 105, 106–07 
(2004).  
 301. “Man in the house” rules, common in the 1950s and 1960s, allowed welfare officials to 
count the income of non-marital cohabitants as substitute husbands for the determination of 
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promotion policies that are now part of federal welfare law,302 and 
broad legal recognition of marriage-like relationships in private 
law303—all in an effort to shift the burden of support onto a male 
“breadwinner.”  
By contrast, in the course of allocating marriage-based 
entitlements, the state tends to gravitate toward a narrower, more 
legalistic definition of marriage—also, in part, to limit the polity’s 
liability for women’s support. For example, the Social Security Act 
crafts a narrow definition of “spouse” and imposes other eligibility 
restrictions so as to ensure that only certain “wives” and “widows” 
receive benefits. Thus, widows who were themselves wage earners, 
equal to or greater than their husbands, rather than stay-at-home 
caregivers, do not benefit from spousal entitlements and are in certain 
respects penalized for pursuing a nontraditional role.304 For many 
 
welfare eligibility, or to drop women and children from welfare rolls altogether, if they discovered 
a “man in the house.” See William E. Forbath, Lincoln, the Declaration, and the “Grisly, Undying 
Corpse of States’ Rights”: History, Memory, and Imagination in the Constitution of a Southern 
Liberal, 92 GEO. L.J. 709, 764–67 (2004); Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the 
Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963). “Man in the house” rules were declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1968 and 1970. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 559 
(1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 321–27 (1968). But there is evidence to suggest that they, 
along with their generous conception of the legally cognizable familial obligations, are 
reemerging in local welfare laws and policies. See Sanchez v. San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 919, 931 
(2006) (upholding a California statute that explicitly allows home visits by welfare workers to 
confirm that “an ‘absent’ parent does not live in the residence”). 
 302. For example, the stated purposes of the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
program provide, in part, to “end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by 
promoting . . . marriage; prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and 
establish annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; 
and encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.” Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Welfare Reform Act), 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) 
(2006).  
 303. In the context of private law disputes between unmarried couples, following the 
watershed case Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), over the last twenty years courts 
have broadened recognition of marriage-like relationships, imposing post-relationship support 
obligations on one member of the couple (usually the man in a heterosexual relationship) in favor 
of the member of the couple who had assumed a caregiver role at the expense of income-
generating employment. Such broadening of legally recognized familial status acknowledges the 
financial reliance interests that frequently develop along with affective bonds, but as Grace 
Blumberg has observed, it also helps to limit public liability for family dependents. See 
Blumberg, supra note 6, at 1270. 
 304. See Meyer, supra note 33, at 462 (“Indeed, the stratifying effects of noncontributory 
benefits undermine the otherwise redistributive characteristics of the Social Security system. . . . 
They are most beneficial to women who never work and who maintain lengthy marriages.”); see 
also Marilyn R. Flowers, Supplemental Benefits for Spouses Under Social Security: A Public 
Choice Explanation of the Law, 17 ECON. INQUIRY 125, 125 (1979) (“Individuals who qualify both 
for retired worker benefits and for supplementary spouse benefits are in the position of receiving 
total retirement benefits under the program which are no greater than would have been granted 
had they never been employed and paid social security taxes.”); Karen C. Holden, Supplemental 
OASI Benefits to Homemakers Through Current Spouse Benefits, a Homemaker Credit, and 
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years, divorced women were not eligible for any form of spousal 
benefit under the Social Security Act, regardless of how long they were 
married and regardless of what led to the divorce.305 Today, some 
women who are divorced from their husbands are provided for, but 
only if they remain unmarried following divorce and the marriage 
lasted at least ten years, a provision that is strictly enforced to the day 
by the Social Security Administration.306 In this way, the state limits 
its responsibility to provide for women’s dependency through marriage 
by allocating spousal benefits to those wives who assume a relatively 
traditional homemaker role and remain in that traditional marital 
relationship. 
An even more dramatic example of how the state uses marriage 
to limit the allocation of marriage-based entitlements is evident in the 
ongoing battles over the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage 
generally and, specifically, from access to social provision that is 
distributed on the basis of marriage. Gay activists’ charges that 
heterosexual-only marriage effectively excludes same-sex couples from 
a whole host of public entitlements were starkly reinforced and 
confirmed by the enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996. 
That federal statute mandates that the term “marriage”—as it 
appears in all federal statutes or “any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of 
the United States”—refers to heterosexual couples only, thereby 
ensuring that federal marriage-based entitlements such as Social 
Security are not allocated to a same-sex spouse.307 
Of course, resistance to marriage or marriage-like relationships 
for same-sex couples is not primarily driven by a desire to minimize 
the state’s fiscal obligations to the families of same-sex couples.308 
Clearly, various ideological objections to homosexuality itself are the 
 
Child-Care Drop-Out Years, in A CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL SECURITY: THE CHANGING ROLES OF 
WOMEN AND MEN IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 41, 51, 58–59 (Richard V. Burkhauser & Karen C. 
Holden eds., 1982) (stating that “one- and two-earner couples with identical combined retired-
worker benefits are treated differently, with the former more likely to receive a supplemental 
spouse benefit”); Madonna Harrington Meyer, Family Status and Poverty Among Older Women: 
The Gendered Distribution of Retirement Income in the United States, 37 SOC. PROBS. 551, 553–
59 (1990) (finding that under the U.S. Social Security system “couples are rewarded for 
maintaining a traditional family structure”). 
 305. Grace Ganz Blumberg, Adult Derivative Benefits in Social Security, 32 STAN. L. REV. 
233, 257 (1980) (“The 1939 amendments did not include any provision for divorced wives.”). 
 306. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(d) (2006); George v. Sullivan, 909 F.2d 857, 861–62 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(denying Social Security benefits to an ex-wife because the duration of the marriage was six days 
short of the ten-year requirement).  
 307. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
 308. See Cossman, supra note 6, at 482–83. 
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source of the continuing exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage 
in most U.S. jurisdictions, and such objections similarly animate the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from the bounty of federal and state 
marriage-based entitlements.309 Nevertheless, the exclusion of same-
sex couples from marriage and marriage-based entitlements is a 
particularly charged example of how such entitlements have become 
part and parcel of the social meaning of marriage itself, and how the 
government limits the legal definition of marriage to control access to 
those entitlements. Thus, just as we should be attuned to the ways 
that a broad conception of the legally recognized family is employed in 
an effort to attach women to a male breadwinner, thereby limiting the 
state’s fiscal responsibility for certain women’s dependency, we should 
also be attentive to the ways that the state has reinforced marriage’s 
exclusionary characteristics when allocating marriage-based 
entitlements. 
Now, one might reason that by using marriage as a basis for 
entitlements, the state has simply selected a preexisting status— 
marriage—as a conduit for redistribution. But one benefit of taking a 
long, historically informed view of the relationship between marriage 
and welfare policy is that we can see how the legal contours of the 
family are responsive to multiple fiscal, institutional, and ideological 
pressures. In the context of both need-based welfare and marriage-
based entitlements, the relationship between the legal institution of 
marriage and social provision is dynamic. The state has not simply 
employed a preexisting notion of the legal “family” or “marriage” as a 
basis for allocating marriage-based entitlements or for limiting need-
based welfare. Instead, acting through all manner of officials, the 
state has shaped the metes and bounds of marriage and the family at 
least in part in response to the pressure created by different legal 
liability rules and systems of social provision. And it has done so while 
preserving and sustaining the image of marriage’s transhistorical and 
enduring stability.  
 
 309. For recent evidence of the mounting efforts to exclude same-sex couples from public and 
private entitlements frequently associated with marriage, see National Pride at Work v. 
Michigan, 481 Mich. 56, 86–87 (2008) (finding that Michigan’s constitutional ban on same-sex 
marriage also prohibits public employers from providing health insurance benefits to the same-
sex domestic partners of covered employees). 
